Amnesty International's Harsh Report on Anti-Picketing Protocol: "Dissent at Risk"

Amnesty International (AI) presented a report on Thursday in which it denounced the "disproportionate" use of force by the government of Javier Milei in response to the demonstrations. According to the organization, the federal security forces followed a repressive pattern based on the "anti-picket protocol" promoted by Minister Patricia Bullrich.

What Amnesty International's report says

According to AI, the report on the repression of social protest yielded alarming figures: during 15 demonstrations, 1,155 people were injured, many of them seriously injured. Of these, 33 were hit in the head or face by rubber bullets, which caused severe damage to their vision. In addition, 50 journalists were injured while covering the protests.

In total, 73 people were "criminalized" for participating in the demonstrations. The report details that documented repressive practices include the abusive use of tear gas, rubber bullets, water trucks, batons and batons, and arbitrary detentions. "In emblematic cases, children were even affected by repressive violence," the organization's text said.

Paola García Rey, deputy director of Amnesty International, explained that the report reveals a clear restriction on the exercise of freedom of expression "in the streets" and a "shrinking of civic space."

Regarding the data that support the report, García Rey pointed out that the organization resorted to various methodologies, such as requests for access to public information from the national state, which were in many cases "denied by the Ministry of Security of the Nation."

 30 testimonies of victims who suffered the disproportionate use of force. We also survey images because, now, social networks enable much more dissemination," he explained.

In this sense, he stressed the importance of making violence visible, assuring that "giving an account of the situation of alarm in the face of violence" seeks to highlight how force is used to restrict dissent and "silence voices". Amnesty's representative in Argentina also stressed that, although the country "has a very active use of the street," this does not justify the government's repressive response.

"Without a doubt, Argentina has a very active use of the street and, surely, it was necessary to have a robust debate on the channeling of popular demands to the Government. But the answer can never be fear as a way to inhibit expression and violence as a strategy to achieve it," he said.

Meanwhile, the organization considers that the repression of protests not only infringes fundamental rights, but also generates an inhibitory effect on citizen participation and the exercise of democracy.

Recommendations to the national government

By way of conclusion, the report concludes with a series of recommendations to Milei's government. "Amnesty International urges the Argentine government to adopt concrete measures that guarantee respect for human rights in the context of social protests," the text emphasizes.

Among these measures, the repeal of the anti-picketing protocol  stands out, a regulation that, according to the organization, "not only violates fundamental human rights, but also contributes to the criminalization of those who demonstrate." In addition, they urge the implementation of police regulations and trainings that align with international standards on the right to peaceful assembly and the use of force.

"The use of force by the authorities must be framed by principles of proportionality and respect for human rights," the report concludes

Police

Investigation into the suspicious death of a federal judge who intervened in a case linked to Los Monos

This is Pablo Seró, who was in charge of the case of the kidnapping of businessman Gastón Tallone. Prosecutor María Occhi is considering the hypothesis of suicide, but there is still a need for expert reports to be carried out

The Entre Ríos Police are investigating the suspicious death of Federal Judge Pablo Andrés Seró, who died this morning when he fell from the terrace of a building in the city of Concepción del Uruguay. He is the magistrate who intervened in the case of the kidnapping and disappearance of businessman Gastón Tallone, linked to the drug gang Los Monos.

According to local media reports, the tragic event occurred after 10 a.m. on Thursday in the Antares building, located at 600 General Galarza Street, right at the intersection with Eva Duarte de Perón.

Sources from the provincial Ministry of Security consulted by Infobae explained that, so far, the main and only hypothesis being considered by the team of prosecutor María Occhi, who was on duty at the time of the event, is that of death by self-determination. However, the results of the experts will be awaited to confirm the circumstances in which the Seró fell into the void.

According to what this media was able to find out, his mother currently resides in the building from where Seró fell, who was not at home at the time of the event.

Seró, 55, head of the Federal Court of Concepción del Uruguay, died on the spot as a result of the serious injuries he suffered after falling into the void.

One of the heaviest cases being handled in his court was that of the kidnapping of Tallone. For that case, Gustavo Juliá, who served a 13-year prison sentence for drug trafficking in Spain, had been arrested ten days ago. He is the son of Brigadier José Juliá, head of the Argentine Air Force during the presidency of Carlos Saúl Menem

The kidnapping of the port businessman from Entre Ríos occurred in Almagro, but it has connections with his work in that area and with the Los Monos gang. Juliá Jr. owns one of the cars that executed the criminal maneuver.

The kidnapping would have been, as suspected, for a debt of 500,000 dollars with that organized crime group.

According to documents in the case accessed by Infobae, lawyer José Uriburu, linked to Los Monos, would have made the first extortion call to Tallone's family to claim that money: "Good night cumpa, the thing is short. The thief is here with us and he's fine. Or they return the drugs and the 500 thousand dollars that he stole and everything ends and he comes back, he stole from all the narcos and now it's time to pay. If you beat the cane, we will go down and go for all of you and your helpers. You don't with the mafia," he reportedly said.

The clarification of the case is in charge of prosecutors Josefina Minata and Santiago Marquevich, of the Specialized Prosecutorial Unit in Organized Crime. The Federal Court of Concepción del Uruguay had prosecuted the lawyer Uriburu and an alleged deliverer of the businessman.

Who was Judge Pablo Seró

Born on May 23, 1969 in the town of Goya in Corrientes, Dr. Seró graduated as a lawyer from the National University of the Northeast in 1994 and took office in 2012 as head of the Federal Court of Concepción del Uruguay, from where he worked in public office with all federal crimes in the city and the area.

The magistrate, a reference of the Entre Ríos Justice, knew how to be linked to causes of great public interest, including the investigation of the alleged Iranian citizen who presented himself as Asan Azad, arrested in June 2022 without personal documentation when he tried to buy a ticket in Concepción del Uruguay with an Argentine ID of another person.

The personnel of the Entre Ríos Police work at the scene together with the Criminalistics Division. Sources in the case told this newspaper that, as of after 1:30 p.m., investigators had not yet been able to find Seró's cell phone.

They warn about the disappearance of small farmers due to lack of profitability.

The Argentine Rural Confederations (CRA) raised its voice again on Monday to demand the urgent elimination of withholdings, a request that is gaining more and more strength in agriculture due to the bad financial situation that the sector is going through as a result of low international prices and the risk of an incipient drought that is being felt in some key areas of the country.

It did so through a novel social media campaign, in which it used puns starting with the letters De and Ex, to express the need for DEXs (the abbreviation for export duties) to be removed.

"Urgent elimination of the DEXs now!", is a kind of slogan that runs through all the posts, in which words such as crumble, degradation, disappearance, uprooting, exclusion and expulsion are used, in reference to the effects that withholdings have on agricultural production.

"The countryside urgently needs the elimination of withholdings. The delay in the measure will cause a cessation of payments, the bankruptcy of thousands of producers and a strong brake on the development of the interior and the economy associated with the productive sector," CRA stressed.

Then, he justified that DEXs are "an unsustainable tax burden," because "they decrease the profitability of the producer, reducing the net price they receive for their products, eroding their profit margins and discouraging investment in technologies, high-quality seeds, modern machinery and more."

The State takes 64.6% of agricultural income: "If withholdings disappeared, it would be 36%"

He also explained that "DEXs do not kill in one fell swoop, but they are signing the disappearance of the producer", because "they generate regional inequality, since regional economies, many of which depend on the export of agro-industrial products, are more vulnerable; the large costs add to the retentions, making producers in remote areas of the country less competitive."

Urgent DEX removal now! Because they are an unsustainable tax burden.

He also added that "DEXs affect both the individual economy and agricultural development as a whole" and in this way "the productive reality leads to the disappearance of producers."

"The drop in international commodity prices, the high cost of inputs and the enormous tax burden show negative margins in many activities such as soybeans," he reviewed.

And he added: "DEXs generate a gap that distances us from development, reduces the ability of Argentine producers to compete in global markets, especially against countries that do not apply these charges. This can lead to the loss of international markets and affect the country's reputation as a reliable supplier."

CÓRDOBA ALSO STANDS AGAINST THE WITHHOLDINGS

In the same way, from Córdoba, the Liaison Table of that province also added its claim against the retentions.

From the point of view of the Cordoba countryside, "the agricultural sector has been enduring a state of inefficiency for more than 20 years, with unsustainable expenses and a fiscal pressure incompatible with production."

The problem is that the adverse climatic situation and international markets are added to this panorama, which is what has revealed the "tremendous damage" caused by the retentions; "a distorting and discriminatory tax that, due to its magnitude and persistence, is suffocating the sector."

For this reason, the Cordoba Table considers it "imperative" that the national government review and take measures regarding the withholdings, because otherwise "the prolongation of this tax puts the survival of small producers at serious risk."

Domingo Cavallo anticipated the future of the dollar in 2025 and what will happen after the exit from the clamps

In his personal blog, the former Minister of Economy assured that the exit from the clamp will imply a jump in the dollar, but "it does not have to be inflationary"

In his personal blog, the former Minister of Economy said that its elimination could consolidate monetary and exchange rate stability in Argentina

Former Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo once again analyzed the situation of the dollar in Argentina and anticipated a possible exchange rate jump in 2025.

His statements, published on his blog in an article entitled "Getting out of the stocks does not have to be inflationary", generated a stir in the economic and political sphere.

Leaving the Stocks does not have to be inflationary

The government has been winning the battle against inflation. The challenge is to win the war.  The government's success in the fight against inflation has its fundamental origin in fiscal adjustment and the elimination of monetary issuance that was due to the fiscal deficit, but control of the exchange rate and the reduction of the gap also played and will continue to play a fundamental role. Both the president and the economy minister suggest that the pace of the crawl can be reduced to 1% per month and finally to 0%, that is, converge to a fixed exchange rate that would lead to the total elimination of what they call inflation induced by the exchange rate adjustment.

Those who bet on the final success of this stabilization strategy and rule out a future devaluation jump are confident that in the medium term the increase in hydrocarbon and mining exports, as well as the productive results of the investments induced by the RIGI will make the exchange rate at the end of the stabilization process sustainable and will not need additional adjustments and that,  as a bridge to reach this situation, there will be the eventual resources provided by the IMF in a future program and eventual access to the capital market when the country risk rate pierces the barrier of 400 basis points.

I argued in January 2024, as soon as the initial measures of President Milei's government were announced, that 'to eliminate inflation, the most important thing will be to avoid a new jump in the price of the dollar before it is in a position to fully unify and liberalize the foreign exchange market'.  The government is cautious about the possibility of eliminating the clamp precisely for fear of an exchange rate jump and its impact on inflation.

In this post I argue that when the complete elimination of the clamp is decided, there will surely be a jump in the exchange rate, but this does not mean that the disinflation process will be interrupted but, on the contrary, it may mean the consolidation of monetary and exchange rate stability.

As a counterweight to a possible exchange rate jump, the complete elimination of the clamp would lead to a greater reduction in country risk, facilitating access to financing to face the principal maturities of the debt in dollars. At the same time, it will help to ensure that there are favorable balances in the trade balance to facilitate the Treasury's access to buy, with the pesos of its primary fiscal surplus, the dollars it needs to meet the payment of the interest on that debt.

The government, instead of postponing the elimination of the clamp until after the elections, in my opinion should seriously consider its elimination in the first months of next year, to reach the election with the economy stabilized and reactivated and in a clear process of growth through investment and increased productivity.

What is the role of the exchange clamp in the disinflation process?

The so-called exchange clamp is made up of many restrictions on the legal purchase and sale of foreign currencies (for simplicity we are going to refer to one currency, the dollar). The restrictions of the traditional exchange control, which have been applied in many economies at different stages of their economic history, are: a) those that oblige exporters to sell to the Central Bank, within maximum periods defined by the regulations, the dollars that these operations generate and b) those that limit importers' access to the dollars that they must disburse,  both in quantity and in the minimum payment deferral period Theoretically, these controls allow the Central Bank to determine the exchange rate (fix or adjust it at will) and, with certain limitations, achieve quantitative targets for the accumulation of reserves. In essence, it is about the control of price and quantity in the foreign exchange market, something that is not easy to maintain for long periods of time without generating evasion mechanisms that feed a parallel market, black, blue or whatever you want to call it.

As a palliative, in order to also control the gap between the parallel market and the exchange rate managed by the Central Bank, operations for the purchase and sale of financial dollars are allowed, but they are also subject to interventions and regulation by the Central Bank that restrict their operation and affect their price. Those who can open an account in dollars within the Argentine financial system and have the necessary pesos to pay them, can buy the stock exchange dollar (MEP) which, except for cash withdrawal, for payments abroad are subject to all exchange control restrictions. Cash settlement operations (CCL) in the bond market allow payments and collections abroad. But those who, due to their export and import activities, or even financial operations, need access to the official exchange market managed by the Central Bank are not allowed to operate in the CCL.

In short, all these restrictions and exchange controls allow the government to manage the exchange rate and the gap with pseudo-free markets. This leads Central Bank officials and, for the moment, most private sector financial operators, to believe that a devaluation jump can be avoided, even if the private sector operating in the real economy complains about the so-called "exchange rate delay" and the increase in costs in dollars.

The dynamics of inflation

The inflation rate published by INDEC for the month of October was 2.7%, a significant drop in relation to the 3.5% of the month of September and just over the 4% average for the months of May to August, but the early data for the month of November anticipate that the monthly inflation rate will probably return to above 3% per month. This can be seen in Table 1, which compares the rates published by INDEC and the trend marked by the data prepared by Alberto Cavallo based on online observations.

The average rate of online prices, which was 2.2% in October, is climbing to 2.9% in November. If the same increase were to occur for the inflation rate measured by INDEC, it would have to increase from 2.7% in October to 3.4% in November. Some indications from the last days of November (for example, the increase in the price of meat), anticipate that there will also be a trend of increase in December.

This persistence of the inflation rate in the range of 3 to 4% per month should not be surprising when the monetary aggregates M2 and bank credit to the private sector have been increasing at rates of 7% and 14% per month respectively since May.

For the moment, the future dollar market seems to validate expectations that the government will succeed in controlling the exchange rate during 2025 with the crawl at the pace it has been announcing. The reduction of the gap between the CCL and the exchange rate set by the Central Bank helps to consolidate this expectation. The key to success is to prevent financial operators from beginning to anticipate a post-election exchange rate jump. To do this, contrary to what some believe, it is important to eliminate the clamp as soon as possible.  The sooner the clamp is eliminated, the better the monetary system will work with currency competition because the dollar will be able to fulfill not only the role of currency for commercial transactions but also as a vehicle for savings to finance the investment of all types of companies. In particular, those that cannot benefit from the RIGI regime.

Arguments that feed the expectation of an exchange rate jump at the time of market unification and liberalization

It is likely that by eliminating the clamps, the exchange rate will increase. In addition to the argument about the appreciation of the peso in the official market (exchange rate delay), which can be aggravated by the devaluation of the Brazilian real and the strengthening of the dollar due to measures adopted by the Trump administration, there are other arguments to predict an exchange rate jump at the time of market unification and liberalization. The main argument is that the gap between the price in the MEP and CCL markets and the price set by the Central Bank is not realistic, because the regulations do not allow dividends and royalties to be remitted to companies that must necessarily operate in the MULC and the access of individuals and companies to the MEP is also severely restricted. It is argued that the unification of the foreign exchange market should be done while maintaining restrictions on the remittance of dividends and payment of royalties, but if this happens, capital inflows will be discouraged.

Exchange rate stability after reunification can only be maintained if the supervening exchange rate stabilizes without the Central Bank selling reserves. On the contrary, stability will be consolidated if the Central Bank accumulates reserves without causing additional depreciation of the peso. For this to happen, capital inflows need to be encouraged. If capital inflows are vigorous, the Central Bank will be able to buy reserves and allow the appreciation of the peso that will automatically reverse any increase in the inflation rate that follows an exchange rate jump. This is the typical phenomenon of stabilization plans with free movement of capital.

That there is no restriction on the purchase and sale of foreign currencies is an essential requirement for the economy to function with competition from Peruvian-style currencies. This is the monetary system that President Milei has been talking about. On the other hand, if exchange rate stability is achieved with competition from Peruvian-style currencies, the economy will be able to function with less rigidity than with complete dollarization or convertibility with a fixed exchange rate.

How would the exchange and monetary system of currency competition (Peruvian-style) work?

Banks will receive deposits in all types of accounts in both pesos and dollars and the Central Bank will control the expansion of bank credit in each of the two currencies with the same instruments: mandatory legal reserve requirements (which may be different) and open market operations with bonds in pesos and dollars to regulate the interest rate in the two currencies.

The stability of prices in the economy will require that the peso does not tend to depreciate, even if it suffers transitory fluctuations. When external shocks demand depreciation of the peso, the Central Bank may limit that depreciation not only by selling reserves but also by increasing the legal reserve requirement for deposits in pesos, decreasing the reserve requirement for deposits in dollars, and conducting open market operations that increase interest rates in pesos and lower rates in dollars.

The management of reserve requirements and open market operations will allow the sale of reserves necessary to stabilize the peso to be limited. When external shocks lead to the appreciation of the peso, the Central Bank will be able to take advantage of it to increase its level of reserves. It will also be able to handle reserve requirements and open market operations in the opposite direction to the aforementioned to curb the depreciation of the peso.

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