MiDire

The case will continue in lower instances, generating tension in the ruling party. Rosatti, Lorenzetti and Rosenkrantz signed the unanimous ruling that declared inadmissible the extraordinary appeal of the Attorney General's Office.

The per saltum – literally, 'leap of instance' in Latin – is an exceptional procedural mechanism that allows the Supreme Court to intervene directly in a judicial case without waiting for the usual route through the lower instances. It is, in other words, a legal shortcut enabled only in circumstances of extreme institutional urgency.

Article 257 bis of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure of the Nation establishes the requirements for its admissibility: that the case be processed under federal jurisdiction and that a 'notorious institutional gravity' is accredited. Both conditions must be met simultaneously. It is not enough to allege urgency or to maintain that the matter under discussion is of public importance.

❝ The per saltum is the last emergency tool of the Argentine judicial system. It is only enabled when the institutional gravity is manifest and the damage irreparable through ordinary channels.

In this case, the Attorney General's Office of the Treasury – the body that legally represents the national State – went to the per saltum on April 16, after the labor judge Raúl Horacio Ojeda of the National Labor Court No. 63 issued a precautionary measure that suspended the application of 82 articles of the labor reform. The Government argued that the situation was institutionally serious and asked the Court to rule without waiting for the exhaustion of ordinary remedies.

The text of the ruling is forceful and concise, as is usually the language of the highest court when it rejects an appeal in limine. The three judges who signed the resolution – Rosatti, Lorenzetti and Rosenkrantz – maintained:

The resolution was accompanied, according to judicial sources consulted by the main media, by an additional consideration: the Executive's request was also 'unofficial' since the labor reform was already in force at the time of the ruling. In effect, Chamber VIII of the National Labor Appeals Chamber had restored the full validity of the articles suspended on April 23, by granting suspensive effect to the appeal of the national State.

✅ Law 27.802 on Labor Modernization is currently IN FORCE. The Court considered that, given this context, the per saltum was additionally 'unofficial'.

From the procedural perspective, the Court's decision does not imply a substantive pronouncement on the constitutionality of the labor reform. The highest court did not evaluate whether or not the law is compatible with the National Constitution: it simply determined that the path chosen by the Government to access that definition – per saltum – did not meet the legal requirements to be admitted.

🕰️ Chronology of the conflict: from the sanction of the law to judicial rejection

To understand the scope of today's ruling, it is essential to reconstruct the procedural itinerary that led the Court to pronounce. The judicial saga of Law 27,802 is one of the most complex constitutional litigations of the year.

The Labor Modernization Law – published in the Official Gazette on March 6, 2026 – represents the most ambitious reform of Argentine labor law in decades. The text modifies the Employment Contract Law (No. 20,744), repeals the Telework Law and intervenes in more than thirty different regulations of the labor legal system.

Among its most controversial provisions are changes in the system of severance pay, modifications to union regulations, alterations to the social security system and the repeal of articles linked to the protection of the worker. From the Executive, the reform was presented as an instrument of deregulation necessary to generate employment and reduce labor litigation.

It was precisely this collision of arguments that led the CGT to file, days after the publication of the law, an action declaring unconstitutionality before the Labor Justice. The union, represented by its general secretaries Sola, Argüello and Jerónimo, maintained that the challenged articles modify the current labor regime and violate constitutional rights and guarantees.

Judge Raúl Horacio Ojeda, head of the National Labor Court No. 63, became the unexpected protagonist of this institutional conflict. On March 30, 2026, Ojeda accepted the precautionary measure requested by the CGT and suspended the questioned articles with general scope – a decision that set off alarms in the Casa Rosada and triggered the judicial strategy of the Executive.

Ojeda is a labor judge of first instance with a background in the Ministry of Labor during the Kirchner administration, where he served as chief adviser to then-Minister Juan Carlos Tomada. His profile was questioned by the ruling party, which pointed out alleged incompatibilities and sought to remove him from the file by questioning his competence to hear a case of these characteristics.

⚠️ Judge Ojeda resisted the orders of the Chamber to refer the file to the federal administrative litigation jurisdiction, a situation that forced the court to issue a peremptory order of 24 hours with authorization of non-working days.

The government's strategy to remove Ojeda was successful at the procedural level: the National Court of Appeals in Federal Administrative Litigation ruled that the case should be processed in its jurisdiction because it is a matter that exceeds classic labor law and involves the validity of a national law. The change of jurisdiction restricts the margin of action of the CGT, which had achieved its main judicial victory in the labor field.

The Court's decision was received in the ruling party as a new front of judicial tension, although government spokesmen tried to minimize its impact by pointing out that the labor reform remains fully in force. However, analysts and political operators agree that the rejection of the per saltum implies a relevant procedural defeat for the Executive.

❝ The Government loses the possibility of obtaining a quick and definitive definition from the Court. The legal uncertainty about the labour reform has been going on indefinitely.

The official strategy had a clear objective: to obtain from the Supreme Court a substantive definition that would shield the law against future judicial questions. When the per saltum is rejected, that objective is postponed and the case will have to go through the ordinary path – which can last for months or even years – before eventually reaching the highest court through the common route.

From the CGT, meanwhile, there was a nuanced reading. Sources from the labor federation told La Nacion that the highest court could have resolved the issue, and recalled that there are still pending pronouncements in the Labor Chamber, where the challenges of its members are being processed.

The Argentine Rural Society also has a presence in the litigation: it appeared before the courts to support the validity of Law 27,802 and request that its application not be suspended, showing the political-economic weight that the reform has for the business sector.

With the per saltum rejected, the case is filed in the Federal Administrative Court No. 12, which must resolve the substance of the conflict: whether or not the challenged articles of Law 27,802 are compatible with the National Constitution. That resolution — which is expected to be appealed by any of the losing parties — could eventually reach the Supreme Court through the ordinary route.

Meanwhile, the labor reform is in force and employers and workers must adjust their relations to the new regulations, although with the uncertainty that the legal scenario could change if the federal court adopts a precautionary measure of suspension or orders the unconstitutionality of the questioned articles.

Beyond the immediate political result, the Court's ruling has legal implications that deserve a detailed analysis. Firstly, the highest court ratifies the exceptional nature of per saltum as a procedural tool: it is not enough that the case is important or that the Executive has an interest in a quick resolution. A 'notorious institutional gravity' is required, which, in this context, the judges considered that it was not duly accredited.

Second, the additional consideration of the 'inofficiousness' of the appeal reveals a pragmatic view: if the law was already in force at the time of ruling, the urgent basis that justifies the per saltum vanishes. The Court, in this sense, not only rejected the appeal for formal reasons, but also for reasons of procedural opportunity.

Third, it is relevant to note that the judgment was signed by only three of the five members of the Court. Judges Juan Carlos Maqueda and Ricardo Lorenzetti – the latter is a signatory – are the five members of the court. The absence of the signature of any of the justices may respond to reasons of recusal, excuse or simple coincidence of agenda, but it could be significant if the case eventually reaches the highest court through the ordinary route.

❝ The rejection of the per saltum does not define the constitutionality of the labor reform. It is a procedural defeat for the government, not a substantive defeat for the validity of Law 27,802.

Scenario 1: The federal administrative jurisdiction rules in favor of constitutionality

If Federal Court No. 12 and eventually the Contentious Administrative Chamber validate the constitutionality of the law, the CGT could file an extraordinary appeal before the Supreme Court, which in that case would intervene through the ordinary channels. This scenario is the most favorable for the government.

Nothing prevents the new court hearing the case from issuing a new precautionary measure that suspends – again – the articles in question. In that case, the government could appeal again and the cycle would be repeated, although now in the federal jurisdiction.

The labor federation has already indicated that it raised the unconstitutionality of the law of precautionary measures against the State that empowered the Federal Court to resolve questions of jurisdiction. If that challenge succeeds, the file could return to the labor jurisdiction, reversing the procedural progress achieved by the Government.

In the context of the parity negotiations and the political dynamics, a scenario of understanding that unlocks the conflict through legislative or regulatory modifications to the most controversial articles of the law cannot be ruled out.

Per saltum is an exceptional procedural remedy that allows the Supreme Court to intervene directly in a case without waiting for the exhaustion of intermediate instances. It is regulated in Article 257 bis of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure and only applies when there is 'notorious institutional gravity'. It is a tool of very restricted use in Argentine judicial practice.

The Court declared the appeal 'inadmissible' on the grounds that the requirements of Article 257 bis of the CPCCN were not met. Additionally, it pointed out that the request was 'unofficial' since Law 27,802 was already in force at the time of resolution, which made the urgent intervention that the Government demanded unnecessary.

Yes. The law has been fully in force since April 23, 2026, when Chamber VIII of the National Labor Appeals Chamber granted suspensive effect to the State's appeal, lifting Judge Ojeda's precautionary measure. The rejection of per saltum does not change this situation.

The CGT challenged more than 80 articles of the law that, according to the labor federation, modify the employment contract regime, union rules, the social security system and access to labor justice in a regressive manner. He argued that these changes violate the principle of progressivity of social rights and freedom of association, both with constitutional support.

The ruling was signed by Horacio Rosatti (president of the Court), Ricardo Lorenzetti and Carlos Rosenkrantz. The three make up the Supreme Court and formed a unanimous decision in the rejection of the extraordinary appeal by leap of instance presented by the Attorney General's Office.

The file continues its processing in the Federal Administrative Court No. 12, which must resolve the substance of the conflict: whether or not the questioned articles of Law 27,802 are constitutional. That decision may be appealed and eventually reach the Supreme Court through the ordinary route.

⚖️ A ruling that defines the pace of the case, not its final destination

The rejection of per saltum by the Supreme Court is not the end point of the judicial saga around Law 27,802. It is, rather, a sign that the highest court is not willing to be used as an express arbiter of disputes that still have a path in the lower instances. The labor reform is still in force, the CGT is not resigning its legal strategy, and the contentious-administrative jurisdiction will now have to bear the weight of a decision that will define the Argentine labor map in the coming years. The Court, meanwhile, waits.

Editorial illustration — RIGI • Incentive Regime for Large Investments • Law 27.742 • Argentina 2024–2026

Keywords: RIGI Argentina • Incentive Regime for Large Investments • Law 27742 • Law of Bases • foreign investment • Vaca Muerta • mining • VPU • fiscal stability 30 years • ICSID • tax benefits Argentina 2026

The Incentive Regime for Large Investments (RIGI) is a promotional program created by Articles 164 to 228 of Title VII of Law 27,742, sanctioned on June 28, 2024 and published in the Official Gazette on July 8, 2024. It is part of the so-called "Law of Bases and Starting Points for the Freedom of Argentines", the largest package of structural reforms of the government of Javier Milei. The RIGI was regulated by Decree 749/2024 (August 2024) and complemented by AFIP General Resolution 5590/2024 and Decree 940/2024. In February 2026, Decree 105/2026 extended the deadline for membership until 8 July 2027.

The logic of the RIGI is based on a clear diagnosis: Argentina has enormous potential in natural resources and energy – lithium, copper, oil, gas, renewables – but lacks the private investment to develop them at scale. The cost of capital in the country is prohibitively high due to the history of regulatory, exchange rate and tax instability. The RIGI seeks to "advance" macroeconomic solutions that under normal conditions would require decades, offering investors a predictable legal and fiscal environment for 30 years.

The backbone of the RIGI is the Single Project Vehicle (VPU). To access the regime, investors must constitute a legal entity whose sole and exclusive purpose is to carry out the approved project. The VPU can take the form of a commercial company, a branch of a foreign company, a temporary union (UTE) or other associative contracts. The rule is strict: the VPU cannot have assets or activities outside the project, except those strictly necessary for the administration of funds.

One variant is the "dedicated branch": a company already operating in Argentina can create a branch specific to the RIGI project, isolating those assets from the rest of its operations. This figure allows multinationals already established in the country to access the regime without dissolving their existing structure.

Stage of the process	Description	Term
1. Incorporation of the VPU	Create the unique legal entity for the project	Before the application
2. Preparation of the plan	Detail the project, sectors, schedule and investment	Variable
3. Application for membership	Submission to the Enforcement Authority	Until 8/7/2027
4. Evaluation	The Evaluation Committee analyzes the project	90 business days
5. Approval and registration	Registration in the VPU Registry	After a favorable opinion
6. Execution	At least 40% of the minimum invested in the first 2 years	Since accession
7. Progress Reports	Periodic report to the enforcement authority	According to schedule

Once approved, the VPU enjoys all the benefits of the RIGI for the life of the project. If you fail to qualify, you may be discharged from the scheme and lose accrued benefits. The execution period varies depending on the project, but the law requires that at least 40% of the minimum investment required be made within the first two years of accession.

The RIGI offers the most extensive package of tax, customs and exchange benefits in recent Argentine history

💰 Tax Benefits

🚢 Customs Benefits

💱 Exchange Benefits

⚖️ Legal Stability: 30 Years of Fixed Rules

The benefit most valued by investors is not fiscal but legal: stability for 30 years. During this period, the State guarantees that:

1. The VPU may not be affected by the repeal of the RIGI or by more burdensome regulations than those in force at the time of accession.

2. The participating provinces and municipalities may not impose new local taxes, except for remuneration rates for services effectively rendered.

3. In the event of a dispute, the investor can go directly to ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, World Bank), avoiding Argentine justice.

4. If a future rule is more beneficial to the VPU, the VPU may choose to apply it in place of the original regime.

The RIGI was the most controversial point of the Basic Law: the debate between development and sovereignty is still open in 2026

The RIGI was, from its conception, the most debated and questioned chapter of the Basic Law. The critics come from very diverse spectrums: heterodox economists, environmental organizations such as Greenpeace, research foundations such as FUNDAR and FARN, SME unions, opposition legislators and even some sectors of the local business establishment. Their objections are articulated in four main axes.

💸 The Fiscal Impact Argument

Economist Martin Reydó (Fundar) argues that the RIGI represents "the core of the government's proposal" and warns that "tax benefits minimize tax revenues; in this way, an essential way for the exploitation of natural resources to benefit the Nation as a whole is sterilized."

The exact fiscal cost of RIGI has not been officially calculated or published. Private estimates vary widely depending on the projects that are actually developed. What is clear is that the difference between the general rate of Profits (35%) and that of the RIGI (25%) implies a tax "donation" of 10 percentage points on the profits of projects that, together, could exceed USD 60,000 million.

🌱 The Environmental Issue

Article 193 of the Basic Law establishes that inputs for strategic export projects must be guaranteed "regardless of whether it affects domestic supply." Cristian Fernández (FARN) warns: "If water is affected by mining projects and, suddenly, there is a context of drought, the water supply for the communities will not matter because the water will be given to the mining companies."

Greenpeace was even more categorical in its statement of June 13, 2024, warning that the RIGI does not impose prior environmental impact assessment conditions and does not guarantee consultation with local populations or indigenous peoples, which violates the National Constitution and the international treaties on environmental and indigenous rights signed by Argentina.

⚖️ The ICSID Problem

Direct access to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the World Bank's arbitral tribunal, is one of RIGI's most controversial points. Argentina already has a painful history with that court: after the 2001 crisis, it was ordered to pay millions of dollars to foreign investors. The fact that the RIGI enshrines direct access to ICSID by law – without going through Argentine judicial instances – is interpreted by critics as a cession of legal sovereignty over resources that are owned by the State.

As of May 2026: 12 projects approved for USD 25,479 M and others for USD 37,600 M under evaluation — total in portfolio: USD 63,079 M

As of May 2026, RIGI has 12 approved projects for a total of USD 25,479 million, with another 20 projects under evaluation that would add an additional USD 37,600 million. The total in the portfolio – approved plus under evaluation – exceeds USD 63,000 million, equivalent to approximately 9% of Argentina's GDP. According to the government, these projects will generate 36,873 direct and indirect jobs.

Project	Sector	USD Investment	Province	Status
El Quemado Solar Park (YPF Luz)	Solar Energy	211 M	Mendoza	Operational
Vaca Muerta Sur (YPF + 6 companies)	Oil & Gas	2,486 M	Neuquén/Rio Negro	Under construction (51%)
Argentina LNG (Southern Energy / PAE / Golar)	Liquefied natural gas	6,878 M	Rio Negro	DFI outlet
Rincon (Rio Tinto)	Lithium (carbonate)	2,724 M	Jump	Approved
Golden Salt (Little)	Lithium (phosphate/OH/carbonate)	633 M	Jump	Approved
Mariana (Lithium Minera Arg.)	Lithium (chloride)	273 M	Jump	Approved
Gualcamayo (Minas Argentina SA)	Gold and Silver	665 m	San Juan	Approved
Los Azules (Andes Corp. Minera)	Copper	227 M	San Juan	Approved
Imps (Hoc + others)	Silver and Gold	764 M	Salta/Catamarca	Endorsement Committee
Puerto Timbúes (logistics complex)	Infrastructure	N/A	Santa Fe	Approved
Sidersa (steel mill)	Steel industry	296 m	Buenos Aires (San Nicolas)	Approved
Wind farm (GEAR SA)	Wind energy	255 m	Buenos Aires (Olavarría)	Approved

The sectoral distribution is revealing: 72-75% of the approved amounts correspond to energy and oil/gas, 24-26% to mining (lithium, copper, gold). Other sectors – industrial, logistics infrastructure – account for only 2-3% of the total. In terms of geography, San Juan leads in projected employment (12,939 positions), followed by Santa Fe (9,700 through the port of Timbúes) and Salta/Rio Negro.

The most advanced project under execution is the El Quemado Solar Park (Mendoza), which already injects energy into the national electricity system and will be the largest photovoltaic park in the country when it reaches 305 MW. The most ambitious in amount is Argentina LNG (USD 6,878 M), which would position the country as an exporter of liquefied natural gas for the first time in its history.

In February 2026, Decree 105/2026 extended the deadline for joining the RIGI for one year – from July 2026 to July 2027 – using the only extension allowed by law. The decree also expanded the sectoral scope of the regime to include the "exploitation and production of new developments of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons onshore," with a minimum investment of USD 600 million for those projects.

The Secretary of Mining, Luis Lucero, had anticipated at a sectoral event: "My personal recommendation will be to extend the RIGI, because it reflects the economic model to which we aspire: without withholdings, with lower taxes and agile procedures." The extension was interpreted by the market as a sign of continuity and solidity of the regime.

To size the RIGI package, it is convenient to compare it with the general tax regime that governs the rest of the companies in Argentina:

Concept	General Regime	RIGI (VPU)
Income Tax	35 %	25% (-10 pp)
Dividends	13 %	7% (down to 3.5% in year 7)
Adjustment for inflation	Limited	No limitations
Import tariff on inputs	Variable (up to 35%)	0% (zero tariff)
Export duties	Variable	0% (exempt from year 3)
Free availability of currencies	Restricted	100% from year 4
Debit/Credit Tax	Partially computable	100% on account Profits
Gross Income	By province	0% in adhered provinces
Asset depreciation	Normal (shelf life)	Accelerated
Tax Quebranto	Prescribes in 5 years	It does not prescribe; Transferable
Court of Disputes	Argentine justice	ICSID (optional)
Rule stability	No warranty	30 years guaranteed by law

RIGI is, in essence, a high-risk bet with high-return potential. The risk is real: ceding part of the legal and fiscal sovereignty for 30 years in strategic sectors is a decision that commits the country far beyond the government that made it. The potential benefits are also real: if projects are executed as planned, Argentina could transform its balance of payments, generate tens of thousands of jobs, and finance a development process that would otherwise have taken decades.

The first year of the RIGI – with 12 projects approved and the first meters of pipeline installed in Vaca Muerta Sur – shows that the regime has the capacity to attract capital. But it also shows its limits: the almost exclusive concentration in energy and mining, the practically zero effect on industrial employment and the paradox of negative net FDI in the same period.

The debate will remain open as long as the RIGI is in force. What seems indisputable is that this is the most significant structural reform that Argentina has attempted in terms of attracting investment since the privatizations of the 1990s, with all the promises and all the risks that this comparison entails.

📚 Sources and References

5. Infoleg — Decree 749/2024 • Regulation of RIGI (servicios.infoleg.gob.ar)

6. Argentina.gob.ar — RIGI: from today, companies will be able to apply to the regime (October 2024)

7. Argentine Embassy in Portugal — RIGI: Extension and modifications (February 2026)

8. La Nación — RIGI projects are advancing: 10 initiatives for USD 25,479 M (January 2026)

9. Infobae — The success of RIGI (December 2025) • Approved projects (December 2025)

11. Grant Thornton Argentina — RIGI: What You Need to Know (August 2024); One year after its regulation (December 2025)

12. Profile — RIGI: the doubts generated by the most controversial point of the Bases Law (June 2024)

15. Shale24 — RIGI Final Map: Approved and Pending Projects 2026 (January 2026)

16. NY Consulate (Chancellery) — RIGI Investor Guide (cnyor.cancilleria.gob.ar)

Argentina accelerates privatizations: aims for US$ 2,000 million in reserves

Transener, AySA and Belgrano Cargas, at the center of a plan promoted by Caputo that seeks to strengthen the Central Bank's reserves before the end of the year.

🗓️ May 2, 2026 ✍️ Economic Writing ⏱️ Estimated reading time: 5 minutes

The National Executive Branch deepens its strategy of state disinvestment at a pivotal moment for the Argentine macroeconomy. With the goal of accumulating international reserves set in the agreement with the IMF as a backdrop, Economy Minister Luis Caputo presented an ambitious timetable that could add US$ 2,000 million before the end of 2026. The heart of the plan is three major operations: the sale of 50% of Citelec – controlling company of Transener – the 30-year concession of AySA and the total privatization of Belgrano Cargas y Logística.

The most advanced tender – and the one with the greatest immediate impact – is that of Citelec, the controlling company that groups 50% of the state-owned Transener and Transba, the two large high-voltage electricity carriers in the country. The opening of envelopes, which took place on Tuesday, April 29, revealed three proposals totaling almost US$ 890 million, with the following distribution:

The final decision on the award will fall to the Ministry of Finance. Private sector sources pointed out that the winning bid far exceeds initial estimates, which the government interprets as a sign of market confidence in the state reform process.

In parallel with the dispute over Transener, the Ministry of Economy took a fundamental regulatory step by approving, through Resolution 543/2026 of April 28, the concession contract and share transfer model of Agua y Saneamientos Argentinos (AySA). The operation reaches 51% of the company's state shares .

The approved scheme establishes that the concession will have a term of 30 years for the provision of drinking water and sewerage service in the City of Buenos Aires and 26 municipalities of the Buenos Aires metropolitan area, including La Matanza, Quilmes, Avellaneda and Lomas de Zamora, among others. The contractor must comply with the 2024-2026 Transition Plan until the end of the current year, which would guarantee the continuity of the service during the transfer stage.

📌 The tariff table and the minimum investment conditions will be defined in the bidding phase, whose call is expected for the second half of 2026.

The Executive also decreed the total privatization of Belgrano Cargas y Logística, the state-owned freight railway started in July 2025. Unlike the other processes, here the scheme contemplates separate tenders for tracks, workshops, locomotives and wagons, under an "open access" model that would allow multiple operators to enter the system.

The Belgrano, San Martín and Urquiza lines will be tendered independently. According to the Infrastructure portfolio, there is already declared interest from agro-exporters, mining companies and at least one foreign investment group. The proceeds will go to rail infrastructure through a dedicated trust, designed to shield funds from discretionary use.

Privatizations are not an isolated phenomenon: they are a commitment made by Argentina when it signed an Extended Facilities program with the IMF in April 2025, with total disbursements projected at US$ 20,000 million. The agreement establishes strict goals for the accumulation of reserves, and one of the sources of financing envisaged is precisely the extraordinary income derived from the sale or concession of state assets.

Minister Caputo himself stressed that the divestment plan contributes to a broader objective of fiscal sustainability without resorting to the Central Bank's reserves. The consulting firm PwC remarked, in a recent report, that these revenues are key to sustaining fiscal balance in a context of reduced tax pressure.

The Bases Law, passed in July 2024, enabled the transfer of eight state-owned companies to the private sector. The plan started with the ambition of privatizing 41 companies, although only eight received legislative authorization. Here is the status of each one:

The privatization program of Javier Milei's government presents a double-edged equation. On the one hand, the injection of private currency would relieve the pressure on the Central Bank's reserves without generating monetary issuance, a central argument in the official narrative. On the other hand, the speed of the process raises questions about the regulatory quality of the contracts and the capacity of the State to guarantee affordable rates for essential services such as drinking water.

The "open access" scheme in Belgrano Cargas represents a commitment to competition between operators, although specialists in the sector warn that the fragmentation of the system could hinder operational coordination. In the case of AySA, the 30-year duration of the concession generates debates about tariff review mechanisms and the investments committed in sewage infrastructure.

In any case, political timing also matters: with the legislative elections of October 2025 already over and the agreement with the IMF as an umbrella of credibility, the Executive has a window of opportunity to move forward without the vetoes of Congress that stopped the original plan of 41 companies.

⚠️ Editorial note: This article was prepared for informative and journalistic purposes based on verified public sources as of May 2, 2026. The figures may vary as the bidding process progresses.

For the first time in decades, the corridors of the Casa Rosada woke up without a journalistic presence. What began as a criminal complaint against two TN journalists led to the total closure of the historic Balcarce 50 Press Room, unleashing an institutional crisis unprecedented in Argentina's democratic history and an escalation that has already reached the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

On Sunday, April 19, the program "And tomorrow what?", hosted by Luciana Geuna and broadcast by the Todo Noticias (TN) signal, broadcast a report designed to portray the daily functioning of the Casa Rosada and the power dynamics between the sectors of the Government: those close to Karina Milei and those close to Santiago Caputo.

The chronicler Ignacio Salerno made the tour using smart glasses with a built-in camera. During the report, the journalist himself explained that he used this device so that viewers could see what a day inside the government palace is like. The video showed common corridors, classrooms, the office of Cabinet Chief Manuel Adorni and that of Eduardo "Lule" Menem, Karina Milei's bishop.

For the Government, this material constituted a violation of security regulations. The Military House maintained in its criminal complaint that the filming exposed surveillance systems, communication equipment and access control devices, providing intelligence on the President's movements. The judicial text invoked articles 222 and 223 of the Penal Code, which contemplate penalties of one to six years in prison for obtaining or revealing political or military secrets.

The government's reaction was immediate and of unprecedented forcefulness. On Thursday, April 24, without prior notice, the Ministry of Communication removed the fingerprints of around 60 accredited journalists from different national and international media from the biometric access system. The extensions to accreditations that had been in force since 2025 were suspended indefinitely.

President Javier Milei himself reacted through his account on the social network X with a message that set off alarms in newsrooms and press defense organizations: he described journalists as "disgusting garbage" and "criminals", and validated messages from libertarian accounts that affirmed that Argentines do not need a press room in the Casa Rosada. Milei described the closure of the room as an "excellent" measure. He later posted photos of journalists on his social networks, in what FOPEA described as an act of personal harassment.

The measure did not come out of nowhere: approximately three weeks before the total shutdown, the government had already withdrawn accreditations from journalists from C5N, A24, El Destape, Ámbito Financiero, Tiempo Argentino and Radio La Patriada, linking them to an alleged Russian intelligence operation in 2024. According to FOPEA, by the end of 2025, 67 journalists had lost permanent accreditations in the Casa Rosada.

On Thursday, April 23, the Argentine Journalism Forum (FOPEA) filed a formal complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, addressed to the president of the IACHR, Edgar Stuardo Ralón Orellana. The document details that the official decision to disqualify press workers who cover the Executive Branch in a generalized manner violates international standards of freedom of expression.

The presentation was not an isolated movement. It gives continuity to the proposals that FOPEA initiated in November 2025 in Miami, during a public hearing of the Commission's 194th Session. At that time, the entity had already warned commissioners about the risks to journalism in Argentina. The IACHR had also received a complaint from the Association of Argentine Journalistic Entities (ADEPA) that same month for "censorship."

On Monday, April 27, the IACHR's Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (SLR) made public its concern and urged the Argentine State to review the restriction, demanding that it be adjusted to inter-American standards. It is the first formal international response to the conflict and a diplomatic blow of relevance for the government.

The conflict between the government of Javier Milei and the press did not begin with TN's lenses. Since the inauguration of the president in December 2023, the tension has been escalating under various modalities: public attacks on the reputation of journalists, accusations that journalism is part of "the caste", the installation of the narrative that most journalism is corrupt and the selective withdrawal of accreditations.

In March 2024, Milei accused journalists of being infiltrated agents of Cuba and Venezuela. In the following months, selective restrictions and attacks on press workers during operations were recorded. By the end of 2025, according to FOPEA, 67 professionals had already lost their permanent accreditations at Casa Rosada.

The total closure of April 24, 2026 represents, according to the historical journalists of the government headquarters themselves, an unprecedented event in Argentine history, even in the face of the military dictatorship of 1976–1983. The head of FOPEA, Fernando Stanich, remarked that although pressures on the press have existed in different administrations, it had never been prohibited to enter the main area of operation of the Executive Branch by name and surname.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and its Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression have repeatedly established that the access of the press to government spaces is a basic condition for the exercise of freedom of expression and citizen control. Limiting such access across the board, without proportionate justification or reliance on reasonable security standards, constitutes an illegitimate restriction on the right to information.

FOPEA maintains that the Casa Rosada, as the seat of the country's political power, has the character of an institutional public space. Its closure to the press not only affects journalists but also directly affects the right of citizens to access information about government acts, a pillar of the democratic system recognized by the American Convention on Human Rights.

Highway Case: Justice orders the confiscation of assets of Cristina Kirchner and the other convicted

⚖️ Highway Case: Justice orders the confiscation of assets of Cristina Kirchner and the other convicted

In an unprecedented ruling that marks a milestone in the recovery of assets from corruption, the Court determined the beginning of the execution of assets of the main convicts in the so-called Highway Case. The measure seeks to cover the economic damage against the National State, estimated at billions of pesos.

The judicial decision instructs the corresponding agencies to identify, appraise and execute the assets of those found guilty of fraudulent administration. Among those affected by the measure are former Vice President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, businessman Lázaro Báez and former officials of the Public Works portfolio.

The ruling stresses that the confiscation is not only an accessory sanction, but a restorative justice tool necessary to correct the diversion of public funds that should have been allocated to road infrastructure in the province of Santa Cruz.

Justice has set its sights on a complex web of properties and values that include:

"The execution of these assets represents a fundamental step in the fight against financial impunity," said judicial sources close to the process.

The technical breakdown of the assets ordered for confiscation by the Federal Court of Criminal Cassation amounts to a record figure of $684,990,350,139.86 (approximately 537 million dollars). According to the latest expert report and the judicial resolution of April 2026, the auction will affect a total of 111 properties and various financial assets distributed among the main convicts.

TWO YEARS OF RESISTANCE: THE ARGENTINE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY RETURNS TO THE STREETS

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/76/Marcha_Federal_Universitaria_-_23A_-_Argentina_%282024%29.jpg/1200px-Marcha_Federal_Universitaria_-_23A_-_Argentina_%282024%29.jpg

▲ Federal University March on April 23, 2024. More than 430,000 people throughout the country. Source: Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 4.0

This April 23 marks exactly two years since the first Federal University March, that mobilization that brought together approximately 430,000 people throughout the Argentine territory and that forced the government of President Javier Milei to sit down to dialogue with rectors, unions and students. It was an unprecedented postcard in the country's recent history: faculties in the dark, classrooms empty, and hundreds of thousands of citizens marching in defense of free, public higher education.

Two years later, the conflict was not only not resolved, but deepened. May 12, 2026 will be the date of the fourth federal march, jointly convened by the National Interuniversity Council (CIN), the Trade Union Front of National Universities and the Argentine University Federation (FUA), under the slogan: "Federal march for education, the public university and national science".

The data speak for themselves and are as forceful as they are alarming. According to the CIN, fund transfers to public universities fell by 45.6% since 2023 in real terms. Teaching and non-teaching salaries, which represent 90% of the university budget, have accumulated a loss of between 30% and 50% of purchasing power since November 2023, when Milei won the presidential runoff.

"Salaries are the lowest in 40 years," said Clara Chevalier, secretary general of Conadu. For its part, the Federation of University Teachers (Fedun) reported that the sector's revenues have been falling in real terms for 17 consecutive months. In March 2026, while official inflation was 3.4%, the government ordered a wage increase of 1.7% – exactly half of what is needed to maintain purchasing power.

Added to this is the collapse of Progresar student scholarships: according to the National Economy Research Center (CIEN), between 2023 and 2025 the number of beneficiaries fell by 62.4%, while the purchasing power of each scholarship fell by 46.5%. To return to December 2023 levels, investment in this area should grow by 63%.

At the center of the conflict is the University Financing Law No. 27,795, sanctioned by the National Congress on August 22, 2024. The regulation establishes the monthly update for inflation of the salary and operating expenses of national state universities, and implies a 51% increase for teachers and non-teachers in order to recover what has been lost since December 2023.

The Executive Branch vetoed the law in October 2024, which triggered the second federal march. In an unprecedented legislative maneuver, Congress rejected the veto in December. However, the government enacted the rule without implementing it, citing "lack of funds." The answer came from the Courts: on December 23, 2025, the judge of first instance Martín Cormick ordered immediate compliance with articles 5 and 6 of the law, referring to salary and scholarship updates. The State appealed the measure.

On March 31, 2026, Chamber III of the National Court of Appeals in Federal Administrative Litigation confirmed the ruling of the first instance and ratified the precautionary measure in favor of the universities. The sentence was signed by judges Sergio Gustavo Fernández and Jorge Eduardo Morán. Even so, the government maintains the non-compliance.

Rectors, unions and students speak with a common voice, although from different positions. From the CIN, the organization that brings together rectors from all over the country, Rector Bartolacci summarized the collective feeling: "We are all aware of the economic situation of the country and that there are many sectors that are having a very bad time. But we are demanding a decent salary for those who have the responsibility of training the future generations of professionals that Argentina needs."

On the union front, Patricio Grande, professor at the National University of Luján and member of the executive board of Conadu Histórica, explained the wage urgency: to recover the purchasing power of December 2023, workers should receive more than a 50% increase. On the other hand, the general secretary of Fedun, Daniel Ricci, expanded the call for the march: he asked that it not only be from the university sector, but that it convene the whole of society.

From the student sector, Joaquín Carvalho, president of the FUA and student at the National University of Rosario, warned: "The government does not respond to the need to invest in education, and is pushing the situation towards a scenario of great conflict." Carvalho stressed that the bloc between rectors, unions and students remains solid.

In the weeks leading up to the new march, different faculties throughout the country implemented a new form of protest called "Japanese-style strike": instead of being absent, teaching and non-teaching workers set up free health care posts at the doors of the faculties. In the City of Buenos Aires, thousands of people received dental care, dental prostheses were made, glasses were distributed and blood tests were performed. In addition, 500 pets were cared for by university veterinarians.

In response to the complaints, the Executive proposed in February 2026 an alternative project that does not repeal Law No. 27,795 but modifies its central points. The official text offers an increase of 12.3% in three installments (March, July and September), well below the 51% established by the current law. In addition, it contemplates the updating of operating expenses only if inflation exceeds 14.5%, without recognizing the losses accumulated during 2024.

The proposal was flatly rejected by the university system, and at the close of this edition it had no date for parliamentary treatment. Rector Olmedo, from the National University of Formosa, summarized the situation: "They are reaching a peak where many universities no longer want to open the Faculties because the budget is not updated."

🏛️ NATIONAL POLICY | ⏱️ Estimated reading time: 6 minutes (~1,100 words)

Electoral Reform in Argentina: Milei promotes the elimination of the PASO, Clean Record and changes in party financing

President Javier Milei announced from Israel that he was sending to Congress a bill that could radically redesign the rules of the democratic game before the 2027 legislative elections

Photo caption: President Javier Milei announced the electoral reform from Israel, where he participated in the Israeli Independence Day event with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Buenos Aires, April 22, 2026. — President Javier Milei shook the political chessboard on Tuesday by announcing, through a message published on the social network X from Israel, the immediate sending to the National Congress of a comprehensive electoral reform project. The initiative contemplates three backbones: the definitive elimination of the Primary, Open, Simultaneous and Mandatory (PASO); a reformulation of the system of financing political parties; and the reinstatement of the figure of Clean Record – already rejected by the Senate in May 2025 – to prevent people convicted of corruption from accessing national elective positions.

The announcement came as Milei was closing his third trip to Israel, where he participated in the celebrations for the anniversary of that state's independence and was seen with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The president sang the song "Libre", by Nino Bravo, before a crowd that cheered him, on a day that also marked a strong sign of foreign policy.

📌 Context: What are the PASO and why does Milei seek to eliminate them?

The Open, Simultaneous and Mandatory Primaries were created in 2009, during the presidency of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, through Law No. 26,571. Since then, they have been held on the third Sunday of August of each election year and enable all citizens – regardless of their affiliation – to participate in the internal selection of candidates of each political force.

Its operation fulfills three central functions: to order the internal competition of the parties, to enable competition between lists within the same force and to act as an electoral filter prior to the general election. However, the system is subject to sustained criticism of the cost to the public treasury of organizing an additional election whose result, in many cases, does not define truly competitive candidates.

During the 2025 legislative elections, Milei's government managed to suspend the PASO through a measure approved in the Senate on February 20 of that year. Now, the Executive is going a step further and proposing its permanent elimination from the Argentine electoral system.

💰 The debate over political financing

The second axis of the reform aims to transform the structure of economic support of party activity. The current system contemplates public financing for campaigns, free spaces for electoral advertising and ordinary operation of the parties, complemented by private contributions with regulated ceilings.

The proposal of the Executive Branch seeks to reduce the weight of the State in this scheme, in line with the cut in public spending that constitutes the core of the economic policy of the libertarian administration. If the change prospers, financing would tend to move to private sources or internal resources of each force, with a direct impact on the campaign structure and party organization, especially for the smaller parties.

🧾 Clean Record: a battle that the ruling party wants to reopen

The Clean Record initiative — which would prevent those convicted in the second instance from running for national elective office — has a recent and controversial legislative history. The bill obtained half approval in the Chamber of Deputies, but was rejected in the Senate in May 2025 in an extremely close vote.

The defeat in the upper house was marked by the vote of the missionary senators of the Renewal, Carlos Arce and Sonia Rojas Decut, whose position ended up tipping the balance against the ruling party. The law, if approved, would have left former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, convicted in the second instance in corruption cases, out of competence.

Now, the Casa Rosada is relaunching the proposal, but this time integrated into the broader electoral reform package, with the expectation that the political momentum and the pre-electoral context of 2027 will generate more favorable conditions for its approval.

🗣️ Political reactions

From the ruling bloc, Deputy Lilia Lemoine was one of the first to come out to defend the initiative on social networks: "The vote of each deputy and each senator in this project will be very revealing. Those who oppose it will make it clear that they see politics as a business," he said.

The Secretary of Communication, Javier Lanari, was in the same vein: "No good political party can oppose this agenda," he said, aiming to install a political cost for those who reject the reform.

However, in the corridors of Congress the panorama is more complex. Parliamentary sources from the PRO and the UCR expressed reservations regarding the elimination of the PASO, arguing that the mechanism, despite its costs, allows them to resolve their internal conflicts and legitimize themselves in the eyes of the electorate. "If we go together in Buenos Aires, we will have to resolve it this way or Karina (Milei) will come and want to impose the candidate on us," said a radical legislator off the record.

In the entourage of the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Martín Menem, it was learned that the deputy from La Rioja had asked the Casa Rosada to delay sending the bill until he was certain about the votes necessary to approve it. Milei's own early announcement from Israel ended that possibility.

🔮 Perspectives: What can happen in Congress?

The formal submission of the bill opens a stage of intense negotiation in Congress. The ruling party knows that it faces two simultaneous fronts: the resistance of its own allies – PRO and radicalism – to the elimination of the PASO, and the need to recompose the support that was lacking to approve Ficha Limpia last year.

Political analysts consulted by this newspaper agree that the legislative treatment is unlikely to take place before the second half of the year, considering that in the first half of the year the focus will be on the World Cup in the United States, Canada and Mexico, and that the proximity to the electoral calendar will condition the willingness of the blocs to vote on structural changes.

The government's bet seems to be long-term: to install public debate, make visible the position of each legislator and build political capital for 2027. "Impunity is over. The is over," Milei repeated, making it clear that the axis of the upcoming campaign already has a name.

🔗 Sources and references

More than five years after the death of Argentina's greatest football idol, the country's justice system made a second attempt to answer the question that divides a nation: did Diego Maradona die of natural causes, or was he abandoned by the very people paid to keep him alive?

Defendants charged

120

Witnesses expected

8–25

Years in prison if convicted

2nd

Trial (first was annulled)

⚖️A historic second trial begins

On Tuesday, April 14, 2026, the courts of San Isidro — in the greater Buenos Aires metropolitan area — opened their doors to a trial Argentina had been waiting for since the first proceedings collapsed in scandal nearly a year earlier. Seven healthcare professionals once again took their seats before the Oral Criminal Court No. 7 to answer for the death of Diego Armando Maradona, which occurred on November 25, 2020.

The courtroom was packed. Outside, some fifty people carrying Argentine flags and signs demanded "Justice for D10S" — a play on Maradona's iconic No. 10 jersey and "Dios," the Spanish word for God. Inside, daughters Dalma, Gianinna, and Jana Maradona, together with former partner Verónica Ojeda, watched from the front row as proceedings began in what promises to be the final act of a legal saga without precedent in football history.

"Diego Maradona began to die 12 hours before his actual death. Anyone who had thought to transfer him to a clinic in a car or ambulance during his final week would have saved his life."
— Patricio Ferrari, lead prosecutor

👥The seven defendants: who they are

All seven face charges of homicide with eventual intent (homicidio simple con dolo eventual) — the legal concept that applies when someone pursues a course of action knowing it could result in another person's death. All have declared themselves innocent and remain free pending the verdict.

Leopoldo Luque

🧠 Neurosurgeon · Personal physician

Agustina Cosachov

🩺 Treating psychiatrist

Carlos Díaz

🧠 Psychologist · Addiction treatment

Ricardo Omar Almirón

💉 Nurse

Mariano Perroni

👨‍⚕️ Nursing coordinator

Nancy Edith Forlini

📋 Medical coordinator (insurance)

Pedro Di Spagna

🩺 General practitioner

ℹ️

Eighth defendant: Nurse Dahiana Madrid requested a jury trial and will be tried in a separate proceeding whose date has not yet been set.

📋The prosecution: "a diabolical environment"

Lead prosecutor Patricio Ferrari pulled no punches in his opening statement. He described the medical team as "a bunch of amateurs" who committed "all kinds of omissions" and created what he called "cruel" conditions for their patient. According to the prosecution, Maradona was in agony for at least 12 hours with no one making the decision to transfer him to a hospital.

Plaintiff attorney Fernando Burlando, representing daughters Dalma and Gianinna, went further still: "Diego Armando Maradona was murdered." Burlando argued that during Maradona's home convalescence at the San Andrés gated community in Tigre, the icon was "surrounded by strangers" and that between November 11 and 25, 2020, "no one ever listened to Maradona's heart." Attorney Pablo Jurado, representing Maradona's sisters, called it "the chronicle of a death foretold."

Stadium named after Diego Armando Maradona in La Plata, Argentina

📷 The stadium in La Plata, renamed in honour of the football legend. Archive image.

🛡️The defence: "he died of a heart attack"

Defence lawyers categorically rejected the charges. Francisco Oneto, defending neurosurgeon Leopoldo Luque, announced that the trial would prove Maradona died of a heart attack stemming from his pre-existing medical conditions, and not from medical negligence.

Vadim Mischanchuk, lawyer for psychiatrist Cosachov, pointed to Maradona himself: "Diego had a determining role in decisions about his own health." He stressed that there was no "criminal plan" to cause his death. Roberto Rallín, another of Luque's attorneys, went as far as claiming that if Maradona were alive today, he "would ask that they not be convicted."

"If there is one thing that has been definitively ruled out, it is a deliberate criminal plan to kill Maradona."
— Vadim Mischanchuk, defence attorney for Agustina Cosachov

📰Why a second trial? The documentary scandal explained

To understand why this is a second trial, one must go back to May 2025. The first proceedings, which had accumulated more than 20 hearings and 44 witness testimonies over nearly three months, were declared null and void following an unprecedented scandal.

Judge Julieta Makintach, one of the three magistrates presiding over the case, was found to have taken part in an unauthorized documentary about the trial, tentatively titled "Divine Justice" (Justicia Divina). Footage showed the judge walking through courthouse corridors with electronic music playing in the background, before being interviewed at her desk — all filmed using cameras that had been secretly smuggled into the hearings.

The scandal led to Makintach's removal from office following impeachment proceedings in November 2025. Everything that had been done in the first trial was annulled. Zero. Back to square one. Argentina had to start again.

⚠️

Institutional impact: The annulment invalidated 20 hearings and 44 testimonies, including emotional statements from Maradona's children. Defence lawyers argue their clients are being "prosecuted twice for the same cause."

🕐Timeline of the case

⚽

November 2020

Diego Maradona dies

On November 25, Maradona dies of cardiac arrest and acute pulmonary oedema at the San Andrés gated community in Tigre, two weeks after brain surgery for a subdural hematoma.
🔍

2020–2023

Criminal investigation

Authorities investigate the circumstances of Maradona's death. A medical review board concludes he began dying at least 12 hours before his heart stopped.
⚖️

2024 – May 2025

First oral trial

Trial begins with 7 defendants. Over 20 hearings and 44 testimonies are heard, including those of Maradona's daughters.
💥

May – November 2025

Scandal and annulment

Judge Makintach is found to have participated in the "Divine Justice" documentary. The trial is annulled. Makintach is removed from the bench in November.
🔄

March – April 2026

Second oral trial

The process restarts from scratch under a new three-judge panel: Gaig, Ortolani and Rolón. The first hearing takes place on April 14, 2026.
🏛️

June – July 2026 (estimated)

Verdict expected

The tribunal aims to deliver its verdict before the mid-year judicial recess, potentially as early as June 2026.

👨‍⚖️The new judges: under the microscope

The three magistrates now presiding are Alberto Gaig, Alberto Ortolani, and Pablo Rolón, members of the Oral Criminal Court No. 7 of San Isidro. Luque himself had reportedly preferred a jury trial — a request that was denied — though his attorney expressed confidence in the new panel's impartiality.

Hearings are held on Tuesdays and Thursdays, from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., at the courthouse on Ituzaingó Street 340 in San Isidro. The witness list has been trimmed to roughly 90–120 names — down from a proposed 170 — and includes medical experts, family members, police officers, and people from Maradona's inner circle.

💔The family: "We want Diego to rest in peace"

Verónica Ojeda, mother of Dieguito Fernando — Maradona's 13-year-old youngest son — told reporters outside the courthouse: "That's what we all need: justice for Diego. We want to live in peace and for Diego to rest in peace." Her partner and family lawyer, Mario Baudry, was more direct: "I hope they are found guilty. And I hope the judges are severe with Luque, Cosachov and Díaz."

Baudry also pointed to the emotional weight of having to relive the ordeal: "For the victims, going through this again is hard, especially while also having to look after a 13-year-old boy." Daughters Dalma, Gianinna, and Jana attended the first hearing and will be called to testify again.

"We want to live in peace and for Diego to rest in peace."
— Verónica Ojeda, Maradona's former partner and mother of Dieguito Fernando

🔬The medical facts of the case

Maradona died of cardiac arrest and acute pulmonary oedema, against a clinical backdrop that included chronic kidney disease, liver cirrhosis, respiratory failure, and long-standing addictions to cocaine and alcohol. He had undergone surgery on November 3, 2020 at the Clínica Olivos for a subdural hematoma — a blood clot pressing on the brain. He was discharged on November 11 and transferred to a house in the San Andrés gated community in Tigre to recover under home medical supervision.

The medical review board convened by the courts determined that Maradona had begun dying at least 12 hours before he was found unresponsive, and that he displayed unmistakable signs of prolonged agony. Prosecutors argue that a timely transfer to a hospital could have saved his life.

Regarding the conditions of the home convalescence, the prosecution stated there was "no medical equipment, not even a bandage" and described the setup as "deficient, marked by omissions." The defence counters that the treatment plan was "agreed upon and appropriate" to Maradona's condition, and that the footballer himself made decisions about his care.

🌐A case that transcends borders

The trial over Maradona's death is not merely a criminal proceeding: it is a mirror through which Argentina examines its healthcare system, its judiciary, and its relationship with its own legends. The football world watches from outside. AFP, Reuters, CNN, Al Jazeera and dozens of international outlets covered the opening of the second trial in real time.

Whatever verdict is ultimately reached will have implications far beyond prison sentences. It will set a precedent on medical accountability in Argentina and define how far negligence can go before it becomes a crime.

The Number 10 spent his whole life asking the world to remember him. Now he waits, from somewhere beyond, for justice to speak its final word.

#Maradona #MaradonaTrial #SanIsidro #Argentina #MedicalNegligence #LeopoldoLuque #ArgentinaJustice #DiegoMaradona2026

📅 April 18, 2026 • ⏱️ Reading time: 8–10 minutes • 📍 Washington D.C. / Buenos Aires

The meeting between Caputo and Georgieva took place as the formal closing of an intense week of Argentine negotiations in Washington. Even before the official meeting – "on Friday," as the minister himself had announced in an informal meeting that had taken place days earlier on the ground floor of the IMF building – the IMF's technical staff had already given public signs of support for the adjustment plan of Javier Milei's government.

At the end of the meeting, Caputo was blunt to journalists: "It was a very pleasant meeting because there is a relationship of trust," he said. He added, "[Georgieva] is super impressed with the accomplishments." The head of the IMF, for her part, published on her official X account: "Excellent meeting with Minister Luis Caputo and the president of the Central Bank, Bausili, on the solid implementation of policies in Argentina. We look forward to continuing to support reforms to strengthen stability and boost growth."

Luis Caputo, Minister of Economy, after the meeting with Georgieva — Washington, 17/4/2026

👥 The participants of the table

The Argentine delegation was led by Caputo and was attended by the president of the Central Bank, Santiago Bausili; the Deputy Minister of Economy, José Luis Daza; the vice president of the BCRA, Vladimir Werning; and Argentina's representative to the IMF, Leonardo Madcur. The composition of the team reflects the centrality that the government assigns to the management of the external debt and the accumulation of reserves.

The meeting is part of a key moment in Argentina's program with the Fund. On April 15, just two days before the formal meeting, the IMF staff confirmed the Staff Level Agreement (SLA) corresponding to the second review of the Extended Facilities (EFF) program signed in April 2025 for a total of USD 20,000 million. The technical agreement enables a disbursement of approximately USD 1,000 million, which will be finalized once the Executive Board grants its endorsement – scheduled for early or mid-May.

Luis Cubeddu, head of the "Argentine Case" at the IMF, confirmed it unambiguously: "Our plan is to present the request to the board of directors in early or mid-May. We are preparing the necessary documentation." The agency expects Argentina to accumulate USD 8,000 million in reserves during 2026.

📌 The numbers of the agreement

Hours before the meeting with Georgieva, at a press conference held in Washington, the IMF's technical staff gave a closed endorsement to the Argentine government's adjustment plan. Nigel Chalk, director of the organization's Western Hemisphere Department, was in charge of drawing the general picture: "What has happened during the course of this year was a very positive policy impulse for the country. The Budget was approved, there was an important labor reform, the reserves are accumulating through the consistent action of the Central Bank in the markets. There is a continuous effort to eliminate distortions in the economy, to open it up and to increase productivity."

📉 Inflation of 3.4%: the peak

The inflation figure for March – a 3.4% that irritated President Javier Milei – was the only point of tension in the technical debate. Cubeddu offered a weighted reading of the IMF: "The increase in inflation of 3.4% in March reflects a number of factors: the rise in energy prices globally and seasonal increases in education. We project that a disinflation process will take place in the coming months. High-frequency indicators for April suggest that is the case." Twelve-month inflation expectations, he added, "remain relatively well anchored in the 25% range."

The week in Washington was not limited to the IMF. Caputo deployed an intense multilateral agenda: he met with Ajay Banga, president of the World Bank; Ilan Goldjan, head of the IDB; and Sergio Díaz Granado, in charge of CAF. The objective: to close a scaffolding of guarantees to cover the maturities of private debt in dollars that mature in July. According to official information, the minister has already obtained USD 2,550 million in guarantees from multilateral organizations.

Cubeddu, consulted on the matter, described this strategy as "essential": "The authorities are following a multi-pronged strategy. The first is to mobilize financing in dollars from domestic markets. The second has to do with the sale of state assets. The third is through repos from the Central Bank, and the fourth through loans from commercial banks guaranteed by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the IDB."

🗺️ The war in the Middle East: the global variable that was also discussed

Both Caputo and Georgieva agreed on the assessment of the international context: the war in the Middle East and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz represent a global risk of the first order. The IMF director warned member countries during the week: "Do not be complacent, do not start making lax fiscal policies, because if in this context you begin to spend more and increase debt levels, rates will continue to rise and debts will become unsustainable," Caputo described, paraphrasing the organization's position.

For Argentina, the war has a particular nuance: the country is a net exporter of energy. According to the IMF statement, the country "continues to deal well with the indirect effects of the war," although the rise in the international price of crude oil generates an inflationary impact on fuels that was noted in the March data.

Beyond the figures of the agreement, Caputo approved the week in Washington to outline the government's reformist agenda to investors and international officials. The priority of the economic team is, in the words of the minister himself, "to reduce what we call the Argentine cost." And it breaks it down into three specific axes:

▶ Reduce regulations — simplify the regulatory framework to facilitate private activity.

▶ Improve logistics — upgrade infrastructure and eliminate bottlenecks in foreign trade.

The minister also reinforced the political support that sustains the program: "This is the first time we have taken this path and we are not going to move an inch from it to continue with our structural reforms," he said, alluding to the electoral results that the ruling party presented as an endorsement of the administration.

The tone of the week in Washington leaves no doubt: the relationship between Argentina and the IMF is at its best in years. The combination of a staff that praises without conditions, a managing director who declares herself "impressed" and a disbursement of USD 1,000 million within hours of being finalized paints a politically favorable picture for Milei's government. However, the context data deserves closer examination.

✅ What's going well

▶ The BCRA has accumulated more than USD 5,500 million in foreign currency purchases so far this year.

▶ The legal framework was strengthened: Approved 2026 budget, labor reform, ratification of trade agreements.

▶ The second revision of the EFF was approved without major technical friction.

▶ Multilateral guarantees (WB, IDB) allow maturities to be refinanced without going out to international markets at high rates.

⚠️ The points of attention

▶ Net reserves closed 2025 at -USD 14,100 M, far from the target of -USD 1,000 M. The second waiver is in the hands of the Board.

▶ Inflation of 3.4% in March was the highest in months and worries the IMF, although the staff tested a decline for the following months.

▶ Argentina is the main debtor of the IMF with 34.5% of the outstanding loans: the maturities of 2026 amount to USD 3,605 million.

▶ Access to the voluntary capital market is still conditioned by rate differentials: the country avoids borrowing in the markets as long as spreads are high.

📈 FAQ Schema — Frequently Asked Questions

Argentina and the IMF staff reached a Staff Level Agreement approving the second review of the EFF program for USD 20,000 million. The agreement enables a disbursement of USD 1,000 million, pending the approval of the Board of Directors scheduled for May 2026.

Georgieva published in X that it was an "excellent meeting on the solid implementation of policies in Argentina" and expressed the Fund's willingness to continue supporting reforms to consolidate stability and growth.

The Argentine government chose not to go to the international capital markets as long as rate differentials are high. Instead, it articulates guarantees with multilateral organizations (WB, IDB, CAF) to refinance maturities at a lower cost.

In the remainder of 2026, Argentina must pay USD 3,605 million to the IMF. The next maturity is in May for USD 805 million. The country is the main debtor of the organization with 34.5% of outstanding loans.

▶ La Nación — "Caputo reaped another sign of support from the IMF in a meeting with Kristalina Georgieva" — 4/17/2026

▶ Infobae — "Caputo met with the head of the IMF, Kristalina Georgieva, after the announcement of the agreement" — 4/17/2026

▶ El Cronista — "Caputo met with Georgieva at the IMF with the approved review" — 4/17/2026

▶ Ámbito Financiero — "Caputo announced agreement with the IMF for the second review" — 4/15/2026

▶ Channel 26 — "Confirmed: IMF approves second review of agreement with Argentina" — 4/15/2026

▶ Infobae — "Before the Caputo-Georgieva meeting, the IMF staff supported the financing strategy" — 4/17/2026

▶ Agencia Noticias Argentinas / Pregon — "Caputo met with Georgieva at the IMF after the agreement" — 4/17/2026

▶ Panorama newspaper — "The IMF confirmed that it will discuss the revision of the agreement with Argentina in May" — 4/18/2026

The judicial deadline expires: Milei's government must pay $2.5 billion or enter into contempt to update salaries and university scholarships

The Federal Administrative Court ratified the validity of the University Financing Law (No. 27,795) and set for this Friday at 9:30 a.m. the deadline for the national Executive to transfer the funds. Teachers, non-teachers and students of the 56 national universities are waiting for a retroactive salary recomposition that starts in December 2023, while the Government warns that compliance with the ruling would imply the end of the fiscal surplus.

✍️ By the Editorial Staff of Noticias Universitarias | 📅 April 17, 2026 | 🕐 Estimated reading time: 8 minutes

🔍 The judicial stopwatch and the cornered government

The national government is facing an ultimatum with no return. This Friday at 9:30 a.m. is the deadline set by the Federal Administrative Court for the administration of Javier Milei to comply with the ruling that ratifies the full validity of the University Financing Law (Law 27,795). The figure at stake amounts to $2.5 trillion pesos, a disbursement that the Executive Branch itself has already described internally as "the death certificate of the zero deficit."

As reported by Infobae with sources from the Executive Branch, from the Casa Rosada they openly recognize that the money "is not there". The responsibility for redistributing the budget items falls on the chief of staff, Manuel Adorni, who will have to find a way to dose a payment that the ruling party considered unaffordable. Despite the legislative defeat that overturned the presidential veto last year and the ratification in both judicial instances, the libertarian administration did not apply the corresponding budgetary funds, deriving the conflict into a judicial labyrinth where it lost in all previous instances.

The amount owed exceeds by about USD 750 million the disbursement from the IMF that Economy Minister Luis Caputo managed to unblock days earlier in Washington, which illustrates the magnitude of the fiscal impact. The last card that the ruling party is considering is to appeal to the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation requesting suspensive effect, although judicial sources consulted by this newspaper described that possibility as "unlikely" successful.

⚖️ The chain of failures: from the first instance to the Chamber

The origin of the judicial conflict dates back to December 2025, when Judge Martín Cormick, head of the Federal Administrative Court No. 11, granted a collective amparo promoted by the National Interuniversity Council (CIN) and other entities. In that first instance resolution, Cormick stopped Decree 759/2025 with which Milei had suspended the execution of the law, despite the insistence of both chambers of Congress, and considered that said decree presented features of "arbitrariness and manifest illegality".

The magistrate stressed that the Government had justified the suspension of the law by appealing to a norm of lower hierarchy – Article 5 of Law 24,629 – against an express constitutional mandate. Likewise, the judge pointed out that the loss of purchasing power of university professors "continues today, violating labor rights protected by International Human Rights Treaties and by the National Constitution."

The Government appealed, but on March 31, 2026, Chamber III of the Federal Administrative Litigation Chamber – made up of judges Sergio Fernández and Jorge Morán – ratified the precautionary measure, rejected the official arguments and described the Executive's proposals as "not very serious". The chamber members also emphasized that the application of the measure has a limited fiscal impact and does not significantly compromise the public interest. The deadline for compliance was set for 9:30 a.m. on Friday, April 18, 2026.

📋 What Law 27,795 orders and what the ruling requires

The precautionary measure requires immediate compliance with Articles 5 and 6 of Law 27,795, which establish two major obligations for the Executive Branch:

▶ Salary recomposition: update of the salaries of teachers and non-teachers of national public universities, covering the inflationary gap accumulated from December 1, 2023 until the full enactment of the law in September 2025.

▶ Student scholarships: full recomposition and updating of all scholarship programs for students in public higher education, which also suffered a severe deterioration in real terms.

The regulation also contemplates the automatic updating of salaries in accordance with accumulated inflation and establishes that since the transfer of educational competencies to the provinces decades ago, the Nation retains exclusive power over the financing of university education. This singularity makes the universities the only school fund directly under the control of the National Executive, which is why the cut in this sector became an emblem of Milei's "chainsaw" plan.

📊 The Wage Gap in Numbers: Inflation vs. Updates

🎤 Voices of the conflict: university, unions and Casa Rosada

The academic community and the teachers' unions celebrated the Chamber's ruling and began to plan a new federal mobilization. Clara Chevalier, president of the National Federation of University Teachers (CONADU), defined the sentence as "very important news that marks a limit for the Government" and called for a march towards a new Federal University March.

The president of the University Federation of La Plata (FULP), Eugenia Sala, ironized about the presidential rhetoric: "Milei likes to talk about 'everything within the law and nothing outside the law'. Well, within the law: more budget for national universities, better salaries for our teachers and non-teachers, and more budget for student scholarships."

The rector of the National University of Rosario and new president of the CIN, Franco Bartolacci, published on his social networks that the ruling represents "a historic decision" and pointed out that what remains is for the Government to comply with the court order.

From the national government, on the other hand, the message was lapidary. Unobjectionable sources from the Executive Branch told Infobae: "Today we are not going to pay. I say this because we really don't have the money." The ruling party also warned that compliance with the ruling will mean a return to the fiscal deficit, an argument that the Executive has been using as a political shield against judicial and parliamentary demands.

— Unobjectionable source of the National Executive Branch, cited by Infobae, April 2026

🔮 Possible scenarios after the expiration of the term

📅 Chronology of the conflict: from the marches to the Chamber ruling

🎓 The university system in check: beyond salaries

The conflict over university funding is not only a salary dispute: it is the most visible expression of the tension between the fiscal adjustment model promoted by the Milei administration and the defense of the public higher education system that Argentina built over decades. According to the CIN report, transfers to national universities accumulate a real drop of 45.6% between 2023 and 2026, which puts at risk everything from the payment of basic services to the maintenance of university hospitals, research laboratories and student canteens.

At the beginning of 2026, the Undersecretary of University Policies Alejandro Álvarez and the Secretary of Education Carlos Torrendell met with rectors of the CIN to explore the possibility of promoting a new law that would replace the current one with less fiscal impact. The project did not prosper and the ruling party opted to bet on a favorable resolution in the courts, a strategy that also failed.

The teachers' unions, which are holding active strikes – in what some are already calling the "Japanese-style" modality – are preparing to relaunch the massive call in the style of the historic mobilization of 2024, marked as one of the largest since the return of democracy and the largest suffered by the libertarian administration. The prospect of half a million people back on the streets generates, according to different sources, "anxiety" in some offices of the Casa Rosada.

📚 Sources consulted and links verified

Textual quotations are attributed to their original sources. The information reflects the status of the conflict as of April 17, 2026.

🔑 TAGS: public universities · university financing · law 27795 · Milei · Teacher salaries · Student Scholarships · CAF Camera · Contempt of Court · Federal March · Argentina 2026

DATE		FACT
06/03/2026	📜	Congress approves and publishes Law 27,802 on Labor Modernization. Structural reforms to Argentine labor law.
March 2026	⚖️	The CGT files a declaratory action of unconstitutionality and requests a precautionary measure before the Labor Justice.
30/03/2026	🔴	Judge Raúl H. Ojeda (JNT No. 63) suspends 82 articles of the law by means of a precautionary measure. Alarms at Casa Rosada.
16/04/2026	📩	The Treasury Attorney General's Office presents the per saltum to the Supreme Court, seeking to bypass lower instances.
23/04/2026	🟢	Chamber VIII of the Labor Chamber restores the validity of the 82 articles by granting suspensive effect to the State's appeal.
28/04/2026	🏛️	The Federal Administrative Court orders the transfer of the case to the federal jurisdiction, displacing Judge Ojeda.
05/05/2026	⏱️	The Federal Court gives Ojeda 24 hours to submit the file. The judge had ignored the previous order.
07/05/2026	🚫	The Supreme Court declares per saltum inadmissible. Rosatti, Lorenzetti and Rosenkrantz signed. The case is still in lower instances.

	ACTOR	REPRESENTATIVE/MEMBERS	ROLE IN THE CONFLICT
🏛️	Supreme Court	Rosatti, Lorenzetti, Rosenkrantz	It declared the per saltum inadmissible for not complying with the requirements of art. 257 bis CPCCN.
🏛️	Treasury Procurement	Sebastián Amerio	He filed the per saltum on 16/04. He represents the Executive in the judicial dispute.
⚖️	Judge Ojeda (JNT N°63)	Raúl H. Ojeda	It suspended 82 articles on 30/03 by means of a precautionary measure. He resisted orders from the Chamber.
🤝	CGT	Sola, Argüello, Jerónimo	He filed the action of unconstitutionality that triggered the judicial conflict.
🏦	Contentious Chamber Adm.	Room IV	He ordered the case to be transferred to the federal jurisdiction and gave Ojeda 24 hours to comply.
📋	Chamber of Labor	Room VIII – González y Pesino	It restored the validity of the 82 articles on 04/23 by giving suspensive effect to the State's appeal.
🌾	Argentine Rural Society	-	He appeared before the Justice to support the validity of Law 27,802.
⚙️	Min. of Justicia Mahiques	Juan B. Mahiques	He actively intervened to remove the case from the labor jurisdiction and transfer it to the federal jurisdiction.

	ISSUE	STATE	DETAIL
✅	Law 27.802	Current	The labour reform has been in force since 23/04/2026.
🔴	For Saltum	Rejected	The Supreme Court declared it inadmissible on 07/05/2026.
⚖️	Ojeda Precautionary Measure	No effect	Chamber VIII suspended it by granting suspensive effect to the State's appeal.
🏛️	Competent jurisdiction	Contentious Adm.	The case was transferred out of the labor jurisdiction to the federal level.
📋	Case background	Pending	The constitutionality of the law has not yet been resolved on its merits.
📍	Next step	Federal Court No. 12	The federal administrative court must resolve the constitutional merits.

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📅	Publication date	May 7, 2026 \| Continuous Update
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Date	Fact
Sunday 19/04	The program And tomorrow what? of TN issues a report filmed with smart glasses in the internal corridors of the Casa Rosada. Journalists Luciana Geuna and Ignacio Salerno are its protagonists.
Tuesday 22/04	The Military House, headed by Brigadier General Sebastián Ibáñez, filed a criminal complaint in Federal Court No. 4 (Judge Ariel Lijo) for alleged disclosure of political and military secrets (Articles 222 and 223 of the Criminal Code, sentences of 1 to 6 years). The accusation includes Geuna, Salerno, producers and directors of TN.
Thursday 24/04	The Secretariat of Communication, in charge of Javier Lanari, removes the fingerprints of some 60 accredited journalists from the biometric system of access to the Casa Rosada. The historic Press Room is empty for the first time in decades. Milei describes the measure as "excellent" and calls journalists in X "disgusting garbage."
Thursday 24/04	Opposition legislators (Paulón, Selva) try unsuccessfully to obtain official explanations at Casa Rosada. FOPEA issues a statement describing the measure as "extremely serious institutional." Euronews describes it as the first total veto of the press in Argentina's democratic history.
Thursday 24/04	An opposition deputy files a criminal complaint against Milei, Adorni, Lanari and Ibáñez for abuse of authority and restriction of freedom of the press.
Friday 25/04	Monsignor Jorge Lozano (Catholic Church) meets with accredited journalists in Plaza de Mayo, gives statements and asks for a "prompt solution." FOPEA announces that it is requesting an opinion from constitutionalists.
Thursday 23/04	FOPEA presents a formal complaint to the IACHR in Washington, addressed to President Edgar Stuardo Ralón Orellana.
Monday 27/04	The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression) of the IACHR makes public its concern and urges the Argentine State to review the restriction. There is no sign of a retreat from the government.
Tuesday 28/04	Manuel Adorni presents his first management report to the Chamber of Deputies. The conflict remains unresolved.

Actor	Position / Action
🌎 IACHR / Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression	It expressed public concern on 27/04 and urged the State to bring the measure into line with international standards of freedom of expression.
📰 FOPEA	Complaint to the IACHR (04/23), described the measure as "extremely serious institutional" and analyzes new legal actions. He requested an opinion from constitutionalists.
📺 ADEPA	He filed a complaint with the IACHR in November 2025 for "censorship." He supported FOPEA's position.
⛪ Catholic Church	Msgr. Jorge Lozano (Communication Commission, Episcopal Conf.) met twice with journalists in Plaza de Mayo and asked for a "prompt solution."
🏛️ Opposition deputies	Esteban Paulón (United Provinces) summoned journalists in the Chamber of Deputies. Sabrina Selva tried unsuccessfully to obtain an audience with Lanari. They describe the measure as "unconstitutional".
⚖️ Opposition criminal complaint	Filed against Milei, Adorni, Lanari and Ibáñez for abuse of authority and restriction of freedom of the press.
🌐 Euronews / AP	Euronews described the event as the first veto of access to journalists in Argentina's democratic history.
🏛️ Government / Milei	He ratified the closure. There are no signs of reversal. Adorni presents a management report in the Chamber of Deputies on 28/04.

📅 Date of the march	Tuesday, May 12, 2026 — Plaza de Mayo, Buenos Aires
🏛 Conveners	CIN · Union Front of National Universities · GO
📜 Law in dispute	University Financing Law No. 27,795
📉 Budget fall	45.6% since 2023 (CIN data)
💰 Loss of teacher salaries	Between 30% and 50% of purchasing power since Nov. 2023
⚖️ Latest court ruling	Cont. Camera Adm. Fed. — March 31, 2026: Ruling in favor of universities

🏛 APR 2024	1st Federal University March — April 23, 2024. Approximately 430,000 people throughout the country. The government agreed to negotiate and granted a 270% increase in operating expenses.
📜 AUG 2024	Congress approves the University Financing Law No. 27,795 (August 22, 2024). The Executive threatens with a veto.
✋ OCT 2024	2nd Federal March: against the presidential veto. The government suspended the application of the law by decree.
🏛 SEP 2025	3rd Federal March: Congress rejects the veto. The Executive Branch "promulgates" the law but does not apply it.
⚖️ MAR 2026	The Federal Administrative Court confirms the ruling of the first instance (March 31, 2026). The government is flouting the court order.
🚶 MAY 2026	4th Federal March called for May 12, 2026. Prior to this, a week of strike from April 27 to May 2 (Conadu Histórica).

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📅	Date	April 22, 2026
✍️	Sources	Infobae · Profile · The Capital · Diario Uno · Río Negro
🏷️	SEO keywords	Argentina's electoral reform, eliminate PASO, Clean Sheet, Milei Congress 2026
📂	Category	National Policy · Electoral System · Legislative

Keyword / Frase Clave	SEO Type	Search Intent
Caputo Georgieva IMF meeting	Exacta / trending	Informational — news
Argentina IMF 2026 agreement	Long-tail	Informational/Financial
IMF disbursement USD 1000 million	Long-tail numeric	Informational — hard data
Second Review of IMF Argentina Program	Technical/Financial	Informational/Specialized
Staff Level Agreement Argentina	Technical jargon	Informational — high frequency
inflation Argentina IMF March 2026	Long-tail noticiosa	Informational / News
BCRA 2026 IMF Reserves Target	Technique + year	Informational/Data
IMF-Argentina Spring Meetings	Event	Informational — context

Indicator	Cumulative percentage (Dec 2023 — Apr 2026)
Accumulated inflation	280%
College Salary Increase Awarded	158%
Difference (Actual Loss)	−122 percentage points
Estimated loss of purchasing power	−32%
Equivalent in lost monthly wages	≈ 7.3 full salaries
Actual drop in transfers to the system (2023–2026)	−45.6%

Date	Milestone
Dec 2023	Asunción de Milei. Beginning of the adjustment on university items.
Apr. 2024	First Federal University March: almost 1 million people in Buenos Aires.
Sep. 2024	Congress approves Law 27,795 on University Financing.
Oct. 2024	Second Federal University March against the presidential veto.
2025 (annual)	Milei issues Decree 759/2025 suspending the application of the law.
Dec. 2025	Judge Cormick orders the application of the law under the protection of the CIN. First precautionary measure.
31 Mar. 2026	The CAF Chamber ratifies the precautionary measure and sets a period of 15 working days.
Apr 18, 2026	Expiration of the judicial term at 9:30 a.m. Decisive day.

📜 What is RIGI: Definition and Legal Framework

⚙️ How It Works: The VPU and the Accession Process

✅ The Benefits: The RIGI Benefits Package

💰 Tax Benefits

🚢 Customs Benefits

💱 Exchange Benefits

⚖️ Legal Stability: 30 Years of Fixed Rules

⚠️ The Other Side: Criticisms, Risks, and Controversies

💸 The Fiscal Impact Argument

🌱 The Environmental Issue

⚖️ The ICSID Problem

📈 Approved Projects: RIGI in Real Numbers

🗓️ The 2026 Extension: Signals from the Government

📊 RIGI vs. General Regime: How Much the Benefit Is Worth

⚖️ The Balance: Pros and Cons in Perspective

🗣️ Voices of the Debate

🔭 Conclusion: A High-Stakes, High-Stakes Experiment

📚 Sources and References

⚖️ Highway Case: Justice orders the confiscation of assets of Cristina Kirchner and the other convicted

📌 Context: What are the PASO and why does Milei seek to eliminate them?

💰 The debate over political financing

🧾 Clean Record: a battle that the ruling party wants to reopen

🗣️ Political reactions

🔮 Perspectives: What can happen in Congress?

🔗 Sources and references

⚖️A historic second trial begins

👥The seven defendants: who they are

📋The prosecution: "a diabolical environment"

🛡️The defence: "he died of a heart attack"

📰Why a second trial? The documentary scandal explained

🕐Timeline of the case

👨‍⚖️The new judges: under the microscope

💔The family: "We want Diego to rest in peace"

🔬The medical facts of the case

🌐A case that transcends borders

🤝 The meeting: an hour of trust and mutual support

👥 The participants of the table

📊 The context: second revision approved and USD 1,000 million on the way

📌 The numbers of the agreement

📝 Staff support: praise for the "fiscal anchor" and the program

📉 Inflation of 3.4%: the peak

🏗️ The financing plan: WB, IDB and CAF as key pieces

🗺️ The war in the Middle East: the global variable that was also discussed

🛣️ The Three Axes of the "Argentine Cost": Caputo's Roadmap

🧐 Journalistic analysis: what changes and what remains pending

✅ What's going well

⚠️ The points of attention

🔍 Advanced Technical SEO Sheet

Recommended Metadata

Strategic keywords

🛠️ Advanced SEO Strategies 2025–2026

📈 FAQ Schema — Frequently Asked Questions

📚 Sources consulted

The judicial deadline expires: Milei's government must pay $2.5 billion or enter into contempt to update salaries and university scholarships

🔍 The judicial stopwatch and the cornered government

⚖️ The chain of failures: from the first instance to the Chamber

📋 What Law 27,795 orders and what the ruling requires

📊 The Wage Gap in Numbers: Inflation vs. Updates

🎤 Voices of the conflict: university, unions and Casa Rosada

🔮 Possible scenarios after the expiration of the term

📅 Chronology of the conflict: from the marches to the Chamber ruling

🎓 The university system in check: beyond salaries

🔎 Metadata and SEO Optimization of this news

📚 Sources consulted and links verified