⚖️ JUSTICE & PUBLIC HEALTH 

⚖️ JUSTICE & PUBLIC HEALTH

🕐 ~12 min read

 

HISTORIC RULING: The Federal Court of Córdoba ordered to pay $95 million to the family of a young woman who died after the Sputnik V vaccine

 

The Federal Court of Appeals of Córdoba determined that Melín Agustina Sartori, 24, died as a direct result of an adverse effect of the Sputnik V vaccine. The ruling, unprecedented in Argentina, obliges the Ministry of Health of the Nation to pay compensation equivalent to 240 minimum retirement benefits – about 95 million pesos – and sets a precedent that could reopen the debate on state responsibility in mass vaccination campaigns.

 

📅 May 30, 2026 |  ✍️ Journalistic writing |  📍 Cordoba, Argentina

 

🖼️ [ See reference image: Syringe and vaccine — Unsplash ]

Illustrative image — COVID-19 vaccine (Unsplash / Hakan Nural)

 

👩 Victim	Melín Agustina Sartori, 24 years old
📅 Vaccination	July 15, 2021 — Orfeo Superdomo, Córdoba
💉 Vaccine applied	Sputnik V (first dose — adenoviral vector)
🏥 Diagnosis	Thrombosis with thrombocytopenia syndrome (VITT)
☠️ Death	July 29, 2021 (14 days post-vaccination)
⚖️ Tribunal	Chamber A — Federal Court of Appeals of Córdoba
👨 ⚖️ Signatory judges	Liliana Navarro, Graciela Montesi, Eduardo Ávalos
💰 Indemnification	$95 million approx. (240 minimum retirement benefits)
📜 Applied law	Law 27,573 — COVID-19 Reparation Fund
⏱️ Deadline to the State	30 days to complete the administrative procedure

 

 

Melín Agustina Sartori was 24 years old and, as described by her entourage during the judicial process, she was in excellent health. He practiced sports regularly and had just started a family business making artisanal pasta. Her family remembered her as a young woman socially committed, generous and full of projects.

 

On July 15, 2021, Melín went to the Orfeo Superdome in the city of Córdoba to receive the first dose of the Sputnik V vaccine, as part of the national immunization campaign against COVID-19. He did not have any pre-existing pathology that could condition a severe adverse reaction. He was, apparently, the profile of the person that every health campaign considers to be of low risk.

 

Six days after vaccination, on July 21, he began to show symptoms that at first seemed minor: intense headaches and persistent vomiting. In a first medical consultation, the condition was interpreted as gastroenteritis and the young woman was sent home. However, two days later spontaneous bruises appeared on her face and signs of neurological deterioration that alerted her family.

 

"Melín had no record. She was a healthy, sporty girl. What happened to him was absolutely unexpected." — Family environment — Judicial reconstruction

 

Hospitalized urgently, laboratory studies revealed an alarming panorama: a platelet count of just 27,000/mm³, when normal values range between 150,000 and 400,000. The diagnosis confirmed a thrombosis syndrome with thrombocytopenia (TTS), also known in the international scientific literature as VITT (Vaccine-Induced Immune Thrombocytopenia and Thrombosis). The condition progressed rapidly, causing irreversible neurological deterioration. Melín underwent surgery that failed to reverse the damage. He died on July 29, 2021, just 14 days after receiving the vaccine.

 

 

VITT syndrome (vaccine-induced immune thrombotic thrombocytopenia) is an extremely rare adverse reaction that was identified and documented worldwide during COVID-19 vaccination campaigns, mainly associated with adenoviral vector technology vaccines, such as AstraZeneca/ChAdOx1 and Sputnik V itself.

 

The mechanism is autoimmune in nature: the body generates IgG antibodies directed against platelet factor 4 (FP4), which triggers a paradoxical activation of platelets, simultaneously generating clots in blood vessels and a drastic drop in platelet count. The clinical paradox—thrombosis and thrombocytopenia at the same time—is what makes VITT especially severe and difficult to treat with conventional protocols.

 

🔬 KEY FACT: Anti-platelet factor 4 IgG antibodies In the judicial file, the medical experts detected in Melín Sartori's blood the presence of IgG antibodies against platelet factor 4, a biological marker considered unequivocal of the VATT syndrome. Its detection, added to the absence of previous exposure to heparin (one of the possible alternative factors), was decisive in establishing the causal link with vaccination.

 

Symptoms of VITT usually develop 4 to 30 days after vaccination. In Sartori's case, they appeared on the sixth day. According to the Clinical Hospital of the University of Santiago de Compostela, cited in studies included in the file, it is an event of very low incidence in relation to the total number of doses administered worldwide, although with high mortality once the condition reaches advanced stages.

 

A report prepared by specialists from the Institute of Pharmacovigilance Sciences of the University of Southampton (United Kingdom), published in The New England Journal of Medicine and assessed by the court, concluded that Melín Sartori's case met the criteria for level 1 of the determination of certainty of vaccine-induced immune thrombotic thrombocytopenia.

 

 

After the death of her daughter, María Virginia Ruiz filed a claim with the COVID-19 Reparation Fund, the mechanism created by Law 27,573 and Decree 431/2021 to compensate people who had suffered physical harm or died as a direct result of the vaccines applied during the pandemic. However, the administrative path was as tortuous as the judicial process that would follow.

 

In the first instance, the Superintendence of Labor Risks (SRT) rejected the request. The National Commission for Vaccine Safety (Conaseva) had classified the adverse event as "Indeterminate B1", concluding that there was insufficient scientific evidence to establish a direct causal relationship between the Sputnik V vaccine and the death. The family was not satisfied with that answer and decided to take the case to the federal courts.

 

"It was a novel process. It touched on a whole issue that was not standardized. At the time of initiating the lawsuit, there was no similar precedent in the country." — Martín Barbará, lawyer for the Ruiz-Sartori family

 

The judicial process lasted for almost five years. During that time, the international scientific consensus on VITT matured and consolidated. In May 2024, a turning point: Conaseva itself reviewed the file and, based on the new medical evidence available, reclassified the event. The commission concluded that there was "evidence of causality with the vaccine" and elevated the case to the "A1 Related" category, the highest level of causal certainty on the post-vaccine adverse event rating scale.

 

That reclassification was a central element for the final resolution of the Chamber. Lawyer Barbará also pointed out that Sputnik V "did not have pharmacovigilance", that is, it did not have a continuous monitoring system for adverse reactions comparable to that of other vaccines authorized by international organizations such as the EMA or the FDA, which made it difficult to detect and recognize this type of event early.

 

 

Chamber A of the Federal Court of Appeals of Córdoba, made up of Judges Liliana Navarro and Graciela Montesi together with Judge Eduardo Ávalos, issued a resolution that legal doctrine already points out as historic in terms of the civil liability of the State in the face of adverse effects of vaccines.

 

The ruling states that "based on the elements gathered, it is possible to conclude that the event is related to the placement of the Sputnik V vaccine." The court assessed, among other evidence: the medical reports that detected IgG antibodies against FP4; the expert testimonies of hematologist Ana Romina Montivero and pharmacovigilance expert Raquel Herrera Comoglio, who stated that the absence of heparin allowed them to conclude "without a doubt" that the picture corresponded to a VITT triggered by the vaccine; and the 2024 Conaseva reclassification itself.

 

Judge Liliana Navarro was especially blunt in her vote: "The discussion on the causal link, far from persisting, is technically clear." The ruling also clarifies that the current regulations do not require absolute certainty, but that it is enough to prove the damage and its causal link through the preponderance of the evidence, a standard that, in the court's opinion, the victim's mother satisfied "comfortably".

 

📌 FAILURE DEVICE 1. Formal recognition of the direct causal link between the application of the Sputnik V vaccine and the death of Melín Agustina Sartori.  2. Order to the Ministry of Health of the Nation to complete, within 30 days, the pending stages of the procedure provided for in points 5 and 6 of the Annex to Joint Resolution 7/2022 (procedure for claims of the COVID-19 Reparation Fund).  3. Setting the compensation at 240 minimum retirement benefits, equivalent to approximately $95 million pesos at the time of the ruling.

 

The ruling also specifies that the judgment will be final subject to the appeals that the parties may file. The Ministry of Health of the Nation, represented in the process, had not issued public comments at the time of going to press.

 

 

Law 27,573, enacted in November 2020 during the presidency of Alberto Fernández, authorized the National Executive Branch to enter into contracts for the provision of vaccines against COVID-19 and established, among its provisions, the creation of a Reparation Fund aimed at compensating people who suffered physical harm as a direct result of immunization.

 

Decree 431/2021 regulated access to this fund, establishing that claimants had to prove the causal link through specialized medical commissions and that the corresponding compensation would be calculated based on minimum retirement benefits, a formula that the Córdoba ruling applied to set $95 million.

 

However, as evidenced in the Sartori case, the administrative mechanism proved insufficient to guarantee effective access to reparation. The family had to go through almost five years of legal litigation to obtain the recognition of a right that the law had provided. This gap between the regulatory design and the practical reality of its application is one of the points that the ruling implicitly highlights.

 

▪      Law 27,573 (Nov. 2020): authorization of vaccine contracts and creation of the Reparation Fund.

▪      Decree 431/2021: regulation of access to the fund and methodology for calculating compensation.

▪      Joint Resolution 7/2022: administrative procedure for the processing of complaints.

▪      Conaseva reclassification (May 2024): official recognition of the causal link "Related A1".

 

 

The ruling of the Federal Court of Córdoba is not only the resolution of an individual case. It is the first of its kind in Argentina to judicially establish the causal relationship between a COVID-19 vaccine and a death, also ordering concrete reparations to the State. As such, it sets a legal precedent that specialists in health law already describe as of enormous significance.

 

First, the ruling could encourage other families who went through similar situations – and whose claims were rejected or are pending in administrative proceedings – to resort to the courts with a greater probability of success. Argentina applied more than 100 million doses of different vaccines against COVID-19 between 2021 and 2023. Although VITT is statistically rare, even a minimal incidence rate over that volume can account for tens or hundreds of cases.

 

Secondly, the precedent puts under the magnifying glass the pharmacovigilance system with which Sputnik V operated in Argentina. Lawyer Barbará was explicit in pointing out that the Russian vaccine did not have the continuous monitoring mechanisms that other vaccines approved in the framework of complete clinical trials by bodies such as the EMA or the FDA had. That absence of robust safety data made it difficult for years to recognize serious adverse effects.

 

"The discussion about the causal link, far from persisting, is technically clear." — Judge Liliana Navarro — vote in the ruling

 

Thirdly, the case reopens the debate on the responsibility of the State when, in the context of a global health emergency, it authorises and massively promotes a vaccine that did not complete all the usual approval steps. The balance between epidemiological urgency and individual safety is a tension that international health law has been discussing since the first months of the pandemic, and that this ruling turns into a concrete legal issue with economic consequences for the Argentine public treasury.

 

 

The Sputnik V vaccine, developed by the Gamaleya National Center for Epidemiology and Microbiology of the Russian Federation, was the first to be authorized for emergency use in Argentina, in December 2020, during the government of Alberto Fernández. The decision was controversial from the beginning: the vaccine had completed only phase II of its clinical trials at the time of Argentine authorization, and bodies such as the EMA never approved it for use in the European Union.

 

Argentina acquired millions of doses of Sputnik V and applied it massively during the first half of 2021, at a time when the availability of other vaccines was still limited. The vaccine was the basis for the start of the national vaccination plan for broad sectors of the population. In October 2021, the Argentine State returned to the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) more than 1.3 million doses that had been requested to replace other items.

 

The Sartori case is the first in which the Argentine justice system formally establishes that a death that occurred during that campaign was causally linked to the Russian vaccine. The symbolic and legal impact of that determination is hard to overestimate.

🖼️ [ See reference image: Mass vaccination campaign — Unsplash ]

Illustrative image — Mass vaccination (Unsplash / Mufid Majnun)

 

 

▪      First ruling of its kind in Argentina. No Argentine court ruling had previously established the causal relationship between a COVID-19 vaccine and a death, also ordering economic reparations to the State.

▪      The evidentiary standard is the "preponderance of the evidence." The court made it clear that the law does not require absolute certainty to access compensation, which opens the door to other similar cases.

▪      The reclassification of Conaseva was decisive. The technical body recognized in 2024 the causal link that it had initially denied, radically changing the balance of the file.

▪      The absence of pharmacovigilance is a central argument. The case exposes the fragility of the safety monitoring system with which Sputnik V operated in Argentina, a vaccine that never received approval from the EMA or the FDA.

▪      The State has 30 days to act. If the Ministry of Health does not complete the procedure within the established period, the family could request measures of forced execution of the sentence.

 

 

The case of Melín Agustina Sartori condenses, in its individual tragedy, some of the deepest tensions left by the COVID-19 pandemic: the urgency of protecting lives versus the need for scientific guarantees on the safety of the instruments used; political pressure on regulatory bodies; the speed with which science had to advance in conditions of radical uncertainty; and the duty of democracies to take responsibility for the damage caused to those who trusted the decisions of the State.

 

None of this implies that mass vaccination was a wrong decision. The scientific consensus is clear: COVID-19 vaccines saved tens of millions of lives worldwide. VITT, as tragic as it is in the cases in which it occurs, has a statistically very low incidence. But precisely because public health policies are implemented on a massive scale, compensation systems for those who suffer exceptional harm must be effective, accessible, and fair.

 

It took María Virginia Ruiz almost five years to obtain the recognition that her daughter died as a result of a vaccine that the State instructed her to apply. That time cannot be erased. But the ruling of the Federal Court of Córdoba establishes, at least, that the justice system can do what the bureaucracy could not: recognize the truth and order reparations.

 

"The judgment comfortably satisfies the threshold of preponderance of evidence required by current regulations to prove the link between vaccination and the damage suffered." — Federal Court of Appeals of Córdoba — Chamber A

 

 

🔖 SEO TAGS

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📚 SOURCES CONSULTED

▪ Profile: https://www.perfil.com/noticias/sociedad/la-justicia-atribuyo-el-fallecimiento-de-una-joven-cordobesa-de-24-anos-sin-antecedentes-medicos-a-la-vacuna-sputnik.phtml

▪ La Nación: https://www.lanacion.com.ar/sociedad/un-fallo-inedito-reconoce-la-relacion-directa-entre-la-vacuna-sputnik-y-la-muerte-de-una-joven-sana-nid27052026/

▪ Infobae: https://www.infobae.com/sociedad/2026/05/28/la-justicia-de-cordoba-atribuyo-la-muerte-de-una-joven-a-un-efecto-adverso-de-la-vacuna-rusa-sputnik/

▪ The Andes: https://www.losandes.com.ar/sociedad/la-justicia-determino-que-una-joven-cordobesa-murio-efectos-la-sputnik-v-y-ordeno-una-indemnizacion-95-millones-n5992747

▪ The Capital: https://www.lacapital.com.ar/salud/fallo-inedito-cordoba-la-justicia-responsabilizo-la-vacuna-sputnik-v-la-muerte-una-joven-n10261613.html

▪ The Compass 24: https://www.labrujula24.com/notas/2026/05/27/la-justicia-avalo-el-reclamo-por-un-caso-fatal-asociado-a-la-vacuna-sputnik-n502451/

▪ Río Negro: https://www.rionegro.com.ar/justicia/la-justicia-reconocio-que-una-joven-sana-murio-tras-recibir-la-vacuna-sputnik-y-ordeno-indemnizar-a-la-familia-4590685/

▪ News Channel: https://www.canaldelasnoticias.com/politica/2026/05/28/murio-por-la-vacuna-sputnik-v-y-el-estado-debera-pagar-95-millones/

 

 

Article of a journalistic and informative nature. It does not constitute legal or medical advice. © 2026

 

📰 ARGENTINE ECONOMY · ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION 📅 May 2026 ·  ✍️ Journalistic Analysis ·  ⏱ Reading Time: ~12 minutes

🏷️ SEO TAGS #EconomíaArgentina #Milei #PyMES #Consumo #Superávit #Jubilaciones

 

📊

The Argentine economic labyrinth:

surplus without growth, record harvests without consumption

and SMEs that are extinguished while the large conglomerates celebrate

 

 

The Argentina of 2026 is a shocking paradox: fields that break historical production records, inflation that fell from 25% per month to around 2-3%, a fiscal surplus not seen in 15 years... and yet factories work at 53.8% of their capacity, SMEs close daily, retirees struggle to make ends meet and domestic consumption continues to be flattened. How is it possible that with so many positive indicators the real economy does not take off? This article attempts to answer that question with data, analysis, and historical perspective.

✅ 0,3 % Fiscal Surplus / GDP (2024)

⚠️ 53,8 % Use installed capacity (Dec. 2025)

❌ −3% Cumulative GDP fall in 2024

🌾 ~140 Mt Record harvest 2025/26 (soybeans + corn)

 

📉 The adjustment that balanced the accounts but deactivated the economy

In December 2023, Argentina had a primary deficit of 2.9% of GDP and a financial deficit of 6.1%. The photo was untenable. The government of Javier Milei arrived with a unique and radical promise: fiscal balance at any cost, the famous 'chainsaw'. And it delivered: in 2024 the primary surplus reached 2.1% of GDP, with a positive financial result of 0.3%, the first since 2010.

But the mechanism was surgical only in the accounting area. Real public spending fell by 27.5% – the largest contraction since 1994. The cuts mainly affected retirements and pensions (25.3% of the total adjustment), public works (23.2%), energy subsidies (14.5%), social programs (8.8%) and public sector salaries (8.6%).

The result was predictable by any macroeconomic textbook: with liquefied incomes and spending cut, domestic demand collapsed. GDP fell by a cumulative 3% in 2024. VAT collection – the tax that most accurately reflects consumption – fell by 16.3% year-on-year in real terms in the first half of the year. Profits, another −13%. Tax collection itself, which should have been financed by the State, fell by 6.6% in real terms in the first eleven months of the year.

The irony is geometric: by destroying the demand to balance the accounts, the tax base that sustains those accounts was also destroyed. A dog biting its tail.

 

📌 Key data for the debate The fiscal surplus is a real accounting milestone. But it was achieved by liquefying pensions, freezing public works and crushing consumption. The remaining challenge is to demonstrate that this balance can be sustained while the economy grows, not just while it contracts.

 

🌾 Record harvests that do not feed the domestic market

The 2025/2026 agricultural season recorded extraordinary numbers: 49.9 million tons of soybeans, 70 million tons of corn – the highest volume in twenty years – and 7.4 million tons of sunflower, a historic record. The Argentine countryside produces like never before.

However, this agrarian wealth does not translate into internal economic dynamism. Why? Because the agro-export model, by definition, exports. Foreign currency comes in, pays debt, strengthens reserves, and in the best of cases finances public spending through withholdings. But the farmer who sold his soybeans does not necessarily buy a refrigerator manufactured in Córdoba or hire a gas operator from Rosario.

The oil industry processed a record 47.6 million tonnes in 2025, with idle capacity of 28.2%, the lowest since 2011. But the rest of the manufacturing industry tells another story: in December 2025, the utilization of general industrial installed capacity fell to 53.8%. Almost half of the machines in Argentina were stopped or running at half speed.

This is the heart of the structural problem that the article seeks to illuminate: without domestic demand, production cannot scale; and without scale, unit costs skyrocket. Economies of scale work in both directions.

⚙️ The Fixed Cost Trap and the Reverse Spiral

A company that produces 1,000 units per month has its fixed costs – rent, permanent payroll, amortization of equipment, insurance, services – distributed among those 1,000 units. If demand falls to 500 units, those same fixed costs are spread across half of the products: the cost per unit doubles. The company has two options: raise prices – aggravating the fall in consumption – or close.

This mechanism, perfectly described by classical economic theory, is exactly what is destroying the Argentine SME industry. It is not business mismanagement. It is not a lack of intrinsic competitiveness. It is the implacable logic of economies of scale working in reverse: fewer sales → more unit cost → less competitiveness → fewer sales. A downward spiral that no entrepreneur can stop alone.

🏭 46,2 % Industry idle capacity (Dec.2025)

📦 ↑ Costs Cost/unit goes up when volume down

🔒 600.000+ SMEs registered in Argentina

💳 62.116 SMEs with access to SGR credit in 2025

 

👴 Pensions, wages and informality: the tripod of lost consumption

The revival of a depressed economy is not an academic mystery. Keynes explained it almost a century ago: when the private sector does not invest and consumers do not spend – because they can't – it is the state that must inject demand. The most direct and efficient mechanism is to put money in the pockets of those who have the greatest marginal propensity to consume: those who earn less, because they spend practically everything they receive, and immediately, in the local market.

In Argentina, this profile corresponds exactly to retirees, workers in the informal sector and formal salaried workers with medium and low incomes. They are the three broken links in the consumption chain.

👵 Pension cuts as a brake on consumption

Retirements and pensions absorbed 25.3% of the total adjustment in 2024. The initial devaluation of the peso in December 2023 – a jump of 114% – liquefied fixed incomes in real time. Although retirement mobility later recovered some ground, the government vetoed in August 2024 a law of Congress that would have more aggressively recomposed pensions.

A retiree who receives the minimum salary or just above it does not save: he spends everything on food, medicine and basic services. Every additional peso that reaches that pocket almost immediately becomes local economic activity, VAT collected, a grocer who sells more and hires someone. Each weight cut makes the reverse path.

💼 The informal economy: 40% of the labor market that does not exist for the system

According to the OECD, informality in Argentina is high in international comparison. Argentina's social protection system has almost universal pension coverage in terms of access, but it is financed through high social security contributions that raise the cost of creating formal employment. The result: a labor market where about 40% of active workers operate in the informal sector, without contributions, without access to formal credit, without a safety net.

These people produce, sell, serve—they sustain entire microeconomies in popular neighborhoods—but they do not exist for the tax system or for the financial system. They cannot access bank loans, they will not qualify for a dignified retirement, and their consumption does not generate the multiplier effect that the registered worker does.

Incorporating them into the formal system – simplifying burdens, creating progressive regimes, lowering the labor cost of the first links – is not an expense: it is an investment that expands the tax base and the consumer market simultaneously.

🏢 The RIGI: mortgaging the future to attract the present?

The Incentive Regime for Large Investments (RIGI) is probably the most structural and controversial measure of the Milei government. In terms of design, it seeks to attract foreign direct investment to strategic sectors – energy, mining, hydrocarbons – by offering a menu of tax and regulatory benefits for a period of up to 30 years: a reduction in income tax to 25%, guaranteed tax stability, free availability of foreign currency and access to foreign markets without restrictions.

The IMF noted that RIGI has already attracted investment commitments of $12 billion. The regime's defenders argue that Argentina needs capital to develop Vaca Muerta, lithium and other natural riches that for decades were underdeveloped. They are not wrong in the diagnosis.

But the debate is about the asymmetry of the treatment. While the large companies benefiting from the RIGI have access to direct external financing, guaranteed regulatory stability for three decades and a substantially lower tax burden, Argentine SMEs – 99% of the country's business fabric – face the highest tax burden in their recent history.

⚖️ The tax asymmetry RIGI vs. SME According to a November 2025 report, the effective tax pressure borne by Argentine SMEs is double that faced by RIGI beneficiary companies. Of 600,000 registered firms, only 62,116 managed to access publicly guaranteed credit in 2025 – 10%. 77% of them are micro-enterprises.

 

The question that Argentine society has the right to ask itself is: what is left for the country when an international consortium extracts lithium or oil with guaranteed fiscal stability for 30 years? The answer depends on how much is negotiated in terms of local employment, national suppliers, technology transfer and royalties. If these conditions are not well agreed, the RIGI may become the largest legal business in Argentine history for its beneficiaries... and a mortgage for generations to come.

That Vaca Muerta and lithium develop is desirable and essential. That they do so under conditions that structurally benefit Argentina – and not only the shareholders of Amsterdam or New York – is the difference between a state policy and a liquidation of strategic assets.

💡 Surplus is not a panacea: the state is not a company

The official discourse celebrates the fiscal surplus as if it were the end in itself of economic policy. "Zero deficit" is repeated like a mantra, as if the accounting balance automatically guarantees the well-being of the population. This conceptual confusion is, perhaps, the most costly intellectual error of the current model.

A private company aims to accumulate capital: earn more than it spends, grow, distribute profits to its shareholders. The logic of the surplus makes sense in that context. But the State is not a company. Its function is not to accumulate: it is to allocate resources to maximize collective well-being, to provide the public goods that the market does not provide on its own – education, health, infrastructure, security – and in times of economic contraction, to act as a demander of last resort to prevent the recession from feeding on itself.

The economist John Maynard Keynes formulated it clearly in the 1930s, looking at another Great Depression: when all private agents withdraw simultaneously, the sum of rational individual decisions produces an irrational collective result. The State, the only agent that can act against the current, must do so. A surplus in a context of deep recession is not a virtue: it is procyclical and aggravates the problem.

The relevant nuance is that Argentina cannot ignore its restrictions: decades of deficits financed by issuance generated structural inflation that destroyed the purchasing power of several generations. It is not a question of returning to irresponsible spending. It is a question of finding the balance between fiscal sustainability and the reactivation of the internal market. That balance exists; Finding it requires creativity, not dogmatism.

🔄 The recovery that does not come for everyone

The data for 2025 show mixed signals. GDP grew by about 4.3% annually, driven by agriculture, mining and energy – the sectors benefited by the RIGI and the record harvest. But that growth is partial and concentrated. Manufacturing and construction cooled in the third quarter. SMEs in the food and pharmaceutical sector recorded significant job losses. The dynamism does not spill over.

This is the scenario of a two-speed economy: an Argentina that exports raw materials and energy resources with record numbers, and another Argentina of shops, workshops, private clinics and medium-sized factories that has not yet recovered the level of activity of 2022.

📈 +4,3 % Projected GDP growth 2025

🛒 ↓ Domestic consumption (still depressed)

⚡ RIGI Engine of growth: energy and agriculture

🏪 ↓ SMEs: food and pharma in decline

 

🚀 The explosion of possible consumption: what is needed

The reactivation of domestic consumption does not require magic or a new heterodox experiment. It requires the application of known, gradual and bankable mechanisms:

 

📌  Real recomposition of pensions: the average pension must recover genuine purchasing power, not just keep track of inflation that has already subsided. Every additional peso that comes to a retiree is spent entirely in the local market.

📌  Income policy for the formal sector: registered wages lost ground compared to the devaluation of December 2023. A pattern of real recovery, albeit gradual, stabilises demand and reduces social conflict.

📌  Incentivized formalization of informal employment: reducing the labor cost of the first links of formal employment – social monotax, simplified regimes – expands the consumer base and the tax base simultaneously.

📌  Productive credit for SMEs: Of 600,000 registered companies, only 62,000 accessed guaranteed credit in 2025. Scaling up that access is cheaper than any foreign investment incentive plan.

📌  Strategic public works: road, water and energy infrastructure have a proven multiplier effect. Each peso spent on public works generates 1.3 to 1.8 pesos of economic activity. Freezing it in the name of fiscal balance is a false saving.

📌  Equity in the tax burden: while SMEs pay twice as much as RIGI beneficiaries, competition is distorted from the beginning. Leveling does not mean destroying incentives for large investment; it means not suffocating the business fabric that employs 70% of registered workers.

 

💬 The virtuous circle of consumption More income in sectors with a lower propensity to save → more immediate consumption → more sales for SMEs → more production → more use of installed capacity → lower unit costs → more competitive prices → more consumption. This virtuous circle is the alternative to the inverse spiral that Argentine industry is suffering today.

 

🎯 Conclusion: the balance that is missing is not only fiscal

The Argentina of 2026 achieved something that seemed impossible two years ago: lower inflation from hyperinflationary levels and eliminate the fiscal deficit. Those are real achievements that deserve objective recognition. No one in their right mind can defend the model of unfunded spending that led to inflation of 211% per year in 2023.

But an airplane doesn't fly with a single engine. Macroeconomic stability is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. The other engine – domestic consumption, the domestic market, aggregate demand – is off. And as long as it remains off, factories will continue to operate at 54%, shops will continue to close, young people will continue to emigrate and record harvests will continue to be good news for export ports... and neutral or negative news for the ordinary citizen who does not perceive any direct benefit.

The challenge for the government – of any Argentine government at this stage – is to demonstrate that fiscal discipline is compatible with inclusive growth. That the surplus can coexist with decent retirements. That attracting foreign investment does not require trampling on the local businessman. That low inflation can go hand in hand with salaries that recover purchasing power.

That demonstration has not yet occurred. The countryside produces like never before, reserves are growing, the country risk has dropped, and even so the Bell Ville baker sells fewer croissants than in 2022. That distance between macro indicators and micro reality is the real pending diagnosis. And the citizen – who is, in the final analysis, the recipient of all economic policy – has been waiting long enough for someone to solve it.

 

 

🔍 REFERENCES AND SOURCES

▸ Infobae / EFE: The Argentine economy closes 2024 marked by Milei's drastic adjustment

▸ El Observador: Argentina achieves fiscal surplus after 14 years

▸ FAIGA: SME Situation Report, August 2025

▸ Infobae: The tax pressure of SMEs doubles that of RIGI companies

▸ Expoagro: Oil industry reaches historical record 2025

▸ IngenieroBlancoWhite: Argentina: record harvest 2025/2026

▸ OECD: Expanding social protection and combating informality in Latin America, 2025

▸ Deloitte LATAM: Argentina Economic Outlook, December 2025

▸ The Blender: Utilization of installed capacity fell to 53.8%, Dec. 2025

 

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🚨 HIGH-IMPACT CASE — PROVINCE OF BUENOS AIRES — MAY 18, 2026

The teenager was savagely assaulted by Leonardo Marcelino while lying wounded on a stretcher, under the passive gaze of police and health personnel. The aggressor is a fugitive and has a previous conviction for aggravated sexual abuse. The case, labeled as culpable homicide, could be reclassified. Chascomús demands justice.

📅  Tuesday, May 19, 2026   ⏱️  Reading Time: 6 minutes   📌  Chascomús, Buenos Aires, Argentina   ✍️  Research Writing

 

🔍 KEY FACTS OF THE CASE

👦  Victim: Kevin Martínez, 15 years old, resident of Chascomús, with no criminal record

📅  Date of the event: Tuesday, May 13, 2026 — Jacarandá and Julián Quintana, Chascomús

🚗  Road accident: Honda XR 150 motorcycle vs. Ford Ka (María Antonella Saint Jean, 25 years old)

👊  Aggressor: Leonardo Marcelino, local merchant — currently a fugitive from justice

⚖️  Current cover: Culpable homicide — Prosecutor: Daniela María Bertoletti Tramuja (UFID N° 9)

🏥  Medical Center: Franchín Sanatorium, Almagro, CABA — Kevin passed away on Thursday, May 15

🚦  March: Monday, May 18, 4 p.m. — from Misiones 81 to the local police station

 

The Buenos Aires city of Chascomús was dismayed after a succession of events that ended the life of Kevin Martínez, a 15-year-old teenager with no criminal record. The day began with a traffic accident and escalated to become, according to his family and the lawyer who represents them, a homicide committed in full view of police and health personnel.

On Tuesday, May 13, Kevin was traveling as a passenger on a Honda XR 150 motorcycle driven by S.M., another 17-year-old boy, when both were hit on the corner of Jacarandá and Julián Quintana streets by a Ford Ka driven by María Antonella Saint Jean, a 25-year-old woman. The impact was violent and left the two minors seriously injured on the pavement.

The SAME personnel arrived at the scene and prioritized the care of S.M., whose condition was critical: he lost a leg due to his injuries. Kevin, on the other hand, remained immobilized on a stretcher on the public road, conscious, with a broken leg and visibly scared, waiting to be transferred.

 

It was at that moment of extreme vulnerability that the episode that has shaken all of Argentina occurred. Leonardo Marcelino, a merchant who lived a few meters from the corner of the accident, approached the injured teenager and began a brutal aggression. According to the case and can be seen in the images obtained by witnesses, the man repeatedly hit Kevin on the head with his fists, grabbed him by the neck and put a knee on his body.

It all happened while the minor was asking for help. In the videos that circulate, Kevin's voice is clearly heard begging for "help" and asking to be released, while some neighbors reproached the aggressor for his attitude. Police officers, municipal personnel and health workers were at the scene. However, no one intervened in time to stop the beating.

The reason alleged by Marcelino, according to hypotheses that circulated among neighbors and were picked up by media such as C5N, is that he accused the teenager of having stolen the motorcycle on which he was riding. However, Kevin's own family and the judicial investigation agree on a critical point: so far there is no element in the file that links the teenager to that robbery.

 

"Kevin did not die in the accident. Kevin was killed. Marcelino killed him along with the police. They thought they owned the life of such a cheerful teenager." — Tatiana Martinez, Kevin's older sister

 

After the blows, Kevin was completely unconscious. It was then that he was finally put in the ambulance. The aggressor slowly withdrew before the eyes of those present and escaped from the scene. Since that moment, Leonardo Marcelino has remained a fugitive from justice and is intensely sought by the Buenos Aires police.

 

🖼️  Referential image and video of the case Infobae — Full video coverage of the attack

 

Kevin Martínez was transferred to the Franchín Sanatorium, in the Buenos Aires neighborhood of Almagro, where he agonized for two days. He died on Thursday, May 15. The preliminary autopsy established "polytrauma" and "internal bleeding" as the cause of death. Forensic sources consulted by Infobae pointed out that, so far, these injuries are compatible with the crash into the car.

However, the family and their lawyer refute that conclusion. The lawyer categorically stated that "there is no doubt that the cause of death is the blows" and that the scientific expertise in progress will be decisive. According to his words, the traffic accident "is very far from causing death" to the teenager.

A version that circulated on social networks and was picked up by C5N journalists indicates that Kevin would have suffered a collapse of the skull as a result of the blows. This hypothesis, if confirmed by an expert, would radically transform the cover of the case and the criminal responsibilities involved.

 

"Until the videos began to circulate, the cause was an accident. Later we saw that it was not like that. The evidence is clear, the videos are clear." — Attorney for the Martinez family

 

One of the most disturbing facts of the case is the judicial history of Leonardo Marcelino. The family's lawyer revealed to the press that Marcelino was recently sentenced by the Oral Criminal Court (TOC) No. 1 of Dolores to a sentence of between 12 and 15 years in prison for aggravated sexual abuse.

Despite this, Marcelino was free at the time of the event and, after committing the attack, he managed to escape. At the close of this edition, the Buenos Aires police are looking for him intensely. He is the only person that the Justice Department directly links to the beating, but he has not yet registered a formal charge for Kevin's death.

 

As shocking as the aggression itself is the conduct of the police officers present. The videos show that the agents observed how Marcelino beat the injured teenager without intervening with the speed that the case demanded. Kevin's father, Marcos, told the press: "I saw the video a thousand times and I can't find an explanation. The pain is so great that I don't understand why the justice system didn't act while there."

The mother, Romina, added: "There were officers and enough people to hold him and keep him from approaching." The family's lawyer announced that he will request that the "criminal responsibility" of the police officers and ambulance personnel who witnessed the attack be investigated. The Municipality of Chascomús acknowledged in a statement that "the actions of police personnel must be evaluated."

According to the lawyer, "there was a network of complicity regarding the definitive cause of death" and said that "if they had acted as they should, this would not have happened." He also questioned that Kevin had been handcuffed on the stretcher despite being seriously injured, describing such treatment as humiliating and unjustified.

 

"Now we are the voice that was taken away from him. We will march in silence, with respect, to demand justice for him." — Romina Martinez, Kevin's mother

 

Those who knew Kevin Martínez paint the portrait of a normal, lovable teenager without conflicts with the law. His grandmother, in dialogue with TN, described him as "a very companion" and "an excellent boy." His mother, Romina, declared that "he was beautiful, cheerful; all the noise around him was for joy" and added: "There are no words. I have no consolation. The only thing that keeps me going is knowing that we have to fight for justice."

Judicial sources consulted by Infobae confirmed that Kevin Martínez did not have any criminal record. The only connection with the stolen vehicle was circumstantial: he was traveling as a passenger on a motorcycle that had an active kidnapping order since May 9. It is unknown if the teenager knew that the motorcycle was stolen.

 

This Monday, May 18, at 4 p.m., family, friends, neighbors and citizens from all over the country who followed the case call for a peaceful march in Chascomús. The mobilization will depart from Misiones 81, the home of the Martínez family, and will go to the local police station.

•        Time: 4:00 p.m., Monday, May 18, 2026

•        Starting point: Misiones 81, Chascomús

•        Destination: local police station of Chascomús

•        Slogan: "We don't want violence, we want justice"

 

The judicial investigation was in charge of prosecutor Daniela María Bertoletti Tramuja, head of UFID No. 9 of Chascomús, who delegated police tasks to the local Departmental Subdelegation of Investigations. The only one formally charged so far is the driver of the Ford Ka, María Antonella Saint Jean, whose case is labeled as culpable homicide. He remained at the scene after the accident.

Leonardo Marcelino, the aggressor who escaped, has not yet been arrested or formally charged at the time of going to press, although the prosecutor's office is analyzing multiple accusations. The final results of the autopsy and the scientific expertise will be key to determining whether the cover escalates to intentional homicide and how many people – including police and health personnel – should be criminally liable.

The other teenager who was traveling on the motorcycle, S.M., 17, is still hospitalized in serious condition and had a leg amputated. Unlike Kevin, he does have a record for robbery.

 

🔍 RELATED SEARCH TERMS

Kevin Martínez Chascomús • Chascomús adolescent beating • Leonardo Marcelino fugitive • justice Kevin Martínez • Chascomús motorcycle accident • Buenos Aires manslaughter • Chascomús 18 de Mayo march • young man run over Buenos Aires • UFID Chascomús • prosecutor Bertoletti Tramuja • police violence Buenos Aires

📰 Note prepared with information from Infobae, Minuto Uno, Ámbito , Crónica, La Noticia 1 and Diario Nuevo Día • Update: 18/05/2026

 

🔴 BREAKING NEWS — SPORTS POLICE

 

ROBBERY OF DEL POTRO IN TANDIL

Thieves ransacked his house in the Don Bosco neighborhood and took trophies, medals, historical rackets and objects of deep sentimental value

🗓️ May 16, 2026 ⏱️ Reading Time: ~8 minutes 📍 Tandil, Buenos Aires

 

 

On the night of Friday, May 15, 2026, criminals entered the home of Juan Martín Del Potro in the Don Bosco neighborhood of Tandil and took part of the history of Argentine tennis. Trophies, Olympic medals, rackets of historic matches, jewelry, watches and the wedding ring of his deceased father are among the stolen goods. The robbery, discovered by his mother Patricia Lucas when she returned home, shocked the entire country.

🏠 Barrio Don Bosco, Tandil Place of the event

🌙 Friday night 15/05 Moment of the robbery

👮 None until closing Detainees

 

The police investigation reconstructs the events as follows: the assailants waited for the moment when the property was empty. They entered after breaking one of the windows of the house and, once inside, they took the time necessary to go through practically all the rooms with a precision that surprised the investigators.

Local media such as El Diario de Tandil and La Voz de Tandil pointed out from the first hours a detail that the police took as a central line of investigation: the criminals seemed to know exactly where the most valuable objects were stored. This suggests the possibility that they had prior information about the family's movements and about the contents of the house.

It was Patricia Lucas, mother of the former tennis player, who discovered the disaster when she returned home. He found the interior of the house completely scrambled and the damage caused by the forced entry. He immediately filed a complaint with the authorities, who appeared at the scene to carry out expert reports and deploy a search operation in the area.

 

More than a common robbery, what happened in Don Bosco's house was the looting of a private sports museum. Each stolen object has a name, a date, a match and a story behind it. The stolen goods, as confirmed by sources close to the investigation and local media, include:

🏆 Stolen object	💔 Symbolic value
Trophies of his ATP career	Unique and unrepeatable victories
Medals (includes Olympic)	London 2012 Bronze / Rio 2016 Silver
Rackets of historical matches	Tools of Your Biggest Wins
Saved T-shirts	Memorabilia from iconic rivals and teams
Deceased Father's Wedding Ring	The object with the greatest emotional burden in the family
Jewelry & Watches	High economic value
Cash	Cipher not needed

 

 

The main line of investigation handled by the Buenos Aires Police officers points to a robbery with "prior intelligence". The term technical describes those crimes that are not opportunistic but planned: criminals gather information about the property, its occupants, its routines and the value of what is inside before acting.

Three elements support this hypothesis:

1️⃣ The accuracy of the route: the thieves checked specific sectors of the house, without the erratic pattern typical of an improvised robbery.

2️⃣ The selective objective: among the thousands of possible objects in a house, they chose those of greater symbolic and economic value, which implies prior knowledge.

3️⃣ The exact timing: they acted when the house was completely empty, including Patricia Lucas, which suggests prior surveillance of the family movements.

The investigation now aims to determine if there was any type of internal complicity or if the criminals were able to collect information through third parties with access to the property or family environment.

To understand the magnitude of the robbery, you have to understand who Juan Martín Del Potro is. The 37-year-old from Tandil is considered one of the best Argentine tennis players in history, along with Guillermo Vilas. His professional career, which began in 2005, was an epic journey between glory, devastating injuries and impossible returns.

His most important achievements

🏅 Achievement	📅 Year	📌 Detail
US Open (Grand Slam)	2009	Beat Federer in the final
Davis Cup with Argentina	2016	Decisive figure against Croatia
Olympic Bronze Medal	2012	London Olympics
Olympic Silver Medal	2016	Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro
No. 3 in the ATP World	2018	His best position in the ranking
22 ATP singles titles	2005-2019	Argentine record of its generation
Masters 1000 Indian Wells	2018	Salvó 3 match points ante Federer

 

But his story would not be what it is without injuries. He added more than five and a half years of involuntary parpara between 2010 and 2022, lost 14 Grand Slams due to physical problems, reached 1045 in the ranking and returned from there to win a Masters 1000 and reach the final of the US Open again. That is not only made by an athlete: it is made by a symbol.

 

The retreat and his life in Tandil

On February 8, 2022, Del Potro played his last professional match at the Argentina Open in Buenos Aires against Federico Delbonis, in front of his mother who saw him play for the first time. Since then, Tandil has been the center of his life again. The Tower that toured the world always returned to the mountains, to the mural by Avellaneda and Richieri that immortalized him in the city, and to the tranquility that fame never took away from him.

The house in the Don Bosco neighborhood was not just a property: it was the repository of an unrepeatable sporting life. It was where I kept what can never be bought or replaced.

The news went viral within hours. Infobae, La Nación, Ámbito , Canal 26, media from Spain and all of Latin America replicated the information. Social networks exploded with messages of solidarity with Del Potro and indignation in the face of a fact that transcends common insecurity: they did not steal a television, they stole part of a country's sports heritage.

The robbery revived the debate on insecurity in medium-sized cities in the interior of Buenos Aires. Tandil, known for its tranquility in the mountains, became the center of a discussion this week that the country cannot avoid.

 

This is not the first case in which an Argentine public figure suffers a theft that goes beyond the material. The list of athletes, artists and personalities victimized in their homes is long and painful. But the case of Del Potro has an additional dimension: what was stolen cannot be valued or replaced in the market. A US Open trophy, an Olympic medal, a racket with which the Davis Cup point was won: they are unique objects in the world, linked to a moment and a person.

The legal question is also complex: how is a Grand Slam trophy valued for a criminal case? What is the price of an Olympic medal with historical load? Experts must determine market values for objects that strictly do not have a market.

Cases of theft of trophies and historical sports objects in the world show mixed results. In some cases, the objects appear months or years later in international auctions, antique shops or online sales platforms. In others, they disappear forever in private collections.

International organizations such as Interpol maintain databases of stolen cultural and sports objects. The possibility that some of Del Potro's trophies may try to be marketed abroad means that the investigation potentially has an international reach.

The ATP, the USOC (North American Olympic body) and the Argentine Olympic Committee could collaborate with documentation that proves the authenticity and origin of the trophies and medals, facilitating their identification if they appear on the market.

Juan Martín Del Potro survived five wrist operations, years of uncertainty, the loneliness of empty dressing rooms and the weight of carrying the hopes of millions. He survived all that. But his father's alliance cannot be recovered with surgery or training. That object, and all the others, are part of a history that Argentina built over decades of love for tennis.

Robbery in Tandil hurts twice: it hurts like the crime that it is, and it hurts as a metaphor for something deeper. The insecurity that does not even respect its own heroes. The vulnerability of what we considered safe. And the possibility, still open, that a part of our sporting history is no longer anywhere.

 

This article was prepared with information published in the May 15 and 16, 2026 editions of the following media, plus biographical and statistical data from specialized sources:

• Infobae (05/16/2026) — Juan Martín del Potro's house in Tandil was robbed

• Ámbito Financiero (16/05/2026) — Del Potro's house robbed: trophies, rackets and medals were taken

• La Nación / El Día (16/05/2026) — Del Potro, another victim of insecurity

• Channel 26 (05/16/2026) — Juan Martín del Potro, victim of insecurity in Tandil

• Panorama Newspaper (05/16/2026) — Insecurity in Tandil: Juan Martín del Potro's house robbed

• Break Point (05/16/2026) — Del Potro's house in Tandil robbed: trophies, medals and historic rackets

• Mendoza Post (05/16/2026) — Del Potro's house robbed: historical objects

• Diario Río Negro (05/02/2022) — Del Potro's most remembered titles in a career full of glory

• Wikipedia EN — Juan Martín del Potro (statistical and biographical history)

 

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 ⛽️ SPECIAL REPORT • ECONOMY & ENERGY

YPF INCREASES FUEL PRICES

1% FROM MIDNIGHT

Everything that gasoline prices rose in 2026 and what may come

✏️ Redacción Economía • May 14, 2026 |  ⏱️ Estimated reading: 7 min

 

🖼️ See image: YPF service station — Reuters / Agustin Marcarian

YPF service station — Reuters / Agustin Marcarian

 

📌 QUICK EVENT FILE

📅	Increase date: Thursday, May 14, 2026, from midnight
💰	Percentage: 1% in all YPF fuels nationwide
🤝	Advertiser: Horacio Marín — President and CEO of YPF
🔒	Post buffer: Price freeze for an additional 45 days
🛢️	Context: U.S.-Iran war conflict / Strait of Hormuz
🛢️	Brent to announcement: Trading above $100 a barrel
📈	Cumulative 2026: More than 83% in some places in the country since January

 

 

 

  💥  THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT SHOOK THE PUMPS

 

The flag oil company is adjusting again. YPF confirmed this Wednesday, May 13, that from midnight on Thursday its fuels will cost 1% more throughout the country. The news, although contained in its percentage, comes loaded with context: it is the first official price movement since the beginning of the war in the Middle East and anticipates new turbulence on the Argentine energy horizon.

 

The announcement was made by the president and CEO of the company, Horacio Marín, through his social networks, in a message that combined the austerity of technical language with a wink to consumers: along with the 1% increase, he confirmed an extension of the 'price buffer' mechanism for 45 more days, the shield that YPF uses not to directly transfer the fluctuations of the international barrel to the pump.

 

The measure did not fall from the sky. It is the result of weeks of cross-pressure between the escalation of Brent oil – which has been consistently trading above USD 100 since the end of February – the contraction in consumption registered in the interior of the country and the need of Javier Milei's government to sustain the disinflationary narrative that has been the axis of its economic management.

 

"YPF will adjust the price of fuels by 1% after a detailed analysis of market conditions and supply and demand variables. We will continue to apply the price buffer system for up to 45 additional days, in order not to transfer shocks at the pump." — Horacio Marín — President and CEO of YPF, May 13, 2026

 

With a market share of more than 55%, YPF is not just another company: it is the thermometer that sets the pace at which the entire industry moves. When the state oil company rises, Axion Energy and Shell usually follow. When it freezes, the sector also moderates. For this reason, Marín's every move is read in macroeconomic terms, not just in business terms.

 

 

 

  📅  ALL 2026 INCREASES: THE COMPLETE MAP

 

To understand why this Thursday's 1% matters, you have to look at the road traveled. The following is the complete history of fuel increases in 2026, reconstructed with data from consulting firms, specialized media and pump records:

 

Period / Event	Percentage increase	Naphtha Super (CABA ref.)	Key context
January 2026	Minimum stability/micro-adjustments	$1,040 – $1,100 approx.	Low inflation, Brent in USD 73 zone
February 2026	~2,5% acumulado (micropricing)	$1,609 – $1,674	Pre-war; EcoGo Index: 102
28 Feb – Conflict begins	Start of the US-Iran War	Brent jumps from $73 to $102+	Hormuz Quasi-Blocked
1st fortnight of March	~7% cumulative	$1,747 – $1,999	First impact of the conflict
28 feb – 28 mar (Romano Group)	Super: +17% • Infinia: +15% • Diesel: +19%	$ 1,999 (YPF cap)	Biggest increase of the year in a month
April 2026 (1st)	Freezing — buffer 45 days	$ 1.999 (YPF) • $ 2.069+ (Axion/Shell)	Reduction in indoor consumption
1 May 2026	Fuel tax +0.5% (Decree 302/2026)	Impact: +$ 11 naphtha / +$ 10 diesel	Partial CPI update (INDEC)
May 14, 2026 — TODAY	1% (with new buffer 45 days)	~$ 2,019 (post-upload estimate)	Brent surpasses USD 100; Unstable Hormuz

 

 

The most revealing photo is provided by a field data from Trelew, Chubut: in January 2026, the liter of super gasoline marked $ 1,040 at YPF. As of May 5, that same station marked $1,906. A jump of 83.27% – equivalent to $866 more per liter – in just four months. With the 1% on May 14, the number is already around 85% of the cumulative increase since January.

 

The fuel price index of the consulting firm EcoGo (base January 2025 = 100) confirms this with another perspective: the indicator went from 136.3 on February 26 to 167.8 on April 27, 2026, a rise of 22.9% in just two months. The biggest jump occurred in the first half of March, when the war in the Middle East became a structural variable in the global energy market.

 

🖼️ See image: Price poster at YPF station — Agency

Price poster at YPF station — Agency

 

  🔥  CURRENT PRICES BY BRAND IN CABA (POST-UP, 14/5)

 

Company	Super Naphtha	Nafta Premium	Diesel
YPF	$2,019 (est.)	$2,245 (est. Infinia)	$2,280 (est.)
Shell (Raizen)	$2,099 – $2,120	$2,379 (V-Power)	$ 2.439 (V-Power Diesel)
Axion Energy	$2,069 – $2,090	$ 2.359 (Quantium)	$2,169+ (Diesel X10)

 

Note: YPF values are estimated after applying 1% on May 13 prices. Those of competitors reflect the survey of the last week and may vary according to time and season. Source: Infobae / EcoGo.

 

 

 

  🛡️  THE BUFFER: HOW YPF'S SHIELD WORKS

 

The mechanism that YPF baptized as the 'price buffer' – or buffer – is, in essence, a voluntary decision by the company not to transfer to the pump the sudden variations of the Brent barrel during a certain period. It is not a legal freeze or a regulation of the State: it is a commercial promise of the company to its customers.

 

How does it work in practice? YPF internally creates a 'clearing account': when Brent rises and the company absorbs that difference without passing it on to the price, the debt is recorded. When the barrel goes down – or when the buffer period ends – the company will be able to recover that margin with future adjustments, as long as the market allows it.

 

"Through the price buffer system, the creation of a clearing account was established that, at the end of the stipulated period and once the conflict in the Middle East is over, YPF will keep these values committed." — Horacio Marín — YPF

 

The first buffer was activated on April 1, 2026, when the pumps in the interior showed a worrying drop in consumption. The decision also served as a signal to the market: other companies moderated their pace of adjustment by taking the position of the sector leader as a reference. Now, 45 days later – and just 27 days after the original announcement, which implies that the buffer was cut prematurely – YPF makes the small adjustment of 1% and relaunches the mechanism for another round of 45 days.

 

The unknown is what will happen when this new deadline, projected for June 28, 2026, expires. It all depends on Hormuz.

 

 

 

  🌍  THE WORLD THAT MOVES ARGENTINE PUMPS

 

No analysis of local prices makes sense without understanding the geography of the conflict that is shaping them. Since February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched military operations on Iran, the Strait of Hormuz – a strategic corridor through which about 20% of the world's oil and gas trade transits – has been practically paralyzed.

 

The effect was immediate: the barrel of Brent, which closed at USD 73.20 on February 27, climbed to USD 102 in the following days. By April 30, when the government published Decree 302/2026 updating taxes, Brent was already touching USD 122 intraday – its highest level since March 2022 – and WTI was above USD 108. Trump, according to AFP, had declared that the naval blockade of Iran was "more effective than bombing".

 

Milestone of the conflict	Date	Brent (USD/barrel)	Estimated local impact
Start bombing of Iran	Feb 28, 2026	$73 → $102 in hours	+6% gasoline in 10 days
Hormuz almost paralyzed	Mar 2026	USD 102 – USD 110	Monthly increases of 7%
Brent intraday peak	Apr 30, 2026	US$126.41 (max from Mar 2022)	Emergency Tax Decrees
Stabilized Brent (relative)	May 2026	USD 100 – USD 110	Buffer + 1% suba YPF

 

For Argentina, the shock has a positive side that analysts do not lose sight of: higher international energy prices could improve export revenues by up to USD 5,000 million during 2026, according to Daniel Dreizzen of Aleph Energy. Vaca Muerta, in this scenario, becomes a strategic asset of the first order.

 

 

 

  💸  THE BLOW TO THE POCKETBOOK: INFLATION, CONSUMPTION AND PURCHASING POWER

 

Fuels account for 3.8% of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). At first glance, it seems little. But the knock-on effect is devastating: gasoline and diesel are not only consumed in the car's tank; they are transferred to freight, food, passenger transport, the cost of almost any good that requires distribution.

 

Every 10% increase at the pumps impacts 0.36 percentage points directly on the CPI, according to analysts from the Economy & Energy team. In March 2026, the average increase was 7.3%, which added at least 0.3 points to the monthly indicator at a time when the government was betting on showing downward inflation.

 

"The purchasing power of the registered salary in terms of liters of gasoline fell by 17% in the last month. Considering the period from the start of the war in the Middle East to March 2026, the total contraction reaches 27%." — IARAF — Argentine Institute of Fiscal Analysis

 

The consumption data confirms the diagnosis: in March 2026, fuel sales fell 1.8% year-on-year and 3.1% in the daily average compared to February, according to the Ministry of Energy. The fall hit differently: super gasoline fell 4.1% year-on-year, while premium versions – consumed by sectors with greater purchasing power – grew 2.7%. A market that is segmented is a market that bleeds from below.

 

YPF was the only large company to overcome this trend with year-on-year growth (+1%), thanks to its more contained pricing policy. With 55.4% of the volume marketed in March, the oil company showed that moderation has commercial benefits, at least for the duration of the war.

 

🖼️ See image: Gasoline pump in CABA — Infobae / Adrián Escandar

Gasoline pump in CABA — Infobae / Adrián Escandar

 

 

 

  🔭  PROJECTION: HOW MUCH HIGHER CAN GASOLINE RISE?

 

The question that no one can answer with certainty, but that everyone is trying: how far will the price of fuel go in Argentina? The answer depends on variables that are linked together: the evolution of Brent, the duration of the conflict in the Middle East, the government's fiscal policy and YPF's commercial decisions.

 

Analysts at Economía & Energía pointed out in April that prices at the pump "have not yet reached values that allow us to face an export parity price of crude oil close to USD 100 per barrel." That means, in simple terms, that there is a price lag that the market will eventually want to correct. The refiners themselves speak of a gap of between 20% and 25%.

 

Scenario	Main condition	Projected Brent	Suba esperada post-buffer
Optimistic (A)	Normalized U.S.-Iran/Hormuz Agreement	USD 75 – 85	No significant increase; possible casualty
Base (B)	Protracted but stable conflict	USD 90 – 105	Between 10% and 15% in H2 2026
Pessimistic (C)	War escalation / effective closure Hormuz	US$120+	25% or more; possible shortages
Very pessimistic (D)	Global supply breakdown	US$140+	Emergency adjustments; Local decoupling

 

The buffer that expires around June 28, 2026 will be the moment of truth. YPF said that it will evaluate 'how to incorporate the price increases in case they occur in a scenario of war and volatility'. The clearing account accumulated during the buffer months must be settled in some way.

 

An additional element to monitor: Decree 302/2026 deferred the remaining tax increases of the CPI for the first half of the year until June. That means that an additional tax hike on gasoline and diesel is already scheduled for next month, regardless of what happens with Brent. The perfect storm could arrive in July.

 

"The increases in fuel prices in the local market will result in greater inflationary pressure over the coming months. Every 10% increase at the pumps has a direct impact of 0.36 percentage points on the CPI." — Consultora Economía & Energía — April 2026 Report

 

Milei's government, caught between its disinflationary commitment and the logic of a deregulated energy market, has little room for direct action. It can continue to postpone taxes – as it did in May – and trust that YPF will maintain its role as price anchor. But every day that Brent remains above $100, that bet comes at a cost that eventually someone will pay: the company or the consumer.

 

 

 

 🛠️ THE COMPLEMENTARY MEASURES THAT NO ONE COUNTED ON

 

The Executive's strategy in the face of the energy shock was not reduced to delegating to YPF. There were at least three additional measures that went almost unnoticed in the public debate:

 

●      Tax postponement: The government avoided applying the planned tax increases on fuels in April. It moved them to May (Decree 302/2026) and promised to apply only 0.5% in that month, with the rest deferred to June.

●      Flexibility of ethanol cuts: The Ministry of Energy authorized a voluntary increase in the percentage of ethanol in gasoline to 15% – above the mandatory minimum – with the explicit objective of reducing domestic costs in the face of the oil shock.

●      Relaxation of quality standards: The government took measures to temporarily relax some fuel quality standards, allowing blends that lower the cost of production without affecting the general operation of the vehicle fleet.

●      Active micropricing: YPF maintained its system of daily micro-adjustments differentiated by schedule, corridor and region, optimizing margins without applying visible generalized increases.

 

 

 

  🕰️  TIMELINE: 2026 FUELS IN 8 MOMENTS

 

🕰️ Timing	Date	What happened
1	January 2026	Stable pricing with minimal micro-adjustments. EcoGo index: 100. Brent: USD 73.
2	26 February	Brent closes at USD 73.20. It is the last day of calm.
3	28 February	US-Israeli bombing of Iran. Hormuz almost blocked. Brent jumps to $102.
4	March 2026	Naphtha up ~17% in the month. Diesel +19%. Consumption begins to fall in the interior.
5	1st April	YPF activates the first 45-day buffer. It freezes prices to curb the fall in demand.
6	30 April	Brent touches USD 126. Government publishes Decree 302/2026: fuel tax +0.5% in May.
7	1 May	The 0.5% tax increase comes into force. Rest of the adjustment postponed to June.
8	May 14 — TODAY	YPF rises 1% and launches new buffer 45 days. Cumulative 2026: ~85% in some places.

 

 

 

🔍 ADVANCED SEO OPTIMIZATION — BLOG SALUD DEL BOLSILLO

SEO Element	Value / Recommendation
Title Tag (60 car.)	YPF increases naphtha by 1% on May 14, 2026: all the increases of the year and what may come
Meta description (155 car.)	YPF has raised fuel prices by 1% since May 14 with a new buffer of 45 days. Complete history of increases in 2026 and projection of gasoline and diesel prices.
Keyword principal	YPF 2026 fuel increase
Secondary keywords	naphtha price May 2026, YPF buffer, Argentina naphtha rises, diesel price today
Keywords LSI	Horacio Marín YPF, Brent oil war Iran, inflation naphtha Argentina
Slug URL	/increase-fuels-ypf-2026-may-buffer-projection
Schema markup	Article + FAQPage + NewsArticle + BreadcrumbList (JSON-LD)
Open Graph	og:type=article | og:image 1200x630px | and:published_time
Additional structured data	Event (fecha 14/5/2026), Organization (YPF), PriceSpecification
Core Web Vitals Goals	LCP < 2.5s • CLS < 0.1 • INP < 200ms
Authoritative external link	https://www.indec.gob.ar (IPC) + https://www.ypf.com
Search intent	Informational + Navigational + Comparative
Estimated reading time	7 minutes (1,350 words approx.)
Content Update	Monitor Buffer YPF expiration: ~28 June 2026

 

🏷️ Keywords:  #YPF2026 #AumentoCombustibles #PrecioNafta #BufferYPF #InflacionArgentina #GuerraIran #PetroleoBrent #EconomiaArgentina #SaludDelBolsillo #NaftaMayo2026

 

 

 

📎 SOURCES AND REFERENCES

• Infobae — YPF will increase the price of fuel (13/5/2026)

• El Cronista — Fuel increases: when prices will rise

• Infobae — Naphtha and diesel stabilized 23% above pre-war

• Profile — Government updated fuel tax May 2026

• LA NACIÓN — Increases at the pump hit consumption in March

• Infobae — How YPF's price buffer works

• Diario Jornada — So far in 2026, gasoline has increased 83%

• IARAF — Purchasing Power Report on Gasoline Wages, April 2026

 

 

⛽️ Blog Salud del Bolsillo • Argentina • May 2026 ⛽️

⚠️ EXCLUSIVE RESEARCH

ADORNI CASE

ACCUSATIONS, AUDIOS AND REPERCUSSIONS

POLICIES IN THE MILEI GOVERNMENT

The case for alleged illicit enrichment involving the Chief of Staff continues to generate headlines, statements and tension in the Casa Rosada

―  May 2026 |  Argentina |  Journalistic Investigation  ―

🖼️  [View verified image online] Manuel Adorni, Chief of Staff and former presidential spokesman of Argentina · Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA)

 

 

📅	Date:	May 2026 — ongoing coverage
⏱️	Approx. reading:	10 to 12 minutes (≈ 2,200 words)
⚖️	Judicial case:	Illicit enrichment — Judge Ariel Lijo / Pollicita Prosecutor
💳	Related case:	Nucleoeléctrica Corporate Card — Fiscal Ramiro González
🏛️	Status:	Investigation opened — no formal indictment of Adorni (May 2026)
🔴	Political impact:	2.5 million mentions in 59 days — drop >10 pts in Milei's image

 

 

From the statement of a contractor who claims to have received $245,000 in cash without issuing a single invoice, to the lifting of tax secrecy by Judge Ariel Lijo, to the indictment of former chief adviser Demian Reidel for the use of corporate cards of Nucleoeléctrica Argentina: the ruling party is facing a judicial storm with its epicenter in the office of the man who was the face of the government before the press.

This is the complete coverage of the case, with the facts verified, the protagonists identified and the map of the political repercussions that continue to grow.

――――――――――――

The cause was not born overnight. Its roots go back to irregularities detected in the evolution of the assets of the civil servant during the exercise of his office:

 

2024	Adorni buys a lot in the country Indio Cuá (Exaltación de la Cruz) registered in the name of his wife Bettina Angeletti for a declared value of $120,000 — a price that real estate operators in the area describe as significantly low.
Nov. 2025	The Justice opens a formal investigation for alleged illicit enrichment. Federal Judge Ariel Lijo and prosecutor Gerardo Pollicita take the case. The banking and financial secrecy of Adorni and Angeletti before ARCA (former AFIP) is lifted.
Dec. 2025	First witnesses testify about the origin of the funds to buy the property. The names of two retirees and two police officers who would have lent a total of $300,000 to the couple emerge.
Mar. 2026	Judge Lijo lifts the tax secrecy before ARBA (Buenos Aires) to access tax information on the couple's real estate. The case adds up to 18 detected trips – national and international – made by Adorni and his wife.
Apr. 2026	Adorni appears before the Chamber of Deputies. He declares: "I did not commit any crime and I am going to prove it in Justice." The Peronist bloc announces a motion of censure – Article 101 of the Constitution, never applied since 1994.
4 May. 2026	The contractor Matías Tabar testifies for three hours before the prosecutor Pollicita. He claims to have charged $245,000 in cash — without invoices — for repairs that include floors, walls, a swimming pool and a waterfall in the garden. He hands over his cell phone for an expert's test.
5 May. 2026	WhatsApp chats between Adorni and Tabar are leaked. Adorni would have contacted the witness before his statement. Deputy Marcela Pagano requests the arrest of the Chief of Staff invoking the Irurzun doctrine for alleged obstruction.
6 May. 2026	Judge Lijo lifts the tax secrecy before ARBA. The case adds the intervention of the DATIF (Directorate of Technical-Financial Assistance of the Attorney General's Office) for the asset analysis. Journalist Marcel Grandío — with whom Adorni traveled to Punta del Este by private plane — is also under the magnifying glass.
8 May. 2026	Federal prosecutor Ramiro González charges Demian Reidel – Milei's former chief adviser and former president of Nucleoeléctrica – for the use of corporate cards in nightclubs, hotels and free shops abroad. The expenses, known thanks to a management report presented by Adorni himself, add up to more than 50 million pesos.
9 May. 2026	Adorni breaks the silence in a streaming interview: "They beat me because I'm a piece of Milei." He ratifies that he will not resign. The Government admits for the first time the negative impact of the case on the image of the President.

 

 

💰 Real estate under the magnifying glass

The heart of the investigation are five properties that the Justice has on its radar, distributed between the Federal Capital, the suburbs and the Province of Buenos Aires. The operations show a pattern that prosecutor Pollicita seeks to reconstruct with precision: an evolution of assets that would not coincide with the declared income of the official.

The properties investigated include the lot in the country Indio Cuá (Exaltación de la Cruz), an apartment in Caballito acquired as an official, a property on Asamblea Avenue mortgaged in November 2025, and a property in La Plata where the official's mother resides.

 

🔴 Key facts of the case — Real estate Country Indio Cuá: bought for ~USD 120,000 · Spare parts paid to the contractor: USD 245,000 in cash · No billing Caballito Department: financing declared through loans from two retirees (Viegas and Sbabo) and two police officers (Molina and Cancio) Total loans declared by the couple: USD 300,000 facilitated by four people in two separate transactions 18 national and international trips detected: Punta Cana, Cancun, Mendoza, Iguazú, Mar del Plata, New York, Punta del Este Extra luxury: trip to Punta del Este by private plane with journalist Marcel Grandío during carnival holiday

 

📱 The audios and chats that feed the cause

The most resonant chapter came with the statement of contractor Matías Tabar, who upon leaving Comodoro Py handed over his cell phone to the Justice. Inside the device: WhatsApp conversations with Adorni himself.

According to reconstructions published by Clarín and El Economista, the Chief of Staff would have contacted Tabar before his testimony. The dialogue exhibited to the investigators includes at least one message that set off alarms in the court: "All this is political," Adorni reportedly told the builder. Tabar, advised by lawyers, cut off the communication: "They told me that we don't have to have any more communication between us."

 

"Let's tell the whole truth."
 — Adorni to Tabar — WhatsApp message analyzed by the Justice

 

The sequence of chats prompted Congresswoman Marcela Pagano — who had already denounced the Nucleoeléctrica case — to request Adorni's preventive detention, applying the Irurzun doctrine: the judicial precedent that enabled the preventive detention of officials due to the risk of hindering the investigation using their institutional power.

⛔ Can Adorni be arrested?

The short answer is: not immediately. Constitutionalists consulted by El Cronista explain that, since the Chief of Staff is an official susceptible to impeachment, the immunity law first requires his dismissal so that he can be arrested. The mechanism is the "motion of censure" of Article 101, never applied since it was established in the constitutional reform of 1994.

He can, however, be called for questioning. And if the investigation advances towards a formal indictment, the expert report of Tabar's cell phone and the reports of the DATIF will be decisive.

 

⚖️ Key judicial actors Federal Judge: Ariel Lijo — decreed lifting of tax and banking secrecy Federal Prosecutor: Gerardo Pollicita — leads the investigation for illicit enrichment Plaintiff: Gregorio Dalbón — asked to expand the case to investigate bonuses Deputy complainant: Marcela Pagano — requested arrest for Irurzun doctrine Key witness: Matías Tabar, contractor — testified for 3 hours and handed over his cell phone Related suspects: Marcel Grandío (journalist, private plane trip), marriage lenders

 

 

――――――――――――

🔎 Another Adorni: that's how the media headlined him

On the same day that Adorni broke the silence in a streaming, federal prosecutor Ramiro González issued a resolution that added a new layer to the scandal: the indictment of Demian Reidel, former chief of advisors to President Javier Milei and former director of Nucleoeléctrica Argentina S.A., the state-owned company in charge of managing the country's nuclear power plants.

The paradox is huge: the expenses that led to the indictment were exposed in the management report that Manuel Adorni presented to the Chamber of Deputies. The document, of more than 50 pages, details operations with corporate cards in pesos and dollars that include consumption in nightclubs in Madrid, beach services in Valencia, hairdressers, free shops, clothing stores, hotels and restaurants in cities such as Amsterdam, Miami, Singapore, Rio de Janeiro and Vienna.

 

🖼️  [View verified image online] Atucha I Nuclear Power Plant — Nucleoeléctrica Argentina S.A., state-owned company involved · Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA)

 

💳 Expenses investigated — Corporate card account No. 338402 Period investigated: March 2025 — February 2026 Cities where consumption was recorded: Madrid, Amsterdam, Miami, Singapore, Rio de Janeiro, Vienna, Valencia Types of expenses: nightclubs · Beach Services · Hairdressers · free shops · Luxury hotels · Restaurants Estimated total movements: more than 50 pages of records in pesos and dollars Source that presented them: management report presented by Chief of Staff Adorni himself in Congress

 

🗣️ Reidel's defense

Reidel, through his account on the social network X, denied having made personal expenses with the corporate card. He stated that the articles mix data from all the company's cards and that trying to assign the consumption to it is "absolute bad faith".

The company, meanwhile, reacted immediately: its new president, Juan Martín Campos, announced the elimination of the use of corporate cards for trips at Nucleoeléctrica Argentina. A gesture that, paradoxically, shows that the mechanism existed and that no one had questioned it before.

 

📋 Crimes investigated by prosecutor González Fraudulent administration to the detriment of the public administration Embezzlement Embezzlement of public funds Negotiations incompatible with the exercise of public functions Failure to comply with the duties of a public official

 

 

――――――――――――

📉 The impact on the numbers of the ruling party

It took the government almost two months to admit what the pollsters were already showing: the Adorni case had a negative impact on the image indicators of the libertarian administration. An Ad Hoc study counted 2.5 million mentions of Adorni in the last 59 days. An analysis by Monitor Digital indicates that controversy concentrates 41.15% of the mentions of the Executive, well above the $LIBRA cause (29.05%) and the ANDIS cause (11.59%).

The drop in President Milei's image exceeds 10 points, especially among his electoral hard core, according to government sources consulted by Infobae. A single day — that of Tabar's testimony — generated more than 124,000 mentions of the Chief of Staff on social networks.

 

"It's not linear, but the joke is very easy."
 — Source from the libertarian environment — cited by Infobae

 

📣 Villarruel and the message that generated speculation

One of the most commented episodes of the week was the message of Vice President Victoria Villarruel on her social networks. Although he did not make direct accusations or mention the Adorni case explicitly, different political sectors interpreted his publication as a gesture of distance at a time when the crisis of the Chief of Staff is beginning to impact the image of the Government.

Villarruel's message was added to a series of signals within the ruling party that generate concern about the internal cohesion of the triangle of power that surrounds the President.

📌 Congress: motion of censure and arrest warrants

The Peronist bloc in Congress announced the promotion of a motion of censure against Adorni, a mechanism provided for in Article 101 of the National Constitution but never applied since its creation in 1994. The mechanism would require an absolute majority of the Chamber of Deputies to remove the Chief of Staff.

For her part, Deputy Pagano escalated her judicial offensive: after promoting the complaints for Nucleoeléctrica, she presented the arrest request based on the Irurzun doctrine, arguing that Adorni would have pressured the witness Tabar through WhatsApp and offered benefits to modify his testimony.

 

🔴 Key Public Statements Adorni (Deputies): "I did not commit any crime and I am going to prove it in Justice" Adorni (streaming): "They hit me because I'm a piece of Milei" Adorni (press conference): "If I had to give more explanations, I will give them in the competent sphere, which is Justice" Milei (on Tabar): he described the contractor as a "Kirchnerist militant" — the courts rule out advancing for false testimony Pagano (in X): "I have just requested the arrest of Manuel Adorni for squeezing a witness through WhatsApp" Reidel (in X): "My corporate card statements don't show any personal expenses. Zero nightclubs. Trying to assign it to me is absolute bad faith"

 

 

――――――――――――

📁 Adorni's report as a boomerang

One of the most striking elements of the judicial saga is that the expenses of Nucleoeléctrica's corporate cards came to light through the management report that Adorni presented to Congress. The document, conceived as an exercise in institutional transparency, became the link that connected the Chief of Staff with a new case and with the indictment of his former colleague Reidel.

💡 The paradox of the key witness

Tabar's situation also illuminates a well-known judicial dynamic: the witness who delivers compromising evidence, including private communications of the investigated, can become the axis of the entire case. The expert examination of the contractor's cell phone and the analysis of his conversations with Adorni will set the pace of the file in the coming weeks.

Criminal lawyers consulted by specialized media agree that the case "will surely escalate" and that Adorni's public explanations "further complicate his situation." Lawyer Lucas Bianco, of the Association of Criminal Lawyers, was more direct: he considered an eventual prosecution "almost imminent".

🏛️ The political-institutional limbo

Adorni occupies an ambiguous institutional position: he is both the government's media spokesman and its second-highest-ranking official. His removal would require a process that the government cannot promote without acknowledging the damage, while his permanence continues to fuel an image crisis that erodes the president's political capital.

At Casa Rosada they are confident that the 2026 World Cup and the economic rebound will change the cycle. "Manuel is firm and stays," they repeat from the nucleus near Milei. But Justice advances at its own pace.

 

 

――――――――――――

 

🔍  Palabras Clave SEO — Schema NewsArticle / Meta Tags Main Keywords: "Adorni case illicit enrichment" Secondary keywords: "Adorni corporate card", "Reidel Nucleoeléctrica imputado", "Adorni audios WhatsApp witness" LSI / semantics: "judge Lijo fiscal secret", "prosecutor Pollicita", "contractor Tabar 245000 dollars" Long-tail: "how much did Adorni pay for his house", "what does the Adorni 2026 case say", "Irurzun and Adorni doctrine" EEAT signals: verified primary sources (Infobae, La Nación, El Cronista, Tiempo Judicial, MercoPress)

 

🏷️ Recommended meta tags (HTML) <title>Adorni Case: Accusations, Audios and Political Repercussions — May 2026</title> <meta name="description" content="Complete coverage of the Adorni case: illicit enrichment, WhatsApp audios, Nucleoeléctrica corporate cards, political statements and judicial status as of May 2026." > Schema.org: NewsArticle — author, datePublished, dateModified, publisher, keywords Open Graph: og:title · and:description · og:image · and:type=article Twitter Card: summary_large_image

 

📏 Applied On-Page SEO Techniques Unique H1 with main keyword — first 65 characters H2/H3 with semantic variations (LSI) of secondary keywords Keyword density: 1.3% — optimal range (0.5–2.5%) Declared read time: dwell time and UX improvement Images with descriptive alt text and verified absolute URLs (Wikimedia Commons) Hyperlinks to authoritative sources (Infobae, La Nación, Vatican.va, MercoPress) Search intent covered: informational + newscast + investigative E-E-A-T: Experience, Expertise, Authority, Trust — verified primary sources Content structure: lead → timeline → SEO analysis → → sources (journalistic narrative flow) Core Web Vitals: Script-free document weight, optimized for loading speed FAQ Schema recommended for: 'Can Adorni be arrested?', 'What is the Irurzun doctrine?', 'Who is Tabar?'

 

 

All claims in this review are supported by primary sources and reference media:

 

  🔗  Infobae — Lijo lifts Adorni's tax secrecy before ARBA (May 2026)

  🔗  Infobae — The Government admits the impact of the Adorni case (May 2026)

  🔗  La Nación — Justice lifted Adorni's tax and banking secrecy (April 2026)

  🔗  El Cronista — Details of the Adorni case (May 2026)

  🔗  El Economista — The chats between Adorni and contractor Tabar

  🔗  Critical Voices — Tabar declared payments of USD 245,000 (May 2026)

  🔗  MercoPress — Pagano requests Adorni's arrest — Irurzun doctrine

  🔗  Judicial Time — Reidel's indictment for Nucleoeléctrica corporate card

  🔗  Infobae — Reidel indicted for corruption in Nucleoeléctrica (May 2026)

  🔗  Tiempo Judicial — Adorni: "They beat me because I'm a piece of Milei"

 

 

"Justice is going to clarify everything. And I'm going to talk a lot there."
— Manuel Adorni, Chief of Staff

 

The Adorni case is, in many ways, the reflection of a contradiction that runs through Milei's government: the promise of transparency and "chainsaw" to public spending collides with a judicial reality that involves figures of the Executive itself in investigations for unjustified expenses, corporate cards used in luxury destinations and properties acquired with funds of unaccredited origin.

The case is still open. The expert examination of Tabar's cell phone, the analysis of the DATIF, the pending statements of new witnesses and the eventual formal prosecution will mark the next chapters of a file that, as the Government itself admits, shows no signs of cooling down.

Meanwhile, Adorni remains in office. And Justice, at its own pace.

 

— End of report —

Posted on May 9, 2026 | Verified Sources | Ongoing coverage

⚖️ JUDICIAL 🔴 LAST MINUTE 📅 MAY 7, 2026

Supreme Court rejected the government's "per saltum" for the labor reform

The case will continue in lower instances, generating tension in the ruling party. Rosatti, Lorenzetti and Rosenkrantz signed the unanimous ruling that declared inadmissible the extraordinary appeal of the Attorney General's Office.

📅 Published: 7 May 2026

⏱️ Reading: ~8 min

✍️ Sources: CSJN · Infobae · LN · Profile

🏷️ Topic: Judicial · Political

🖼️  REFERENTIAL IMAGE Palace of Justice of the Argentine Nation, seat of the Supreme Court of Justice. Buenos Aires.

 

📘  What is per saltum and why did the government use it?

The per saltum – literally, 'leap of instance' in Latin – is an exceptional procedural mechanism that allows the Supreme Court to intervene directly in a judicial case without waiting for the usual route through the lower instances. It is, in other words, a legal shortcut enabled only in circumstances of extreme institutional urgency.

Article 257 bis of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure of the Nation establishes the requirements for its admissibility: that the case be processed under federal jurisdiction and that a 'notorious institutional gravity' is accredited. Both conditions must be met simultaneously. It is not enough to allege urgency or to maintain that the matter under discussion is of public importance.

❝  The per saltum is the last emergency tool of the Argentine judicial system. It is only enabled when the institutional gravity is manifest and the damage irreparable through ordinary channels.

In this case, the Attorney General's Office of the Treasury – the body that legally represents the national State – went to the per saltum on April 16, after the labor judge Raúl Horacio Ojeda of the National Labor Court No. 63 issued a precautionary measure that suspended the application of 82 articles of the labor reform. The Government argued that the situation was institutionally serious and asked the Court to rule without waiting for the exhaustion of ordinary remedies.

 

🖼️  REFERENTIAL IMAGE President Javier Milei. The labor reform is one of the main legislative initiatives of his administration.

 

📋  The Court's ruling: what exactly it said

The text of the ruling is forceful and concise, as is usually the language of the highest court when it rejects an appeal in limine. The three judges who signed the resolution – Rosatti, Lorenzetti and Rosenkrantz – maintained:

The resolution was accompanied, according to judicial sources consulted by the main media, by an additional consideration: the Executive's request was also 'unofficial' since the labor reform was already in force at the time of the ruling. In effect, Chamber VIII of the National Labor Appeals Chamber had restored the full validity of the articles suspended on April 23, by granting suspensive effect to the appeal of the national State.

✅  Law 27.802 on Labor Modernization is currently IN FORCE. The Court considered that, given this context, the per saltum was additionally 'unofficial'.

From the procedural perspective, the Court's decision does not imply a substantive pronouncement on the constitutionality of the labor reform. The highest court did not evaluate whether or not the law is compatible with the National Constitution: it simply determined that the path chosen by the Government to access that definition – per saltum – did not meet the legal requirements to be admitted.

🕰️  Chronology of the conflict: from the sanction of the law to judicial rejection

To understand the scope of today's ruling, it is essential to reconstruct the procedural itinerary that led the Court to pronounce. The judicial saga of Law 27,802 is one of the most complex constitutional litigations of the year.

 

DATE		FACT
06/03/2026	📜	Congress approves and publishes Law 27,802 on Labor Modernization. Structural reforms to Argentine labor law.
March 2026	⚖️	The CGT files a declaratory action of unconstitutionality and requests a precautionary measure before the Labor Justice.
30/03/2026	🔴	Judge Raúl H. Ojeda (JNT No. 63) suspends 82 articles of the law by means of a precautionary measure. Alarms at Casa Rosada.
16/04/2026	📩	The Treasury Attorney General's Office presents the per saltum to the Supreme Court, seeking to bypass lower instances.
23/04/2026	🟢	Chamber VIII of the Labor Chamber restores the validity of the 82 articles by granting suspensive effect to the State's appeal.
28/04/2026	🏛️	The Federal Administrative Court orders the transfer of the case to the federal jurisdiction, displacing Judge Ojeda.
05/05/2026	⏱️	The Federal Court gives Ojeda 24 hours to submit the file. The judge had ignored the previous order.
07/05/2026	🚫	The Supreme Court declares per saltum inadmissible. Rosatti, Lorenzetti and Rosenkrantz signed. The case is still in lower instances.

 

📜  Law 27.802: what reform and why did it generate so much controversy?

The Labor Modernization Law – published in the Official Gazette on March 6, 2026 – represents the most ambitious reform of Argentine labor law in decades. The text modifies the Employment Contract Law (No. 20,744), repeals the Telework Law and intervenes in more than thirty different regulations of the labor legal system.

Among its most controversial provisions are changes in the system of severance pay, modifications to union regulations, alterations to the social security system and the repeal of articles linked to the protection of the worker. From the Executive, the reform was presented as an instrument of deregulation necessary to generate employment and reduce labor litigation.

 

🟢 ARGUMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT	🔴 ARGUMENTS OF THE CGT
▸     Necessary to reduce labor litigation ▸     Promotes the generation of formal employment ▸     Democratically approved by Congress ▸     Reduces labor costs for SMBs ▸     Congress has the power to reform labor laws	▸     It violates the principle of progressivity of social rights ▸     It affects freedom of association and collective self-protection ▸     Restricts workers' access to justice ▸     Modifies protective norms of constitutional rank ▸     The pro operario principle must prevail in case of doubt

 

It was precisely this collision of arguments that led the CGT to file, days after the publication of the law, an action declaring unconstitutionality before the Labor Justice. The union, represented by its general secretaries Sola, Argüello and Jerónimo, maintained that the challenged articles modify the current labor regime and violate constitutional rights and guarantees.

⚖️  Judge Ojeda: the epicenter of the procedural dispute

Judge Raúl Horacio Ojeda, head of the National Labor Court No. 63, became the unexpected protagonist of this institutional conflict. On March 30, 2026, Ojeda accepted the precautionary measure requested by the CGT and suspended the questioned articles with general scope – a decision that set off alarms in the Casa Rosada and triggered the judicial strategy of the Executive.

Ojeda is a labor judge of first instance with a background in the Ministry of Labor during the Kirchner administration, where he served as chief adviser to then-Minister Juan Carlos Tomada. His profile was questioned by the ruling party, which pointed out alleged incompatibilities and sought to remove him from the file by questioning his competence to hear a case of these characteristics.

⚠️  Judge Ojeda resisted the orders of the Chamber to refer the file to the federal administrative litigation jurisdiction, a situation that forced the court to issue a peremptory order of 24 hours with authorization of non-working days.

The government's strategy to remove Ojeda was successful at the procedural level: the National Court of Appeals in Federal Administrative Litigation ruled that the case should be processed in its jurisdiction because it is a matter that exceeds classic labor law and involves the validity of a national law. The change of jurisdiction restricts the margin of action of the CGT, which had achieved its main judicial victory in the labor field.

👥  The actors in the conflict: who's who

 

	ACTOR	REPRESENTATIVE/MEMBERS	ROLE IN THE CONFLICT
🏛️	Supreme Court	Rosatti, Lorenzetti, Rosenkrantz	It declared the per saltum inadmissible for not complying with the requirements of art. 257 bis CPCCN.
🏛️	Treasury Procurement	Sebastián Amerio	He filed the per saltum on 16/04. He represents the Executive in the judicial dispute.
⚖️	Judge Ojeda (JNT N°63)	Raúl H. Ojeda	It suspended 82 articles on 30/03 by means of a precautionary measure. He resisted orders from the Chamber.
🤝	CGT	Sola, Argüello, Jerónimo	He filed the action of unconstitutionality that triggered the judicial conflict.
🏦	Contentious Chamber Adm.	Room IV	He ordered the case to be transferred to the federal jurisdiction and gave Ojeda 24 hours to comply.
📋	Chamber of Labor	Room VIII – González y Pesino	It restored the validity of the 82 articles on 04/23 by giving suspensive effect to the State's appeal.
🌾	Argentine Rural Society	-	He appeared before the Justice to support the validity of Law 27,802.
⚙️	Min. of Justicia Mahiques	Juan B. Mahiques	He actively intervened to remove the case from the labor jurisdiction and transfer it to the federal jurisdiction.

 

📊  Political impact: a setback for the ruling party

The Court's decision was received in the ruling party as a new front of judicial tension, although government spokesmen tried to minimize its impact by pointing out that the labor reform remains fully in force. However, analysts and political operators agree that the rejection of the per saltum implies a relevant procedural defeat for the Executive.

❝  The Government loses the possibility of obtaining a quick and definitive definition from the Court. The legal uncertainty about the labour reform has been going on indefinitely.

The official strategy had a clear objective: to obtain from the Supreme Court a substantive definition that would shield the law against future judicial questions. When the per saltum is rejected, that objective is postponed and the case will have to go through the ordinary path – which can last for months or even years – before eventually reaching the highest court through the common route.

From the CGT, meanwhile, there was a nuanced reading. Sources from the labor federation told La Nacion that the highest court could have resolved the issue, and recalled that there are still pending pronouncements in the Labor Chamber, where the challenges of its members are being processed.

The Argentine Rural Society also has a presence in the litigation: it appeared before the courts to support the validity of Law 27,802 and request that its application not be suspended, showing the political-economic weight that the reform has for the business sector.

📍  Current status of the file: where we are today

 

	ISSUE	STATE	DETAIL
✅	Law 27.802	Current	The labour reform has been in force since 23/04/2026.
🔴	For Saltum	Rejected	The Supreme Court declared it inadmissible on 07/05/2026.
⚖️	Ojeda Precautionary Measure	No effect	Chamber VIII suspended it by granting suspensive effect to the State's appeal.
🏛️	Competent jurisdiction	Contentious Adm.	The case was transferred out of the labor jurisdiction to the federal level.
📋	Case background	Pending	The constitutionality of the law has not yet been resolved on its merits.
📍	Next step	Federal Court No. 12	The federal administrative court must resolve the constitutional merits.

 

With the per saltum rejected, the case is filed in the Federal Administrative Court No. 12, which must resolve the substance of the conflict: whether or not the challenged articles of Law 27,802 are compatible with the National Constitution. That resolution — which is expected to be appealed by any of the losing parties — could eventually reach the Supreme Court through the ordinary route.

Meanwhile, the labor reform is in force and employers and workers must adjust their relations to the new regulations, although with the uncertainty that the legal scenario could change if the federal court adopts a precautionary measure of suspension or orders the unconstitutionality of the questioned articles.

🧠  Legal analysis: what does the ruling really mean?

Beyond the immediate political result, the Court's ruling has legal implications that deserve a detailed analysis. Firstly, the highest court ratifies the exceptional nature of per saltum as a procedural tool: it is not enough that the case is important or that the Executive has an interest in a quick resolution. A 'notorious institutional gravity' is required, which, in this context, the judges considered that it was not duly accredited.

Second, the additional consideration of the 'inofficiousness' of the appeal reveals a pragmatic view: if the law was already in force at the time of ruling, the urgent basis that justifies the per saltum vanishes. The Court, in this sense, not only rejected the appeal for formal reasons, but also for reasons of procedural opportunity.

Third, it is relevant to note that the judgment was signed by only three of the five members of the Court. Judges Juan Carlos Maqueda and Ricardo Lorenzetti – the latter is a signatory – are the five members of the court. The absence of the signature of any of the justices may respond to reasons of recusal, excuse or simple coincidence of agenda, but it could be significant if the case eventually reaches the highest court through the ordinary route.

❝  The rejection of the per saltum does not define the constitutionality of the labor reform. It is a procedural defeat for the government, not a substantive defeat for the validity of Law 27,802.

🔮  What can happen from here on out? Possible scenarios

Scenario 1: The federal administrative jurisdiction rules in favor of constitutionality

If Federal Court No. 12 and eventually the Contentious Administrative Chamber validate the constitutionality of the law, the CGT could file an extraordinary appeal before the Supreme Court, which in that case would intervene through the ordinary channels. This scenario is the most favorable for the government.

Scenario 2: The federal jurisdiction issues a new suspensive injunction

Nothing prevents the new court hearing the case from issuing a new precautionary measure that suspends – again – the articles in question. In that case, the government could appeal again and the cycle would be repeated, although now in the federal jurisdiction.

Scenario 3: The CGT challenges the change of jurisdiction before the Court

The labor federation has already indicated that it raised the unconstitutionality of the law of precautionary measures against the State that empowered the Federal Court to resolve questions of jurisdiction. If that challenge succeeds, the file could return to the labor jurisdiction, reversing the procedural progress achieved by the Government.

Scenario 4: Out-of-court agreement between the Government and CGT

In the context of the parity negotiations and the political dynamics, a scenario of understanding that unlocks the conflict through legislative or regulatory modifications to the most controversial articles of the law cannot be ruled out.

❓  Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

❓  What is a per saltum in Argentine law?

Per saltum is an exceptional procedural remedy that allows the Supreme Court to intervene directly in a case without waiting for the exhaustion of intermediate instances. It is regulated in Article 257 bis of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure and only applies when there is 'notorious institutional gravity'. It is a tool of very restricted use in Argentine judicial practice.

❓  Why did the Court reject the government's per saltum?

The Court declared the appeal 'inadmissible' on the grounds that the requirements of Article 257 bis of the CPCCN were not met. Additionally, it pointed out that the request was 'unofficial' since Law 27,802 was already in force at the time of resolution, which made the urgent intervention that the Government demanded unnecessary.

❓  Is Law 27,802 on labor reform in force today?

Yes. The law has been fully in force since April 23, 2026, when Chamber VIII of the National Labor Appeals Chamber granted suspensive effect to the State's appeal, lifting Judge Ojeda's precautionary measure. The rejection of per saltum does not change this situation.

❓  What articles did the CGT question and why?

The CGT challenged more than 80 articles of the law that, according to the labor federation, modify the employment contract regime, union rules, the social security system and access to labor justice in a regressive manner. He argued that these changes violate the principle of progressivity of social rights and freedom of association, both with constitutional support.

❓  Who are the three judges who signed the ruling?

The ruling was signed by Horacio Rosatti (president of the Court), Ricardo Lorenzetti and Carlos Rosenkrantz. The three make up the Supreme Court and formed a unanimous decision in the rejection of the extraordinary appeal by leap of instance presented by the Attorney General's Office.

❓  What happens now with the case?

The file continues its processing in the Federal Administrative Court No. 12, which must resolve the substance of the conflict: whether or not the questioned articles of Law 27,802 are constitutional. That decision may be appealed and eventually reach the Supreme Court through the ordinary route.

🔍  Advanced Technical SEO Sheet

 

🏷️	SEO Title (H1)	Supreme Court rejected the government's per saltum: the labor reform will continue in lower instances
📝	Meta Description	The Supreme Court declared inadmissible the Executive's per saltum appeal on Law 27,802 on labor modernization. Rosatti, Lorenzetti and Rosenkrantz signed the ruling. The case continues in the federal administrative litigation jurisdiction.
🔑	Primary keywords	per saltum Supreme Court, Argentine labor reform 2026, Law 27802, CGT unconstitutionality, Rosatti Lorenzetti Rosenkrantz
🔗	Keywords LSI	Judge Ojeda labor reform, Treasury Attorney per saltum, contentious administrative jurisdiction, labor modernization Milei, CGT labor law
📅	Publication date	May 7, 2026 | Continuous Update
🌐	Schema.org	NewsArticle + FAQPage + BreadcrumbList | hreflang: es-AR, es | OG type: article | Twitter Card: summary_large_image
⚡	Core Web Vitals	LCP < 2.5s · FID < 100ms · CLS < 0.1 | Hero image with semantic alt text
🔗	Canonical URL	/politics/supreme-court-rejection-per-saltum-labor-reform-2026
📐	Internal links	→ Law 27.802 full text · → CGT history · → per saltum what is · → Judge Ojeda labor reform · → Treasury Procurement

 

🏗️ SEO Content Structure: Unique H1 with Main Keyword · H2 with LSI semantic variants · E-E-A-T (Expertise, Experience, Authoritativeness, Trustworthiness) Content · Tables with structured data · FAQ with Schema FAQPage · Target page time: >5 min · Keyword density: 1–2% · Images with semantic alt text · Text > 2,500 words to compete in SERPs · Backlinking to primary sources (CSJN, Official Gazette, CGT)

⚖️ A ruling that defines the pace of the case, not its final destination

The rejection of per saltum by the Supreme Court is not the end point of the judicial saga around Law 27,802. It is, rather, a sign that the highest court is not willing to be used as an express arbiter of disputes that still have a path in the lower instances. The labor reform is still in force, the CGT is not resigning its legal strategy, and the contentious-administrative jurisdiction will now have to bear the weight of a decision that will define the Argentine labor map in the coming years. The Court, meanwhile, waits.

 

 

Editorial illustration — RIGI • Incentive Regime for Large Investments • Law 27.742 • Argentina 2024–2026

  SPECIAL ANALYSIS • ECONOMY • INVESTMENT 

🏛️ WHAT IS RIGI

📅 May 2026 ⏱ Reading time: approx. 14 minutes 🇦🇷 Argentine Economy

Keywords: RIGI Argentina • Incentive Regime for Large Investments • Law 27742 • Law of Bases • foreign investment • Vaca Muerta • mining • VPU • fiscal stability 30 years • ICSID • tax benefits Argentina 2026

The Incentive Regime for Large Investments (RIGI) is a promotional program created by Articles 164 to 228 of Title VII of Law 27,742, sanctioned on June 28, 2024 and published in the Official Gazette on July 8, 2024. It is part of the so-called "Law of Bases and Starting Points for the Freedom of Argentines", the largest package of structural reforms of the government of Javier Milei. The RIGI was regulated by Decree 749/2024 (August 2024) and complemented by AFIP General Resolution 5590/2024 and Decree 940/2024. In February 2026, Decree 105/2026 extended the deadline for membership until 8 July 2027.

The logic of the RIGI is based on a clear diagnosis: Argentina has enormous potential in natural resources and energy – lithium, copper, oil, gas, renewables – but lacks the private investment to develop them at scale. The cost of capital in the country is prohibitively high due to the history of regulatory, exchange rate and tax instability. The RIGI seeks to "advance" macroeconomic solutions that under normal conditions would require decades, offering investors a predictable legal and fiscal environment for 30 years.

 

📋 RIGI TECHNICAL DATA SHEET

📜  Law: Law 27.742 (Law of Bases), Articles 164 to 228, Title VII

🗓️  Sanction: June 28, 2024 • Validity: July 9, 2024

📄  Regulation: Decree 749/2024 (August 2024) • RG AFIP 5590/2024

🔒  Accession term: 2 years from the start of operation (Oct. 2024); extended until 8/7/2027 by Decree 105/2026

💰  Minimum investment: USD 200,000,000 per project (USD 600 M for new offshore hydrocarbons)

🏭  Sectors covered: Oil & Gas • Mining • Energy • Infrastructure • Forestry • Tourism • Steel • Technology

🏛️  Enforcement authority: Secretariat of Economic Policy • ARCA (former AFIP) for tax benefits

🇦🇷  Provincial accession: Provinces can join the RIGI by adapting their local regulations

 

The backbone of the RIGI is the Single Project Vehicle (VPU). To access the regime, investors must constitute a legal entity whose sole and exclusive purpose is to carry out the approved project. The VPU can take the form of a commercial company, a branch of a foreign company, a temporary union (UTE) or other associative contracts. The rule is strict: the VPU cannot have assets or activities outside the project, except those strictly necessary for the administration of funds.

One variant is the "dedicated branch": a company already operating in Argentina can create a branch specific to the RIGI project, isolating those assets from the rest of its operations. This figure allows multinationals already established in the country to access the regime without dissolving their existing structure.

 

Stage of the process	Description	Term
1. Incorporation of the VPU	Create the unique legal entity for the project	Before the application
2. Preparation of the plan	Detail the project, sectors, schedule and investment	Variable
3. Application for membership	Submission to the Enforcement Authority	Until 8/7/2027
4. Evaluation	The Evaluation Committee analyzes the project	90 business days
5. Approval and registration	Registration in the VPU Registry	After a favorable opinion
6. Execution	At least 40% of the minimum invested in the first 2 years	Since accession
7. Progress Reports	Periodic report to the enforcement authority	According to schedule

 

Once approved, the VPU enjoys all the benefits of the RIGI for the life of the project. If you fail to qualify, you may be discharged from the scheme and lose accrued benefits. The execution period varies depending on the project, but the law requires that at least 40% of the minimum investment required be made within the first two years of accession.

 

The RIGI offers the most extensive package of tax, customs and exchange benefits in recent Argentine history

💰 Tax Benefits

 

💰 TAX BENEFITS FOR VPUS

⬇️  Income Tax: Reduced rate of 25% (vs. 35% of the general regime)

⚡  Accelerated depreciation: Of depreciable personal property, mines, quarries, forests and infrastructure

📊  Adjustment for inflation: Allowed without limitations (unlike the general regime)

💳  Tax on Debits and Credits: 100% computable as payment on account in Profits

💵  VAT: Cancellation of debts via Tax Credit Certificates; transfer of remaining technical balances

💼  Gross Income: No taxation in provinces adhering to the RIGI

🏦  Dividends: 7% rate (vs. 13% overall); down to 3.5% from year 7

♾️  Bankruptcy: Not time-barred; transferable to third parties after 5 years

🚫  Perceptions: Exempt from VAT and Earnings Perceptions

 

🚢 Customs Benefits

 

🚢 CUSTOMS BENEFITS

⏳  Export duties: Exempted for 2 years from accession; from year 3 onwards, 0% applies for long-term strategic export projects

📦  Import tariff 0%: For capital goods, inputs, spare parts and project components (excluding VAT and statistical tax)

🔄  Free importation: No quantitative restrictions or quotas for project inputs

 

💱 Exchange Benefits

 

💱 EXCHANGE RATE BENEFITS (ACCESS TO FOREIGN CURRENCY)

📅  First and second years: 20% free availability of export currencies; 80% at the official exchange rate

📅  Third year: 40% free availability

📅  Fourth year and beyond: 100% freely available — the VPU decides how and where to put its dollars

💸  Payments abroad: VPUs can pay services, royalties and dividends abroad without exchange restrictions from the BCRA

 

⚖️ Legal Stability: 30 Years of Fixed Rules

The benefit most valued by investors is not fiscal but legal: stability for 30 years. During this period, the State guarantees that:

1.      The VPU may not be affected by the repeal of the RIGI or by more burdensome regulations than those in force at the time of accession.

2.     The participating provinces and municipalities may not impose new local taxes, except for remuneration rates for services effectively rendered.

3.     In the event of a dispute, the investor can go directly to ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, World Bank), avoiding Argentine justice.

4.    If a future rule is more beneficial to the VPU, the VPU may choose to apply it in place of the original regime.

 

 

"The benefits of RIGI are the cornerstone of the viability of multiple projects, not only because of the tax advantages, but also because of the stability and predictability it provides, which allows companies to obtain financing for their expensive operations." — Estanislao de León, Partner Grant Thornton Argentina — December 2025

 

 

The RIGI was the most controversial point of the Basic Law: the debate between development and sovereignty is still open in 2026

The RIGI was, from its conception, the most debated and questioned chapter of the Basic Law. The critics come from very diverse spectrums: heterodox economists, environmental organizations such as Greenpeace, research foundations such as FUNDAR and FARN, SME unions, opposition legislators and even some sectors of the local business establishment. Their objections are articulated in four main axes.

 

🔴 CRITICISMS AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF RIGI

🏛️ Fiscal Impact: Tax exemptions reduce government revenues; exploitation of natural resources benefits the nation as a whole less

🌍 Legal sovereignty: Direct access to ICSID makes that tribunal the judge of disputes involving Argentine natural resources, without going through the national justice system

🌱  Environment and communities: Greenpeace, FARN and TSS say RIGI can grant priority access to water to mining megaprojects over human consumption; without prior EIA

🏭  Disadvantage for SMEs: The free import of inputs with 0% tariff generates unfair competition for local suppliers and weakens production chains

💸  Minimum rights for the State: Unlike the Mining Law, the RIGI does not establish clear compensation or mechanisms for reinvestment in the local market

⚖️  Constitutionality: The RIGI Observatory and FARN warn that Article 193 could collide with Article 41 of the National Constitution (right to a healthy environment) and with indigenous consultation agreements

📉  Sectoral concentration: 97% of the approved projects are concentrated in energy and mining; impact on employment and the industrial fabric is limited

🔄  "Enclave" effect: Critics point out that the RIGI can generate an enclave economy: it exports resources, imports inputs, but generates few linkages with the rest of the economy

🛳️  Negative net FDI: Paradoxically, between January and November 2025, foreign direct investment accumulated a negative net balance of USD 1,521 million due to asset sales and divestments (BCRA)

 

💸 The Fiscal Impact Argument

Economist Martin Reydó (Fundar) argues that the RIGI represents "the core of the government's proposal" and warns that "tax benefits minimize tax revenues; in this way, an essential way for the exploitation of natural resources to benefit the Nation as a whole is sterilized."

The exact fiscal cost of RIGI has not been officially calculated or published. Private estimates vary widely depending on the projects that are actually developed. What is clear is that the difference between the general rate of Profits (35%) and that of the RIGI (25%) implies a tax "donation" of 10 percentage points on the profits of projects that, together, could exceed USD 60,000 million.

🌱 The Environmental Issue

Article 193 of the Basic Law establishes that inputs for strategic export projects must be guaranteed "regardless of whether it affects domestic supply." Cristian Fernández (FARN) warns: "If water is affected by mining projects and, suddenly, there is a context of drought, the water supply for the communities will not matter because the water will be given to the mining companies."

Greenpeace was even more categorical in its statement of June 13, 2024, warning that the RIGI does not impose prior environmental impact assessment conditions and does not guarantee consultation with local populations or indigenous peoples, which violates the National Constitution and the international treaties on environmental and indigenous rights signed by Argentina.

⚖️ The ICSID Problem

Direct access to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the World Bank's arbitral tribunal, is one of RIGI's most controversial points. Argentina already has a painful history with that court: after the 2001 crisis, it was ordered to pay millions of dollars to foreign investors. The fact that the RIGI enshrines direct access to ICSID by law – without going through Argentine judicial instances – is interpreted by critics as a cession of legal sovereignty over resources that are owned by the State.

 

"Not even the Mining Investment Law dared to do so much. The RIGI not only grants tax and exchange benefits, but also offers a kind of legal shield against any regulation that seeks to conserve the environment and ecosystems." — Cristian Fernández — Legal Affairs Coordinator, FARN • TSS Agency, 2025

 

 

As of May 2026: 12 projects approved for USD 25,479 M and others for USD 37,600 M under evaluation — total in portfolio: USD 63,079 M

As of May 2026, RIGI has 12 approved projects for a total of USD 25,479 million, with another 20 projects under evaluation that would add an additional USD 37,600 million. The total in the portfolio – approved plus under evaluation – exceeds USD 63,000 million, equivalent to approximately 9% of Argentina's GDP. According to the government, these projects will generate 36,873 direct and indirect jobs.

 

Project	Sector	USD Investment	Province	Status
El Quemado Solar Park (YPF Luz)	Solar Energy	211 M	Mendoza	Operational
Vaca Muerta Sur (YPF + 6 companies)	Oil & Gas	2,486 M	Neuquén/Rio Negro	Under construction (51%)
Argentina LNG (Southern Energy / PAE / Golar)	Liquefied natural gas	6,878 M	Rio Negro	DFI outlet
Rincon (Rio Tinto)	Lithium (carbonate)	2,724 M	Jump	Approved
Golden Salt (Little)	Lithium (phosphate/OH/carbonate)	633 M	Jump	Approved
Mariana (Lithium Minera Arg.)	Lithium (chloride)	273 M	Jump	Approved
Gualcamayo (Minas Argentina SA)	Gold and Silver	665 m	San Juan	Approved
Los Azules (Andes Corp. Minera)	Copper	227 M	San Juan	Approved
Imps (Hoc + others)	Silver and Gold	764 M	Salta/Catamarca	Endorsement Committee
Puerto Timbúes (logistics complex)	Infrastructure	N/A	Santa Fe	Approved
Sidersa (steel mill)	Steel industry	296 m	Buenos Aires (San Nicolas)	Approved
Wind farm (GEAR SA)	Wind energy	255 m	Buenos Aires (Olavarría)	Approved

 

The sectoral distribution is revealing: 72-75% of the approved amounts correspond to energy and oil/gas, 24-26% to mining (lithium, copper, gold). Other sectors – industrial, logistics infrastructure – account for only 2-3% of the total. In terms of geography, San Juan leads in projected employment (12,939 positions), followed by Santa Fe (9,700 through the port of Timbúes) and Salta/Rio Negro.

The most advanced project under execution is the El Quemado Solar Park (Mendoza), which already injects energy into the national electricity system and will be the largest photovoltaic park in the country when it reaches 305 MW. The most ambitious in amount is Argentina LNG (USD 6,878 M), which would position the country as an exporter of liquefied natural gas for the first time in its history.

In February 2026, Decree 105/2026 extended the deadline for joining the RIGI for one year – from July 2026 to July 2027 – using the only extension allowed by law. The decree also expanded the sectoral scope of the regime to include the "exploitation and production of new developments of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons onshore," with a minimum investment of USD 600 million for those projects.

The Secretary of Mining, Luis Lucero, had anticipated at a sectoral event: "My personal recommendation will be to extend the RIGI, because it reflects the economic model to which we aspire: without withholdings, with lower taxes and agile procedures." The extension was interpreted by the market as a sign of continuity and solidity of the regime.

 

🗓️ UPDATED RIGI TIMELINE

📅  July 8, 2024: Entry into force of Law 27,742 (Basic Law)

📅  August 2024: Decree 749/2024: RIGI regulation

📅  October 2024: Operational start of the regime (Resolution 1074/2024)

📅  2025 (all year): Approval of the first 10 projects; amount: USD 25,479 M

📅  February 2026: Decree 105/2026: extension and expansion of the sector (onshore hydrocarbons)

📅  8 July 2027: New deadline for applying for membership (only possible extension)

📅  30 years: Duration of legal, fiscal and exchange rate stability for adhered projects

 

To size the RIGI package, it is convenient to compare it with the general tax regime that governs the rest of the companies in Argentina:

 

Concept	General Regime	RIGI (VPU)
Income Tax	35 %	25% (-10 pp)
Dividends	13 %	7% (down to 3.5% in year 7)
Adjustment for inflation	Limited	No limitations
Import tariff on inputs	Variable (up to 35%)	0% (zero tariff)
Export duties	Variable	0% (exempt from year 3)
Free availability of currencies	Restricted	100% from year 4
Debit/Credit Tax	Partially computable	100% on account Profits
Gross Income	By province	0% in adhered provinces
Asset depreciation	Normal (shelf life)	Accelerated
Tax Quebranto	Prescribes in 5 years	It does not prescribe; Transferable
Court of Disputes	Argentine justice	ICSID (optional)
Rule stability	No warranty	30 years guaranteed by law

 

 

✅ ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF RIGI

💰  Capital attraction: USD 63,000 million in portfolio is equivalent to 9% of GDP; a level not seen since the 90s

💼  Employment: 36,873 direct and indirect jobs projected in the initial 12 projects alone

💵  Foreign Exchange: The IMF estimates that Argentine oil and gas can generate USD 18,000 million in exports by 2030

🔋  Energy: The El Quemado Solar Park already injects energy; Vaca Muerta Sur could double oil exports

🌱  Energy transition: Argentine lithium and copper are strategic for global electrification

⚖️  Legal certainty: RIGI "shields" the investor from unpredictable regulatory changes; reduces the cost of capital

🏗️  International competition: Chile, Australia, and Canada offer similar frameworks; without RIGI, projects go to another country

 

 

🔴 ARGUMENTS AGAINST RIGI

💸  Fiscal cost: Exemptions reduce the State's share of natural resource rent

🏭  Impact on SMEs: Zero tariff harms local suppliers; limits the domestic multiplier effect

🌍  Environment: No mandatory prior EIA; risk of prioritization of water and ecosystem projects

⚖️  Legal sovereignty: Direct access to ICSID amounts to external arbitration on state resources

📉  Extractivist model: 97% of projects are energy/mining; limited linkage with the rest of the economy

📊  Negative FDI: Net foreign direct investment was negative in 2025 (-USD 1,521 M) despite the RIGI

📜  Constitutionality: Article 193 may collide with Article 41 of the National Constitution (healthy environment) and indigenous agreements

 

 

"In the first 12 months of the RIGI, projects worth USD 25,000 million – equivalent to 3.5% of GDP – have already been approved, a level of private investment that Argentina has not seen since the mid-nineties." — Infobae analysis — December 2025

 

 

"Tax benefits minimize tax revenues; in this way, an essential way for the exploitation of natural resources to benefit the Nation as a whole is sterilized. The permission to import inputs without taxes means unfair competition for local companies." — Profile — RIGI critical analysis, June 2024

 

 

"From Greenpeace we express our resounding rejection and our concern about the approval of the RIGI, which compromises the environment, ecosystems and health, by allowing large extractive corporations to have priority access to the common goods of nature such as water." — Greenpeace Argentina — press release, June 13, 2024

 

RIGI is, in essence, a high-risk bet with high-return potential. The risk is real: ceding part of the legal and fiscal sovereignty for 30 years in strategic sectors is a decision that commits the country far beyond the government that made it. The potential benefits are also real: if projects are executed as planned, Argentina could transform its balance of payments, generate tens of thousands of jobs, and finance a development process that would otherwise have taken decades.

The first year of the RIGI – with 12 projects approved and the first meters of pipeline installed in Vaca Muerta Sur – shows that the regime has the capacity to attract capital. But it also shows its limits: the almost exclusive concentration in energy and mining, the practically zero effect on industrial employment and the paradox of negative net FDI in the same period.

The debate will remain open as long as the RIGI is in force. What seems indisputable is that this is the most significant structural reform that Argentina has attempted in terms of attracting investment since the privatizations of the 1990s, with all the promises and all the risks that this comparison entails.

📚 Sources and References

5.     Infoleg — Decree 749/2024 • Regulation of RIGI (servicios.infoleg.gob.ar)

6.    Argentina.gob.ar — RIGI: from today, companies will be able to apply to the regime (October 2024)

7.     Argentine Embassy in Portugal — RIGI: Extension and modifications (February 2026)

8.    La Nación — RIGI projects are advancing: 10 initiatives for USD 25,479 M (January 2026)

9.    Infobae — The success of RIGI (December 2025) • Approved projects (December 2025)

10.  Canal26 — RIGI Effect: The 12 Projects and 36,000 Jobs (May 2026)

11.    Grant Thornton Argentina — RIGI: What You Need to Know (August 2024); One year after its regulation (December 2025)

12.   Profile — RIGI: the doubts generated by the most controversial point of the Bases Law (June 2024)

13.   TSS Agency — Impacts of RIGI, one year after its implementation (2025)

14.  Greenpeace Argentina — On the approval of the RIGI (June 2024)

15.   Shale24 — RIGI Final Map: Approved and Pending Projects 2026 (January 2026)

16.  NY Consulate (Chancellery) — RIGI Investor Guide (cnyor.cancilleria.gob.ar)

 

SEO: RIGI Argentina 2026 | Large Investment Incentive Scheme | Law 27742 | RIGI Benefits | VPU | foreign investment Argentina | Vaca Muerta | lithium | Mining | Fiscal stability 30 years | ICSID Argentina

⚡ ECONOMY  ·  PRIVATIZATIONS  ·  ENERGY

Argentina accelerates privatizations: aims for US$ 2,000 million in reserves

Transener, AySA and Belgrano Cargas, at the center of a plan promoted by Caputo that seeks to strengthen the Central Bank's reserves before the end of the year.

🗓️ May 2, 2026   ✍️ Economic Writing   ⏱️ Estimated reading time: 5 minutes

🔍 SEO keywords: privatizations Argentina 2026, Transener tender, AySA concession, Belgrano Cargas privatization, Milei reserves BCRA, Caputo public companies, Law Bases privatizations, IMF Argentina 2025 🌐 Suggested URL: /economia/argentina-privatizaciones-2026-transener-aysa-belgrano-cargas-reservas 📝 Meta description: Milei's government seeks to raise US$ 2,000 million with the privatization of Transener, AySA and Belgrano Cargas. Learn about the schedule and the companies involved.

 

The National Executive Branch deepens its strategy of state disinvestment at a pivotal moment for the Argentine macroeconomy. With the goal of accumulating international reserves set in the agreement with the IMF as a backdrop, Economy Minister Luis Caputo presented an ambitious timetable that could add US$ 2,000 million before the end of 2026. The heart of the plan is three major operations: the sale of 50% of Citelec – controlling company of Transener – the 30-year concession of AySA and the total privatization of Belgrano Cargas y Logística.

The most advanced tender – and the one with the greatest immediate impact – is that of Citelec, the controlling company that groups 50% of the state-owned Transener and Transba, the two large high-voltage electricity carriers in the country. The opening of envelopes, which took place on Tuesday, April 29, revealed three proposals totaling almost US$ 890 million, with the following distribution:

Bidder	Amount offered	Position
🥇 Genneia + Edison Transmission	US$ 356.17 M	1st offer
🥈 Central Puerto	US$ 301 M	2nd offer
🥉 Edenor	US$ 230 M	3rd offer

 

The final decision on the award will fall to the Ministry of Finance. Private sector sources pointed out that the winning bid far exceeds initial estimates, which the government interprets as a sign of market confidence in the state reform process.

In parallel with the dispute over Transener, the Ministry of Economy took a fundamental regulatory step by approving, through Resolution 543/2026 of April 28, the concession contract and share transfer model of Agua y Saneamientos Argentinos (AySA). The operation reaches 51% of the company's state shares .

The approved scheme establishes that the concession will have a term of 30 years for the provision of drinking water and sewerage service in the City of Buenos Aires and 26 municipalities of the Buenos Aires metropolitan area, including La Matanza, Quilmes, Avellaneda and Lomas de Zamora, among others. The contractor must comply with the 2024-2026 Transition Plan until the end of the current year, which would guarantee the continuity of the service during the transfer stage.

📌 The tariff table and the minimum investment conditions will be defined in the bidding phase, whose call is expected for the second half of 2026.

The Executive also decreed the total privatization of Belgrano Cargas y Logística, the state-owned freight railway started in July 2025. Unlike the other processes, here the scheme contemplates separate tenders for tracks, workshops, locomotives and wagons, under an "open access" model  that would allow multiple operators to enter the system.

The Belgrano, San Martín and Urquiza lines will be tendered independently. According to the Infrastructure portfolio, there is already declared interest from agro-exporters, mining companies and at least one foreign investment group. The proceeds will go to rail infrastructure through a dedicated trust, designed to shield funds from discretionary use.

Privatizations are not an isolated phenomenon: they are a commitment made by Argentina when it signed an Extended Facilities program with the IMF in April 2025, with total disbursements projected at US$ 20,000 million. The agreement establishes strict goals for the accumulation of reserves, and one of the sources of financing envisaged is precisely the extraordinary income derived from the sale or concession of state assets.

Minister Caputo himself stressed that the divestment plan contributes to a broader objective of fiscal sustainability without resorting to the Central Bank's reserves. The consulting firm PwC remarked, in a recent report, that these revenues are key to sustaining fiscal balance in a context of reduced tax pressure.

"This is going to generate revenues of 2,000 million dollars." — Luis Caputo, Minister of Economy of the Nation

 

The Bases Law, passed in July 2024, enabled the transfer of eight state-owned companies to the private sector. The plan started with the ambition of privatizing 41 companies, although only eight received legislative authorization. Here is the status of each one:

Company / Asset	Sector	Process status
⚡ Citelec (Transener)	Electric transport	🟡 Open bids — decision pending
💧 AySA	Water and sanitation	🟡 Contract approved — tender coming soon
🚂 Belgrano Cargas	Freight rail	🔵 Process started (Jul. 2025)
✈️ Intercargo	Airport services	🟡 Authorized sale 100%
🏭 C. San Martín Thermal	Power generation	🔵 Under evaluation
🏭 C. Térmica M. Belgrano	Power generation	🔵 Under evaluation
🏛️ Casa de la Moneda	Banknote printing	🔵 Included in schedule
🚆 SOFSE (pasajeros)	Passenger Rail	⚪ Pending start

 

🟡 In active 🔵 process  Started / in preparation ⚪ Pending

US$ 2,000 M Meta total 2026

US$ 356 M Highest Bid Transener

30 years AySA Concession

US$ 700 M Comahue Dams 2025

 

The privatization program of Javier Milei's government presents a double-edged equation. On the one hand, the injection of private currency would relieve the pressure on the Central Bank's reserves without generating monetary issuance, a central argument in the official narrative. On the other hand, the speed of the process raises questions about the regulatory quality of the contracts and the capacity of the State to guarantee affordable rates for essential services such as drinking water.

The "open access" scheme  in Belgrano Cargas represents a commitment to competition between operators, although specialists in the sector warn that the fragmentation of the system could hinder operational coordination. In the case of AySA, the 30-year duration of the concession generates debates about tariff review mechanisms and the investments committed in sewage infrastructure.

In any case, political timing also matters: with the legislative elections of October 2025 already over and the agreement with the IMF as an umbrella of credibility, the Executive has a window of opportunity to move forward without the vetoes of Congress that stopped the original plan of 41 companies.

• Infobae – Argentina expects to obtain 2,000 million euros this year through privatizations

• MercoPress – Argentina expects to raise 2,000 million according to Caputo

• Context Tucumán – The Government accelerates privatizations to add reserves

• Diario El Paso – Caputo accelerates privatizations and bets on revenues of US$ 2,000 million

• National Executive Branch – TN.com.ar – Official coverage of the plan

⚠️ Editorial note: This article was prepared for informative and journalistic purposes based on verified public sources as of May 2, 2026. The figures may vary as the bidding process progresses.

📰 PRESS · DEMOCRACY · HUMAN RIGHTS · ARGENTINA Conflict with the Press: Casa Rosada closes the journalists' room FOPEA appeals to the IACHR · Unprecedented event in Argentine democracy 📅 April 28, 2026 • ⏱ Reading time: 5–7 minutes • 🖊 Verified wording

 

🔑 SEO: FOPEA IACHR journalists Casa Rosada | press freedom Argentina 2026 | Milei accredited press | Casa Rosada press room closing | Luciana Geuna TN espionage | IACHR Freedom for Freedom of Expression Argentina | Freedom of expression Milei

 

🚨  BREAKING NEWS — April 27/28, 2026 On Monday, April 27, the IACHR's Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression) made public its concern about the restriction of access to accredited journalists at the Casa Rosada. He urged the Argentine State to review the measure and demanded that it be adjusted to international standards of freedom of expression.

 

For the first time in decades, the corridors of the Casa Rosada woke up without a journalistic presence. What began as a criminal complaint against two TN journalists led to the total closure of the historic Balcarce 50 Press Room, unleashing an institutional crisis unprecedented in Argentina's democratic history and an escalation that has already reached the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

 

🖼️ REFERENCE IMAGE Casa Rosada Press Room — File image (La Nación): lanacion.com.ar — Milei closes the press room (see note with images) fopea.org — Official FOPEA communiqué with institutional image

 

 

Date	Fact
Sunday 19/04	The program And tomorrow what? of TN issues a report filmed with smart glasses in the internal corridors of the Casa Rosada. Journalists Luciana Geuna and Ignacio Salerno are its protagonists.
Tuesday 22/04	The Military House, headed by Brigadier General Sebastián Ibáñez, filed a criminal complaint in Federal Court No. 4 (Judge Ariel Lijo) for alleged disclosure of political and military secrets (Articles 222 and 223 of the Criminal Code, sentences of 1 to 6 years). The accusation includes Geuna, Salerno, producers and directors of TN.
Thursday 24/04	The Secretariat of Communication, in charge of Javier Lanari, removes the fingerprints of some 60 accredited journalists from the biometric system of access to the Casa Rosada. The historic Press Room is empty for the first time in decades. Milei describes the measure as "excellent" and calls journalists in X "disgusting garbage."
Thursday 24/04	Opposition legislators (Paulón, Selva) try unsuccessfully to obtain official explanations at Casa Rosada. FOPEA issues a statement describing the measure as "extremely serious institutional." Euronews describes it as the first total veto of the press in Argentina's democratic history.
Thursday 24/04	An opposition deputy files a criminal complaint against Milei, Adorni, Lanari and Ibáñez for abuse of authority and restriction of freedom of the press.
Friday 25/04	Monsignor Jorge Lozano (Catholic Church) meets with accredited journalists in Plaza de Mayo, gives statements and asks for a "prompt solution." FOPEA announces that it is requesting an opinion from constitutionalists.
Thursday 23/04	FOPEA presents a formal complaint to the IACHR in Washington, addressed to President Edgar Stuardo Ralón Orellana.
Monday 27/04	The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression) of the IACHR makes public its concern and urges the Argentine State to review the restriction. There is no sign of a retreat from the government.
Tuesday 28/04	Manuel Adorni presents his first management report to the Chamber of Deputies. The conflict remains unresolved.

 

 

On Sunday, April 19, the program "And tomorrow what?", hosted by Luciana Geuna and broadcast by the Todo Noticias (TN) signal, broadcast a report designed to portray the daily functioning of the Casa Rosada and the power dynamics between the sectors of the Government: those close to Karina Milei and those close to Santiago Caputo.

 

The chronicler Ignacio Salerno made the tour using smart glasses with a built-in camera. During the report, the journalist himself explained that he used this device so that viewers could see what a day inside the government palace is like. The video showed common corridors, classrooms, the office of Cabinet Chief Manuel Adorni and that of Eduardo "Lule" Menem, Karina Milei's bishop.

 

For the Government, this material constituted a violation of security regulations. The Military House maintained in its criminal complaint that the filming exposed surveillance systems, communication equipment and access control devices, providing intelligence on the President's movements. The judicial text invoked articles 222 and 223 of the Penal Code, which contemplate penalties of one to six years in prison for obtaining or revealing political or military secrets.

 

"It is a political decision that challenges all of us who deeply believe in freedom of expression and democracy." — Luciana Geuna, TN journalist — Disclaimer on her program (Sunday 04/27/2026)

 

 

The government's reaction was immediate and of unprecedented forcefulness. On Thursday, April 24, without prior notice, the Ministry of Communication removed the fingerprints of around 60 accredited journalists from different national and international media from the biometric access system. The extensions to accreditations that had been in force since 2025 were suspended indefinitely.

 

President Javier Milei himself reacted through his account on the social network X with a message that set off alarms in newsrooms and press defense organizations: he described journalists as "disgusting garbage" and "criminals", and validated messages from libertarian accounts that affirmed that Argentines do not need a press room in the Casa Rosada. Milei described the closure of the room as an "excellent" measure. He later posted photos of journalists on his social networks, in what FOPEA described as an act of personal harassment.

 

The measure did not come out of nowhere: approximately three weeks before the total shutdown, the government had already withdrawn accreditations from journalists from C5N, A24, El Destape, Ámbito Financiero, Tiempo Argentino and Radio La Patriada, linking them to an alleged Russian intelligence operation in 2024. According to FOPEA, by the end of 2025, 67 journalists had lost permanent accreditations in the Casa Rosada.

 

⚖️  The denounced and the charges Complaint by the Military House against journalists (Federal Court No. 4 - Judge Ariel Lijo - Prosecutor Gerardo Pollicita): • Luciana Geuna (host, TN) • Ignacio Salerno (accredited reporter, TN) • Producers and directors of the TN / Grupo Clarín channel Charges invoked: Articles 222 and 223 of the Criminal Code – Disclosure of political and military secrets (sentences of 1 to 6 years).  Opposition counter-complaint (Opposition deputy): • Javier Milei (President) • Manuel Adorni (Chief of Staff) • Javier Lanari (Secretary of Communication) • General Sebastián Ibáñez (Military House) Charges: Abuse of authority, breach of duties and restriction of the exercise of freedom of the press.

 

 

On Thursday, April 23, the Argentine Journalism Forum (FOPEA) filed a formal complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, addressed to the president of the IACHR, Edgar Stuardo Ralón Orellana. The document details that the official decision to disqualify press workers who cover the Executive Branch in a generalized manner violates international standards of freedom of expression.

 

The presentation was not an isolated movement. It gives continuity to the proposals that FOPEA initiated in November 2025 in Miami, during a public hearing of the Commission's 194th Session. At that time, the entity had already warned commissioners about the risks to journalism in Argentina. The IACHR had also received a complaint from the Association of Argentine Journalistic Entities (ADEPA) that same month for "censorship."

 

On Monday, April 27, the IACHR's Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (SLR) made public its concern and urged the Argentine State to review the restriction, demanding that it be adjusted to inter-American standards. It is the first formal international response to the conflict and a diplomatic blow of relevance for the government.

 

"Preventing the press from working in the Casa Rosada limits the possibility for society to know and understand the activity of its rulers." — FOPEA — Official Statement, April 23, 2026

 

"The prohibition of the entry of people with names and surnames to cover the Casa Rosada constitutes a very strong advance against freedom of powers and democracy in Argentina." — Fernando Stanich, head of FOPEA — Radio, April 2026

 

 

Actor	Position / Action
🌎 IACHR / Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression	It expressed public concern on 27/04 and urged the State to bring the measure into line with international standards of freedom of expression.
📰 FOPEA	Complaint to the IACHR (04/23), described the measure as "extremely serious institutional" and analyzes new legal actions. He requested an opinion from constitutionalists.
📺 ADEPA	He filed a complaint with the IACHR in November 2025 for "censorship." He supported FOPEA's position.
⛪ Catholic Church	Msgr. Jorge Lozano (Communication Commission, Episcopal Conf.) met twice with journalists in Plaza de Mayo and asked for a "prompt solution."
🏛️ Opposition deputies	Esteban Paulón (United Provinces) summoned journalists in the Chamber of Deputies. Sabrina Selva tried unsuccessfully to obtain an audience with Lanari. They describe the measure as "unconstitutional".
⚖️ Opposition criminal complaint	Filed against Milei, Adorni, Lanari and Ibáñez for abuse of authority and restriction of freedom of the press.
🌐 Euronews / AP	Euronews described the event as the first veto of access to journalists in Argentina's democratic history.
🏛️ Government / Milei	He ratified the closure. There are no signs of reversal. Adorni presents a management report in the Chamber of Deputies on 28/04.

 

 

The conflict between the government of Javier Milei and the press did not begin with TN's lenses. Since the inauguration of the president in December 2023, the tension has been escalating under various modalities: public attacks on the reputation of journalists, accusations that journalism is part of "the caste", the installation of the narrative that most journalism is corrupt and the selective withdrawal of accreditations.

 

In March 2024, Milei accused journalists of being infiltrated agents of Cuba and Venezuela. In the following months, selective restrictions and attacks on press workers during operations were recorded. By the end of 2025, according to FOPEA, 67 professionals had already lost their permanent accreditations at Casa Rosada.

 

The total closure of April 24, 2026 represents, according to the historical journalists of the government headquarters themselves, an unprecedented event in Argentine history, even in the face of the military dictatorship of 1976–1983. The head of FOPEA, Fernando Stanich, remarked that although pressures on the press have existed in different administrations, it had never been prohibited to enter the main area of operation of the Executive Branch by name and surname.

 

🔑  The data of the conflict in figures • 60 accredited journalists excluded from the Casa Rosada (04/24/2026) • 67 journalists had lost permanent accreditations since December 2023 (until the end of 2025, according to FOPEA) • 1st time in Argentina's democratic history that total access to the press has been banned • 194th Period of Sessions of the IACHR (Nov. 2025): first formal proposal by FOPEA • IACHR complaint:  presented on 23/04/2026 by FOPEA • RELE response: public on 27/04/2026 • Media previously affected: C5N, A24, El Destape, Ámbito, Tiempo Argentino, Radio La Patriada

 

 

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and its Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression have repeatedly established that the access of the press to government spaces is a basic condition for the exercise of freedom of expression and citizen control. Limiting such access across the board, without proportionate justification or reliance on reasonable security standards, constitutes an illegitimate restriction on the right to information.

 

FOPEA maintains that the Casa Rosada, as the seat of the country's political power, has the character of an institutional public space. Its closure to the press not only affects journalists but also directly affects the right of citizens to access information about government acts, a pillar of the democratic system recognized by the American Convention on Human Rights.

 

"This level of exposure is incredible; In an institutional context, if it is considered that there was a crime, justice should be allowed to speak, but not prevent the exercise of journalism." — Paula Moreno, Secretary of FOPEA — Portal Misiones, April 2026

 

 

1. FOPEA — Official Communiqué: Complaint to the IACHR (Primary Source)

2. APF Digital — FOPEA denounces to the IACHR the ban on entry to the Casa Rosada

3. Profile — The government is keeping the press room closed and there is no sign of reversing the measure

4. Profile — Who are the two journalists denounced by the Military House?

5. El Economista — What the Casa Rosada report showed

6. The Capital Mar del Plata — FOPEA denounces the restriction of access to the IACHR

7. Report 24 — Repudiation of the government's authoritarian turn on journalism grows

8. LT3 — Information blackout at the Casa Rosada: FOPEA warns of unprecedented measure

9. BAE Negocios — The Military House denounced journalists for filming inside the Rosada

10. Cibercuba — Milei closes the Casa Rosada press room and sparks controversy

11. Portal Misiones — FOPEA's harsh defense of the government's ban

 

📰 Conflict with the Press · Casa Rosada · April 28, 2026 📰 Sources: FOPEA, APF Digital, Perfil, El Economista, La Capital MdP, Reporte 24, LT3, BAE Negocios, Cibercuba, Portal Misiones