🏷️  [Diego Santilli] [Chief of Staff] [Manuel Adorni] [Milei] [Argentine Political Crisis] [Government 2026]   

🔗 See image: Diego Santilli, Minister of the Interior and new Chief of Staff appointed (Infobae)

Diego Santilli, Minister of the Interior and new Chief of Staff appointed (Infobae)

IN THIS ARTICLE

01 Manuel Adorni's resignation after three months of accumulated scandals

02 Diego Santilli's political profile and why he was elected

03 The Coming Ministerial Restructuring

04 The political cost of the Adorni case for the government

05 Analysis: Can Santilli stabilize Milei's administration?

06 Reactions of the opposition and allies

1. The fall of Adorni: three months that shook the government

On Friday, June 27, 2026, Manuel Adorni published on his social networks a letter of resignation from the position of Chief of Staff with a single final word: "End." With that laconic closure, the most turbulent cycle of the Milei administration to date ended: more than three months of heritage scandals, questionable trips, judicial investigations and a war of attrition that paralyzed the government's legislative agenda and fractured key alliances.

Adorni's departure was not a resignation in the strict sense of the term. According to sources with access to the presidential decision-making circle, it was the President's own entourage that asked him to step aside. Adorni resisted for more than three months protected by the explicit support of Javier Milei, who until Friday, from Madrid, insisted that he would not displace him if the Justice did not certify corruption.

The chronology of a collapse foretold

The plot of the Adorni scandal began in Queens, New York, with an innocent image. A photo of Adorni with his wife Bettina Angeletti in the Lubavitcher cemetery, during the presidential procession of Argentina Week, lit the first fuse.

2. The scandal that paralyzed a government

The Adorni case far exceeded the judicial file. In political terms, the damage was systemic: the government's legislative agenda was paralyzed for weeks because the opposition blocs – and some allies – conditioned any progress in Congress on the departure of the Chief of Staff.

In the Senate, the ruling party was forced not to give a quorum to block a request for Adorni's interpellation, but that temporary halt had an expiration date: Wednesday, July 1, when the Constitutional Affairs Commission was scheduled to deal with the issue. The result would have been unfavorable to him.

The departure of Esteban Bullrich from the PRO – a moderate figure in the party – was another collateral damage. The former Buenos Aires senator announced his departure by coining the phrase that defined the moment: with Adorni we lower the last flag.

🔗 See image: Manuel Adorni in his last press conference as Chief of Staff

Manuel Adorni in his last press conference as Chief of Staff (La Política Online)

3. Diego Santilli: the tightrope walker who reaches the center of the board

It is not a surprising name. When Adorni's collapse became irreversible, Interior Minister Diego Santilli — nicknamed "El Colo" — had been the strongest candidate for succession for weeks. Not by improvisation, but by patient and deliberate political construction.

A profile designed for consensus

Santilli has something that is lacking in libertarian internal politics: simultaneous arrival with all the relevant sectors of power without having broken with any of them. He maintains a fluid relationship with Karina Milei, the secretary general of the Presidency. He is in tune with presidential advisor Santiago Caputo. And he has the explicit support of Patricia Bullrich, head of the ruling bloc in the Senate.

This equanimity is not accidental. Santilli arrived at the Ministry of the Interior in November 2025 after one of the most notable electoral comebacks in recent Buenos Aires political history: when José Luis Espert fell from the official list due to his links to businessman Federico Machado, Santilli was at the head of a candidacy that many thought was lost, and he won.

The meeting that set the course

On Friday night, in total secrecy, Karina Milei, Santilli and Martín Menem met at the Casa Rosada. That meeting ended up setting the course: it was in that area that the offer to the Minister of the Interior was formally advanced. According to those close to the Buenos Aires politician, he was not enthusiastic — the position complicates his projection as a candidate for governor in 2027 — but no one in the government believes that he can say no to the President.

Adorni vs. Santilli: two styles, two moments

4. Ministerial restructuring: what changes and what remains

Santilli's arrival as Chief of Staff is not a simple change of names: it implies a significant reconfiguration of the organizational chart of the libertarian government, with a direct impact on the Ministry of the Interior and the architecture of power around the Casa Rosada.

Interior returns to the orbit of the Headquarters

The first relevant structural change is the reintegration of the Ministry of the Interior under the wing of the Chief of Staff, reversing the autonomy that this portfolio had acquired since Santilli led it. The model once again resembles the previous scheme: centralized political coordination, as it worked with Guillermo Francos and Lisandro Catalán in the first stage of the government.

Changes in presidential communication

The redesign of the political area already began before the formal announcement. The resignation of Press Secretary Javier Lanari and the appointment of economist Adrián Ravier as the new presidential spokesman were interpreted as clear signs that the reorganization was underway. Fabián Rodríguez, Horacio Marín's former spokesman at YPF, took over as Secretary of Communication and Press.

The new scheme seeks to separate the functions of ministerial coordination – which will fall on Santilli – from those of political communication, avoiding the concentration of power that characterized the Adorni cycle, where the Chief of Staff accumulated roles until he was overexposed.

What Santilli will have to manage from day one

▸ Unblock the paralyzed legislative agenda, including the Private Property Law.

▸ Coordinate with governors and financial advances to the provinces to maintain political balance.

▸ Manage the relationship with the PRO and the opposition dialogue blocs.

▸ Contain the deterioration of the government's image after the impact of the Adorni case.

▸ Organize the presidential communication structure during the transition period.

5. The political cost of the Adorni case for the libertarian project

Beyond the judicial files, the political impact of the Adorni case on Milei's government was profound and multidimensional. The administration that came to power promising to exterminate the "caste" and corruption, had to live for more than three months with a Chief of Staff investigated for illicit enrichment.

The President tried to shield his official with unusual resources: posters, public statements, joint appearances at official events. From Spain, he went so far as to say that media coverage had violated the limits of the human. But the accumulated wear and tear was impossible to stop.

The final pressure to remove Adorni came from several simultaneous fronts: the imminence of the interpellation and motion of censure in the Senate, the advance of the Justice towards a possible summons for questioning, the polls that showed a drop in the presidential image, and the explicit warning of Mauricio Macri that the PRO would vote for the impeachment if the Government did not act.

6. Political reactions: between relief and caution

The confirmation of Adorni's departure and the appointment of Santilli generated disparate reactions on the Argentine political chessboard. Within the ruling party, the news was received with relief in most sectors. In the opposition, with a mixture of satisfaction with the result and skepticism about whether change will be enough.

Within the Government

✅ Patricia Bullrich, head of the bloc in the Senate, was one of the main promoters of the departure and supports Santilli's arrival.

✅ Martín Menem, president of the Chamber of Deputies, participated in the decisive meeting on Friday night.

✅ Santiago Caputo confirmed his agreement with the designation, which marks a moment of relative peace in the "iron triangle".

✅ Karina Milei personally coordinated the details of the ministerial transition.

From the opposition

🔵 Several blocs had conditioned their support for the reforms on Adorni's departure. The new situation opens a window for negotiation.

🔵 The promoters of the interpellation said that Adorni's resignation does not close the judicial files, which continue.

🔵 The dialogue opposition will evaluate Santilli's first moves to define his legislative position.

🔗 See image: Meeting between Karina Milei, Santilli and Martín Menem sealed the course on Friday night

Meeting between Karina Milei, Santilli and Martín Menem sealed the course on Friday night (Infobae)

7. Analysis: can Santilli stabilize management?

The question that all political actors in Buenos Aires are asking themselves this Sunday, June 28, is whether Diego Santilli has the capacity and capital to stabilize an administration that has been accumulating turbulence for several months.

The tentative answer is that it has better conditions than its predecessor to try, but it also faces its own restrictions. The Chief of Staff who arrives is not a man from La Libertad Avanza: he comes from the PRO, has a Peronist history and his electoral base is in the province of Buenos Aires. That heterodoxy can be an asset to negotiate with governors and opposition sectors, but also a source of tension in a political space that values ideological purity.

From the institutional point of view, the position of Chief of Staff has in the Argentine Constitution an explicit role of coordination with Congress and political accountability. The fact that this role is now occupied by an operator with legislative and territorial experience – rather than a media spokesperson – represents, in itself, a turn towards a more pragmatic management.

The big question in the medium term is whether Santilli accepted the Cabinet Chief as a definitive political destiny or as a stage of service within a trajectory that points to the Buenos Aires Governorship. That ambiguity can condition their internal authority and their ability to lead ministerial coordination with the energy and commitment that the moment demands.

8. Conclusion: A change of helm with open-ended questions

The departure of Manuel Adorni and the arrival of Diego Santilli as Chief of Staff marks a turning point in Javier Milei's administration. It is not a simple change of names: it is evidence that the government has had to double down in the face of the accumulated pressure of politics, justice and public opinion.

The President, who insisted until the last moment on defending Adorni, gives in to a reality that his own allies clearly pointed out to him: the permanence of the Chief of Staff under investigation was a burden that compromised not only the image of the Government, but also his own ability to govern.

Santilli arrives with political capital, territorial experience and the simultaneous confidence of the most relevant sectors of the official space. But the challenge ahead is enormous: to rebuild the political coordination of a government that has lost time and alliances, while maintaining the economic course that is the main asset of the libertarian project.

Political Argentina is rarely linear. This Sunday, with Santilli's appointment still hot, the questions that remain open are as important as the certainties. And the history of these months teaches that in the Milei era, everything can change faster than any chronicler can write.

📚 SOURCES AND REFERENCES

→ Politics Online — Diego Santilli is the new Chief of Staff

→ Infobae — The resignation of Adorni and Santilli with consensus for the succession

→ La Nación — Milei back, Adorni's departure is being prepared

→ The Chronicler — Adorni's Travels, Undeclared Goods and Contradictions

→ Bloomberg Line — Gamer purchases and Milei's warning about Adorni

→ Infobae — Travel, property and cryptocurrencies: keys to the scandal

→ iProfesional — Santilli to Headquarters and Devitt to Interior

→ MDZ Online — Who is Diego Santilli

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🔥 Manuel Adorni under pressure: Justice investigates the origin of his assets and political tension grows in Milei's government

📅 Updated: June 2026
⏱ Reading time: 9 minutes
✍️ Political Writing | Special Research

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The judicial investigation into Manuel Adorni's assets escalated in recent days after his statements about Bitcoin savings found on a pen drive. The opposition demands explanations and the case generates tension within the government of Javier Milei.

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⚖️ The case that shakes the Casa Rosada

The situation of the Argentine Chief of Staff, Manuel Adorni, became one of the main focuses of political conflict for the administration of Javier Milei.

What began as an investigation into asset inconsistencies ended up becoming a nationwide political scandal after Adorni attributed part of his economic growth to investments in Bitcoin and funds stored on a pen drive that, according to his version, had remained lost for years. (Checked)

The explanation, far from closing the doubts, opened new judicial and political questions.

📈 The wealth growth that set off alarm bells

The Justice is trying to determine if there is a correspondence between the income declared by the official and the significant increase registered in his assets during the last years.

According to documents and public statements analyzed by different media, Adorni made rectifications in his affidavits and incorporated assets linked to cryptocurrencies that were not previously listed in official records. (Checked)

The central axis of the research focuses on:

✅ Transactions with cryptocurrencies not previously declared.

✅ Funds in dollars whose traceability is being examined.

✅ Inconsistencies between previous and subsequent statements.

✅ Documentary justification of the origin of the resources.

The prosecutor's office seeks to establish if the documentation presented is sufficient to explain the accumulated assets and rule out possible irregularities. (Filo News)

₿ Bitcoin, a pen drive and an explanation that generated controversy

During television interviews and subsequent public clarifications, Adorni maintained that part of his wealth comes from an investment made years ago in Bitcoin.

According to his account, he would have invested approximately USD 200,000 in cryptocurrencies and later obtained profits close to USD 300,000. Part of those assets were stored in a digital wallet contained in a pen drive that, he said, remained lost for a while before being recovered. (Instagram)

The explanation provoked an immediate political and media reaction.

Specialists consulted by different media recalled that operations carried out through blockchain usually leave verifiable traces, allowing movements, dates and transfers associated with digital wallets to be reconstructed. (Infobae)

This aspect is considered key to the progress of the investigation.

🔍 The traceability of cryptocurrencies: a key piece

One of the elements that arouses the most interest among researchers and analysts is the possibility of reconstructing the financial history of digital assets.

Unlike cash, transactions recorded on the blockchain can leave verifiable technical evidence.

Experts in financial technology pointed out that, if the wallets used are identified, movements, purchase dates, sales and transfers could be analyzed to determine if the explanations match existing records. (Infobae)

This aspect could become one of the most relevant pieces of evidence in the file.

🏛️ Opposition increases pressure on Congress

The official's explanations failed to defuse opposition criticism.

Various political sectors are promoting requests for reports, subpoenas and parliamentary measures aimed at clarifying the origin of the declared funds. (El País)

Among the main questions are:

🔹 Alleged contradictions in public statements.

🔹 Subsequent modifications of affidavits.

🔹 Lack of documentation considered sufficient by opposition sectors.

🔹 Possible impact on the transparency standards required of public officials.

The case has already begun to occupy a large part of the legislative agenda and threatens to become a new front of attrition for the ruling party.

⚠️ Internal noises in the Government

Although publicly President Milei maintains his political support for Adorni, different journalistic versions indicate that the episode generated discomfort within sectors of the ruling party. (El País)

The main concern would not be linked exclusively to the judicial aspect but to the political cost of a controversy that contradicts one of the main discursive axes of the libertarian administration: the fight against privileges and corruption.

Political sources consulted by national media describe a scenario where the continuity of the controversy threatens to displace other priority issues on the government's agenda. (El País)

💬 The phrase that amplified the controversy

Among the statements that generated the greatest impact is a statement made by Adorni when referring to his personal savings.

The official said that many Argentines had historically chosen to keep money outside the formal circuits to protect themselves from inflation and tax pressure. That explanation was interpreted by critics and opponents as an admission of having kept undeclared funds. (Infobae)

The repercussions multiplied both in the political sphere and on social networks.

📊 The institutional impact

Beyond the possible judicial consequences, the case raises questions about the mechanisms of patrimonial control applied to public officials.

Transparency specialists point out that situations of this type usually generate three immediate effects:

📍 Erosion of institutional credibility

Public confidence is affected when there are doubts about the consistency of asset declarations.

📍 Increasing political polarization

The opposition finds arguments to question the government while the ruling party is forced to defend its officials.

📍 Judicialization of the public agenda

The courts come to occupy a central place in the national political discussion.

📸 Reference images available on the Internet

Manuel Adorni

Imagen:
https://cassette.sphdigital.com.sg/image/straitstimes/d6d354ccb0060b49e43efe7dcfd2300d443489c0a55d2d5f37a45da3a432bc6c

Institutional source:
Casa Rosada

Bitcoin (illustrative image)

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/46/Bitcoin.svg

Source:
Wikipedia Commons - Bitcoin

📝 Conclusion

The investigation into Manuel Adorni's assets has become one of the most delicate political episodes for Javier Milei's government since the beginning of his administration.

While the Justice tries to determine if there is sufficient documentation to support the origin of the declared funds, the opposition intensifies parliamentary pressure and the ruling party faces the challenge of managing a crisis that directly affects its discourse on transparency and public ethics. (Filo News)

The result of the asset expertise, the analysis of the operations linked to cryptocurrencies and the judicial decisions that may arise in the coming weeks will be decisive in defining the political future of one of the officials closest to President Milei. (Infobae)

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⚖️ JUSTICE & PUBLIC HEALTH 

HISTORIC RULING: The Federal Court of Córdoba ordered to pay $95 million to the family of a young woman who died after the Sputnik V vaccine

The Federal Court of Appeals of Córdoba determined that Melín Agustina Sartori, 24, died as a direct result of an adverse effect of the Sputnik V vaccine. The ruling, unprecedented in Argentina, obliges the Ministry of Health of the Nation to pay compensation equivalent to 240 minimum retirement benefits – about 95 million pesos – and sets a precedent that could reopen the debate on state responsibility in mass vaccination campaigns.

📅 May 30, 2026 |  ✍️ Journalistic writing |  📍 Cordoba, Argentina

🖼️ [ See reference image: Syringe and vaccine — Unsplash ]

Illustrative image — COVID-19 vaccine (Unsplash / Hakan Nural)

Melín Agustina Sartori was 24 years old and, as described by her entourage during the judicial process, she was in excellent health. He practiced sports regularly and had just started a family business making artisanal pasta. Her family remembered her as a young woman socially committed, generous and full of projects.

On July 15, 2021, Melín went to the Orfeo Superdome in the city of Córdoba to receive the first dose of the Sputnik V vaccine, as part of the national immunization campaign against COVID-19. He did not have any pre-existing pathology that could condition a severe adverse reaction. He was, apparently, the profile of the person that every health campaign considers to be of low risk.

Six days after vaccination, on July 21, he began to show symptoms that at first seemed minor: intense headaches and persistent vomiting. In a first medical consultation, the condition was interpreted as gastroenteritis and the young woman was sent home. However, two days later spontaneous bruises appeared on her face and signs of neurological deterioration that alerted her family.

Hospitalized urgently, laboratory studies revealed an alarming panorama: a platelet count of just 27,000/mm³, when normal values range between 150,000 and 400,000. The diagnosis confirmed a thrombosis syndrome with thrombocytopenia (TTS), also known in the international scientific literature as VITT (Vaccine-Induced Immune Thrombocytopenia and Thrombosis). The condition progressed rapidly, causing irreversible neurological deterioration. Melín underwent surgery that failed to reverse the damage. He died on July 29, 2021, just 14 days after receiving the vaccine.

VITT syndrome (vaccine-induced immune thrombotic thrombocytopenia) is an extremely rare adverse reaction that was identified and documented worldwide during COVID-19 vaccination campaigns, mainly associated with adenoviral vector technology vaccines, such as AstraZeneca/ChAdOx1 and Sputnik V itself.

The mechanism is autoimmune in nature: the body generates IgG antibodies directed against platelet factor 4 (FP4), which triggers a paradoxical activation of platelets, simultaneously generating clots in blood vessels and a drastic drop in platelet count. The clinical paradox—thrombosis and thrombocytopenia at the same time—is what makes VITT especially severe and difficult to treat with conventional protocols.

Symptoms of VITT usually develop 4 to 30 days after vaccination. In Sartori's case, they appeared on the sixth day. According to the Clinical Hospital of the University of Santiago de Compostela, cited in studies included in the file, it is an event of very low incidence in relation to the total number of doses administered worldwide, although with high mortality once the condition reaches advanced stages.

A report prepared by specialists from the Institute of Pharmacovigilance Sciences of the University of Southampton (United Kingdom), published in The New England Journal of Medicine and assessed by the court, concluded that Melín Sartori's case met the criteria for level 1 of the determination of certainty of vaccine-induced immune thrombotic thrombocytopenia.

After the death of her daughter, María Virginia Ruiz filed a claim with the COVID-19 Reparation Fund, the mechanism created by Law 27,573 and Decree 431/2021 to compensate people who had suffered physical harm or died as a direct result of the vaccines applied during the pandemic. However, the administrative path was as tortuous as the judicial process that would follow.

In the first instance, the Superintendence of Labor Risks (SRT) rejected the request. The National Commission for Vaccine Safety (Conaseva) had classified the adverse event as "Indeterminate B1", concluding that there was insufficient scientific evidence to establish a direct causal relationship between the Sputnik V vaccine and the death. The family was not satisfied with that answer and decided to take the case to the federal courts.

The judicial process lasted for almost five years. During that time, the international scientific consensus on VITT matured and consolidated. In May 2024, a turning point: Conaseva itself reviewed the file and, based on the new medical evidence available, reclassified the event. The commission concluded that there was "evidence of causality with the vaccine" and elevated the case to the "A1 Related" category, the highest level of causal certainty on the post-vaccine adverse event rating scale.

That reclassification was a central element for the final resolution of the Chamber. Lawyer Barbará also pointed out that Sputnik V "did not have pharmacovigilance", that is, it did not have a continuous monitoring system for adverse reactions comparable to that of other vaccines authorized by international organizations such as the EMA or the FDA, which made it difficult to detect and recognize this type of event early.

Chamber A of the Federal Court of Appeals of Córdoba, made up of Judges Liliana Navarro and Graciela Montesi together with Judge Eduardo Ávalos, issued a resolution that legal doctrine already points out as historic in terms of the civil liability of the State in the face of adverse effects of vaccines.

The ruling states that "based on the elements gathered, it is possible to conclude that the event is related to the placement of the Sputnik V vaccine." The court assessed, among other evidence: the medical reports that detected IgG antibodies against FP4; the expert testimonies of hematologist Ana Romina Montivero and pharmacovigilance expert Raquel Herrera Comoglio, who stated that the absence of heparin allowed them to conclude "without a doubt" that the picture corresponded to a VITT triggered by the vaccine; and the 2024 Conaseva reclassification itself.

Judge Liliana Navarro was especially blunt in her vote: "The discussion on the causal link, far from persisting, is technically clear." The ruling also clarifies that the current regulations do not require absolute certainty, but that it is enough to prove the damage and its causal link through the preponderance of the evidence, a standard that, in the court's opinion, the victim's mother satisfied "comfortably".

The ruling also specifies that the judgment will be final subject to the appeals that the parties may file. The Ministry of Health of the Nation, represented in the process, had not issued public comments at the time of going to press.

Law 27,573, enacted in November 2020 during the presidency of Alberto Fernández, authorized the National Executive Branch to enter into contracts for the provision of vaccines against COVID-19 and established, among its provisions, the creation of a Reparation Fund aimed at compensating people who suffered physical harm as a direct result of immunization.

Decree 431/2021 regulated access to this fund, establishing that claimants had to prove the causal link through specialized medical commissions and that the corresponding compensation would be calculated based on minimum retirement benefits, a formula that the Córdoba ruling applied to set $95 million.

However, as evidenced in the Sartori case, the administrative mechanism proved insufficient to guarantee effective access to reparation. The family had to go through almost five years of legal litigation to obtain the recognition of a right that the law had provided. This gap between the regulatory design and the practical reality of its application is one of the points that the ruling implicitly highlights.

▪      Law 27,573 (Nov. 2020): authorization of vaccine contracts and creation of the Reparation Fund.

▪      Decree 431/2021: regulation of access to the fund and methodology for calculating compensation.

▪      Joint Resolution 7/2022: administrative procedure for the processing of complaints.

▪      Conaseva reclassification (May 2024): official recognition of the causal link "Related A1".

The ruling of the Federal Court of Córdoba is not only the resolution of an individual case. It is the first of its kind in Argentina to judicially establish the causal relationship between a COVID-19 vaccine and a death, also ordering concrete reparations to the State. As such, it sets a legal precedent that specialists in health law already describe as of enormous significance.

First, the ruling could encourage other families who went through similar situations – and whose claims were rejected or are pending in administrative proceedings – to resort to the courts with a greater probability of success. Argentina applied more than 100 million doses of different vaccines against COVID-19 between 2021 and 2023. Although VITT is statistically rare, even a minimal incidence rate over that volume can account for tens or hundreds of cases.

Secondly, the precedent puts under the magnifying glass the pharmacovigilance system with which Sputnik V operated in Argentina. Lawyer Barbará was explicit in pointing out that the Russian vaccine did not have the continuous monitoring mechanisms that other vaccines approved in the framework of complete clinical trials by bodies such as the EMA or the FDA had. That absence of robust safety data made it difficult for years to recognize serious adverse effects.

Thirdly, the case reopens the debate on the responsibility of the State when, in the context of a global health emergency, it authorises and massively promotes a vaccine that did not complete all the usual approval steps. The balance between epidemiological urgency and individual safety is a tension that international health law has been discussing since the first months of the pandemic, and that this ruling turns into a concrete legal issue with economic consequences for the Argentine public treasury.

The Sputnik V vaccine, developed by the Gamaleya National Center for Epidemiology and Microbiology of the Russian Federation, was the first to be authorized for emergency use in Argentina, in December 2020, during the government of Alberto Fernández. The decision was controversial from the beginning: the vaccine had completed only phase II of its clinical trials at the time of Argentine authorization, and bodies such as the EMA never approved it for use in the European Union.

Argentina acquired millions of doses of Sputnik V and applied it massively during the first half of 2021, at a time when the availability of other vaccines was still limited. The vaccine was the basis for the start of the national vaccination plan for broad sectors of the population. In October 2021, the Argentine State returned to the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) more than 1.3 million doses that had been requested to replace other items.

The Sartori case is the first in which the Argentine justice system formally establishes that a death that occurred during that campaign was causally linked to the Russian vaccine. The symbolic and legal impact of that determination is hard to overestimate.

🖼️ [ See reference image: Mass vaccination campaign — Unsplash ]

Illustrative image — Mass vaccination (Unsplash / Mufid Majnun)

▪      First ruling of its kind in Argentina. No Argentine court ruling had previously established the causal relationship between a COVID-19 vaccine and a death, also ordering economic reparations to the State.

▪      The evidentiary standard is the "preponderance of the evidence." The court made it clear that the law does not require absolute certainty to access compensation, which opens the door to other similar cases.

▪      The reclassification of Conaseva was decisive. The technical body recognized in 2024 the causal link that it had initially denied, radically changing the balance of the file.

▪      The absence of pharmacovigilance is a central argument. The case exposes the fragility of the safety monitoring system with which Sputnik V operated in Argentina, a vaccine that never received approval from the EMA or the FDA.

▪      The State has 30 days to act. If the Ministry of Health does not complete the procedure within the established period, the family could request measures of forced execution of the sentence.

The case of Melín Agustina Sartori condenses, in its individual tragedy, some of the deepest tensions left by the COVID-19 pandemic: the urgency of protecting lives versus the need for scientific guarantees on the safety of the instruments used; political pressure on regulatory bodies; the speed with which science had to advance in conditions of radical uncertainty; and the duty of democracies to take responsibility for the damage caused to those who trusted the decisions of the State.

None of this implies that mass vaccination was a wrong decision. The scientific consensus is clear: COVID-19 vaccines saved tens of millions of lives worldwide. VITT, as tragic as it is in the cases in which it occurs, has a statistically very low incidence. But precisely because public health policies are implemented on a massive scale, compensation systems for those who suffer exceptional harm must be effective, accessible, and fair.

It took María Virginia Ruiz almost five years to obtain the recognition that her daughter died as a result of a vaccine that the State instructed her to apply. That time cannot be erased. But the ruling of the Federal Court of Córdoba establishes, at least, that the justice system can do what the bureaucracy could not: recognize the truth and order reparations.

🔖 SEO TAGS

#SputnikV #FalloHistórico #CórdobaJusticia #VacunasCOVID #VITT #Trombocitopenia #IndemizaciónCOVID #DerechoSanitario #Ley27573 #FondoReparaciónCOVID #CámaraFederal #MelínSartori #EfectosAdversos #Pandemia #JusticiaCórdoba

📚 SOURCES CONSULTED

▪ Profile: https://www.perfil.com/noticias/sociedad/la-justicia-atribuyo-el-fallecimiento-de-una-joven-cordobesa-de-24-anos-sin-antecedentes-medicos-a-la-vacuna-sputnik.phtml

▪ La Nación: https://www.lanacion.com.ar/sociedad/un-fallo-inedito-reconoce-la-relacion-directa-entre-la-vacuna-sputnik-y-la-muerte-de-una-joven-sana-nid27052026/

▪ Infobae: https://www.infobae.com/sociedad/2026/05/28/la-justicia-de-cordoba-atribuyo-la-muerte-de-una-joven-a-un-efecto-adverso-de-la-vacuna-rusa-sputnik/

▪ The Andes: https://www.losandes.com.ar/sociedad/la-justicia-determino-que-una-joven-cordobesa-murio-efectos-la-sputnik-v-y-ordeno-una-indemnizacion-95-millones-n5992747

▪ The Capital: https://www.lacapital.com.ar/salud/fallo-inedito-cordoba-la-justicia-responsabilizo-la-vacuna-sputnik-v-la-muerte-una-joven-n10261613.html

▪ The Compass 24: https://www.labrujula24.com/notas/2026/05/27/la-justicia-avalo-el-reclamo-por-un-caso-fatal-asociado-a-la-vacuna-sputnik-n502451/

▪ Río Negro: https://www.rionegro.com.ar/justicia/la-justicia-reconocio-que-una-joven-sana-murio-tras-recibir-la-vacuna-sputnik-y-ordeno-indemnizar-a-la-familia-4590685/

▪ News Channel: https://www.canaldelasnoticias.com/politica/2026/05/28/murio-por-la-vacuna-sputnik-v-y-el-estado-debera-pagar-95-millones/

Article of a journalistic and informative nature. It does not constitute legal or medical advice. © 2026

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The Argentine economic labyrinth:

surplus without growth, record harvests without consumption

and SMEs that are extinguished while the large conglomerates celebrate

The Argentina of 2026 is a shocking paradox: fields that break historical production records, inflation that fell from 25% per month to around 2-3%, a fiscal surplus not seen in 15 years... and yet factories work at 53.8% of their capacity, SMEs close daily, retirees struggle to make ends meet and domestic consumption continues to be flattened. How is it possible that with so many positive indicators the real economy does not take off? This article attempts to answer that question with data, analysis, and historical perspective.

📉 The adjustment that balanced the accounts but deactivated the economy

In December 2023, Argentina had a primary deficit of 2.9% of GDP and a financial deficit of 6.1%. The photo was untenable. The government of Javier Milei arrived with a unique and radical promise: fiscal balance at any cost, the famous 'chainsaw'. And it delivered: in 2024 the primary surplus reached 2.1% of GDP, with a positive financial result of 0.3%, the first since 2010.

But the mechanism was surgical only in the accounting area. Real public spending fell by 27.5% – the largest contraction since 1994. The cuts mainly affected retirements and pensions (25.3% of the total adjustment), public works (23.2%), energy subsidies (14.5%), social programs (8.8%) and public sector salaries (8.6%).

The result was predictable by any macroeconomic textbook: with liquefied incomes and spending cut, domestic demand collapsed. GDP fell by a cumulative 3% in 2024. VAT collection – the tax that most accurately reflects consumption – fell by 16.3% year-on-year in real terms in the first half of the year. Profits, another −13%. Tax collection itself, which should have been financed by the State, fell by 6.6% in real terms in the first eleven months of the year.

The irony is geometric: by destroying the demand to balance the accounts, the tax base that sustains those accounts was also destroyed. A dog biting its tail.

🌾 Record harvests that do not feed the domestic market

The 2025/2026 agricultural season recorded extraordinary numbers: 49.9 million tons of soybeans, 70 million tons of corn – the highest volume in twenty years – and 7.4 million tons of sunflower, a historic record. The Argentine countryside produces like never before.

However, this agrarian wealth does not translate into internal economic dynamism. Why? Because the agro-export model, by definition, exports. Foreign currency comes in, pays debt, strengthens reserves, and in the best of cases finances public spending through withholdings. But the farmer who sold his soybeans does not necessarily buy a refrigerator manufactured in Córdoba or hire a gas operator from Rosario.

The oil industry processed a record 47.6 million tonnes in 2025, with idle capacity of 28.2%, the lowest since 2011. But the rest of the manufacturing industry tells another story: in December 2025, the utilization of general industrial installed capacity fell to 53.8%. Almost half of the machines in Argentina were stopped or running at half speed.

This is the heart of the structural problem that the article seeks to illuminate: without domestic demand, production cannot scale; and without scale, unit costs skyrocket. Economies of scale work in both directions.

⚙️ The Fixed Cost Trap and the Reverse Spiral

A company that produces 1,000 units per month has its fixed costs – rent, permanent payroll, amortization of equipment, insurance, services – distributed among those 1,000 units. If demand falls to 500 units, those same fixed costs are spread across half of the products: the cost per unit doubles. The company has two options: raise prices – aggravating the fall in consumption – or close.

This mechanism, perfectly described by classical economic theory, is exactly what is destroying the Argentine SME industry. It is not business mismanagement. It is not a lack of intrinsic competitiveness. It is the implacable logic of economies of scale working in reverse: fewer sales → more unit cost → less competitiveness → fewer sales. A downward spiral that no entrepreneur can stop alone.

👴 Pensions, wages and informality: the tripod of lost consumption

The revival of a depressed economy is not an academic mystery. Keynes explained it almost a century ago: when the private sector does not invest and consumers do not spend – because they can't – it is the state that must inject demand. The most direct and efficient mechanism is to put money in the pockets of those who have the greatest marginal propensity to consume: those who earn less, because they spend practically everything they receive, and immediately, in the local market.

In Argentina, this profile corresponds exactly to retirees, workers in the informal sector and formal salaried workers with medium and low incomes. They are the three broken links in the consumption chain.

👵 Pension cuts as a brake on consumption

Retirements and pensions absorbed 25.3% of the total adjustment in 2024. The initial devaluation of the peso in December 2023 – a jump of 114% – liquefied fixed incomes in real time. Although retirement mobility later recovered some ground, the government vetoed in August 2024 a law of Congress that would have more aggressively recomposed pensions.

A retiree who receives the minimum salary or just above it does not save: he spends everything on food, medicine and basic services. Every additional peso that reaches that pocket almost immediately becomes local economic activity, VAT collected, a grocer who sells more and hires someone. Each weight cut makes the reverse path.

💼 The informal economy: 40% of the labor market that does not exist for the system

According to the OECD, informality in Argentina is high in international comparison. Argentina's social protection system has almost universal pension coverage in terms of access, but it is financed through high social security contributions that raise the cost of creating formal employment. The result: a labor market where about 40% of active workers operate in the informal sector, without contributions, without access to formal credit, without a safety net.

These people produce, sell, serve—they sustain entire microeconomies in popular neighborhoods—but they do not exist for the tax system or for the financial system. They cannot access bank loans, they will not qualify for a dignified retirement, and their consumption does not generate the multiplier effect that the registered worker does.

Incorporating them into the formal system – simplifying burdens, creating progressive regimes, lowering the labor cost of the first links – is not an expense: it is an investment that expands the tax base and the consumer market simultaneously.

🏢 The RIGI: mortgaging the future to attract the present?

The Incentive Regime for Large Investments (RIGI) is probably the most structural and controversial measure of the Milei government. In terms of design, it seeks to attract foreign direct investment to strategic sectors – energy, mining, hydrocarbons – by offering a menu of tax and regulatory benefits for a period of up to 30 years: a reduction in income tax to 25%, guaranteed tax stability, free availability of foreign currency and access to foreign markets without restrictions.

The IMF noted that RIGI has already attracted investment commitments of $12 billion. The regime's defenders argue that Argentina needs capital to develop Vaca Muerta, lithium and other natural riches that for decades were underdeveloped. They are not wrong in the diagnosis.

But the debate is about the asymmetry of the treatment. While the large companies benefiting from the RIGI have access to direct external financing, guaranteed regulatory stability for three decades and a substantially lower tax burden, Argentine SMEs – 99% of the country's business fabric – face the highest tax burden in their recent history.

The question that Argentine society has the right to ask itself is: what is left for the country when an international consortium extracts lithium or oil with guaranteed fiscal stability for 30 years? The answer depends on how much is negotiated in terms of local employment, national suppliers, technology transfer and royalties. If these conditions are not well agreed, the RIGI may become the largest legal business in Argentine history for its beneficiaries... and a mortgage for generations to come.

That Vaca Muerta and lithium develop is desirable and essential. That they do so under conditions that structurally benefit Argentina – and not only the shareholders of Amsterdam or New York – is the difference between a state policy and a liquidation of strategic assets.

💡 Surplus is not a panacea: the state is not a company

The official discourse celebrates the fiscal surplus as if it were the end in itself of economic policy. "Zero deficit" is repeated like a mantra, as if the accounting balance automatically guarantees the well-being of the population. This conceptual confusion is, perhaps, the most costly intellectual error of the current model.

A private company aims to accumulate capital: earn more than it spends, grow, distribute profits to its shareholders. The logic of the surplus makes sense in that context. But the State is not a company. Its function is not to accumulate: it is to allocate resources to maximize collective well-being, to provide the public goods that the market does not provide on its own – education, health, infrastructure, security – and in times of economic contraction, to act as a demander of last resort to prevent the recession from feeding on itself.

The economist John Maynard Keynes formulated it clearly in the 1930s, looking at another Great Depression: when all private agents withdraw simultaneously, the sum of rational individual decisions produces an irrational collective result. The State, the only agent that can act against the current, must do so. A surplus in a context of deep recession is not a virtue: it is procyclical and aggravates the problem.

The relevant nuance is that Argentina cannot ignore its restrictions: decades of deficits financed by issuance generated structural inflation that destroyed the purchasing power of several generations. It is not a question of returning to irresponsible spending. It is a question of finding the balance between fiscal sustainability and the reactivation of the internal market. That balance exists; Finding it requires creativity, not dogmatism.

🔄 The recovery that does not come for everyone

The data for 2025 show mixed signals. GDP grew by about 4.3% annually, driven by agriculture, mining and energy – the sectors benefited by the RIGI and the record harvest. But that growth is partial and concentrated. Manufacturing and construction cooled in the third quarter. SMEs in the food and pharmaceutical sector recorded significant job losses. The dynamism does not spill over.

This is the scenario of a two-speed economy: an Argentina that exports raw materials and energy resources with record numbers, and another Argentina of shops, workshops, private clinics and medium-sized factories that has not yet recovered the level of activity of 2022.

🚀 The explosion of possible consumption: what is needed

The reactivation of domestic consumption does not require magic or a new heterodox experiment. It requires the application of known, gradual and bankable mechanisms:

📌  Real recomposition of pensions: the average pension must recover genuine purchasing power, not just keep track of inflation that has already subsided. Every additional peso that comes to a retiree is spent entirely in the local market.

📌  Income policy for the formal sector: registered wages lost ground compared to the devaluation of December 2023. A pattern of real recovery, albeit gradual, stabilises demand and reduces social conflict.

📌  Incentivized formalization of informal employment: reducing the labor cost of the first links of formal employment – social monotax, simplified regimes – expands the consumer base and the tax base simultaneously.

📌  Productive credit for SMEs: Of 600,000 registered companies, only 62,000 accessed guaranteed credit in 2025. Scaling up that access is cheaper than any foreign investment incentive plan.

📌  Strategic public works: road, water and energy infrastructure have a proven multiplier effect. Each peso spent on public works generates 1.3 to 1.8 pesos of economic activity. Freezing it in the name of fiscal balance is a false saving.

📌  Equity in the tax burden: while SMEs pay twice as much as RIGI beneficiaries, competition is distorted from the beginning. Leveling does not mean destroying incentives for large investment; it means not suffocating the business fabric that employs 70% of registered workers.

🎯 Conclusion: the balance that is missing is not only fiscal

The Argentina of 2026 achieved something that seemed impossible two years ago: lower inflation from hyperinflationary levels and eliminate the fiscal deficit. Those are real achievements that deserve objective recognition. No one in their right mind can defend the model of unfunded spending that led to inflation of 211% per year in 2023.

But an airplane doesn't fly with a single engine. Macroeconomic stability is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. The other engine – domestic consumption, the domestic market, aggregate demand – is off. And as long as it remains off, factories will continue to operate at 54%, shops will continue to close, young people will continue to emigrate and record harvests will continue to be good news for export ports... and neutral or negative news for the ordinary citizen who does not perceive any direct benefit.

The challenge for the government – of any Argentine government at this stage – is to demonstrate that fiscal discipline is compatible with inclusive growth. That the surplus can coexist with decent retirements. That attracting foreign investment does not require trampling on the local businessman. That low inflation can go hand in hand with salaries that recover purchasing power.

That demonstration has not yet occurred. The countryside produces like never before, reserves are growing, the country risk has dropped, and even so the Bell Ville baker sells fewer croissants than in 2022. That distance between macro indicators and micro reality is the real pending diagnosis. And the citizen – who is, in the final analysis, the recipient of all economic policy – has been waiting long enough for someone to solve it.

🔍 REFERENCES AND SOURCES

▸ Infobae / EFE: The Argentine economy closes 2024 marked by Milei's drastic adjustment

▸ El Observador: Argentina achieves fiscal surplus after 14 years

▸ FAIGA: SME Situation Report, August 2025

▸ Infobae: The tax pressure of SMEs doubles that of RIGI companies

▸ Expoagro: Oil industry reaches historical record 2025

▸ IngenieroBlancoWhite: Argentina: record harvest 2025/2026

▸ OECD: Expanding social protection and combating informality in Latin America, 2025

▸ Deloitte LATAM: Argentina Economic Outlook, December 2025

▸ The Blender: Utilization of installed capacity fell to 53.8%, Dec. 2025

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