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⚠️ WEATHER ALERT · WEATHER
Alert for the "deluge of the year": severe storms, gusts of up to 100 km/h and a polar cold wave hit Argentina
The National Meteorological Service maintains a yellow alert in force for this Monday, August 31, which includes hail, strong gusts of wind, electrical activity and risk of flooding in six provinces of the country.
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📅 Publication date |
August 31, 2026 |
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⏱️ Reading Time |
Approx. 4 minutes (≈ 780 words) |
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🗂️ Category |
General Information / Climate |
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📍 Coverage |
Formosa, Corrientes, Misiones, San Luis, Córdoba and La Rioja |
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🏷️ SEO keywords |
weather alert Argentina, storms August 31, SMN yellow alert, hail, polar cold wave |
🖼 Cyclogenesis and storm front over the country — see original image
Image source: Meteored / Composition in Canva, via El Cronista.
Argentina started the last week of August under a scenario of strong atmospheric instability. The National Meteorological Service (SMN) has maintained a yellow alert since early Monday morning for strong storms that, according to the agency, could lead to what is already colloquially described as "the deluge of the year". The combination of intense rains in short periods, wind gusts that would reach 100 km/h, hail and a subsequent thermal drop due to the entry of polar air configures a panorama that requires special attention in at least six provinces.
The phenomenon is part of the advance of a frontal system of great development, which specialists link to a cyclogenesis process of up to 48 hours duration. While the center and north of the country remain on alert, the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires (AMBA) is not, for the moment, among the areas of severe risk.
🌩️ Six provinces under yellow alert for strong storms
According to the latest report from the SMN, the most unstable conditions of the day are concentrated in Formosa, Corrientes, Misiones, San Luis, Córdoba and La Rioja. In these jurisdictions, some storms could intensify quickly and discharge large volumes of water in very short periods of time, accompanied by frequent electrical activity and hail in a timely manner.
• Formosa, Corrientes and Misiones: greater probability of strong storms and abundant rains.
• San Luis, Córdoba and La Rioja: episodes of severe weather of isolated development but rapid intensification.
☔ Flood risk: how much water could fall
🖼 Storm with heavy rain — see original image
Photo: Foco Uy, via El Cronista.
One of the sources of concern is the volume of water that can accumulate in a short time. Official projections place the accumulated between 20 and 50 millimeters, although it is not ruled out that this threshold will be exceeded occasionally in certain localities. This type of discharge can result in temporary flooding in streets, routes and urban or peri-urban sectors with drainage problems, so it is recommended to avoid driving in areas with water accumulation.
💨 Gusts, lightning and hail: the phenomena that are of most concern
Beyond rain, the risk combo includes intense wind gusts – which in some areas could approach or exceed 90-100 km/h – frequent lightning and hail. Each of these phenomena represents a different threat: the wind can detach branches, signs and light structures; lightning poses a direct risk to those left outdoors; and hail can damage vehicles, roofs and crops when storm cells gain intensity.
❄️ After the storm, the cold arrives: polar air enters
The SMN anticipates that, after the passage of the front, a polar air mass will enter that will cause a marked thermal drop. In Misiones, one of the most compromised provinces, the minimums would range between 15°C and 18°C this Monday, with an additional drop expected for Tuesday. This thermal contrast – heat and humidity before the storm, dry cold afterwards – is common in cold fronts at the end of winter and usually coincides with the moment of greatest instability.
In contrast, the AMBA will go through the day without alerts for severe phenomena, with partly cloudy skies, minimums close to 11°C, maximums around 19°C and moderate winds from the east and southeast.
✅ Official recommendations in the face of the yellow alert
Faced with this scenario, the authorities and the SMN itself recommend taking extreme precautions. Among the main preventive measures are:
• Avoid going out during the development of storms, unless strictly necessary.
• Do not drive on flooded streets, routes or roads.
• Clean drains and drains, and do not take garbage out on public roads.
• Check roofs, gutters and balconies before the wind picks up.
• Secure or remove light objects (flower pots, awnings, garden chairs) that can be displaced by the wind.
• Avoid taking shelter under trees, poles, canopies or unstable signs.
• Disconnect appliances if there is a risk of water ingress.
• Stay informed through official channels and updates from the SMN.
📌 What does the yellow alert mean?
The yellow alert is the first step of the National Meteorological Service's warning system and warns of phenomena with the capacity to generate inconveniences in daily activities and certain specific risks for the population, without yet reaching the level of danger of the orange or red alerts. Its validity can be updated as the frontal system evolves, so it is recommended to closely follow the weather reports during the rest of the day.
❓ Suggested FAQs (for FAQs)
• Which Argentine provinces are on alert for storms today? → Formosa, Corrientes, Misiones, San Luis, Córdoba and La Rioja.
• How much wind is expected? → Gusts that could approach 90-100 km/h in the most affected areas.
• Will it be cold after the storm? → Yes, a polar air mass enters with a marked thermal drop.
ECONOMY · LABOR POLICY
Failure in the Wage Council: the CGT and the two CTAs withdraw and the Government will set the new Minimum Wage by decree
Without a quorum or agreement between unions and employers, the Executive Branch will have to unilaterally laud the new value of the SMVM, in the midst of a fall in purchasing power that has already accumulated more than four tenths since November 2023.
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🕒 Reading Time: 8–9 minutes |
📅 Updated: August 29, 2026 |
📍 Location: Buenos Aires, Argentina |
🏛️ What happened: a plenary session that ended without a quorum
The National Council for Employment, Productivity and the Minimum, Vital and Mobile Wage failed again. The plenary meeting, convened for this Friday virtually, ended abruptly after the CGT, the Autonomous CTA and the CTA of the Workers decided to withdraw from the meeting and leave it without a quorum, according to multiple media that covered the day.
The three trade union federations participated only in the technical salary commission – an instance in which each sector presents its proposal for an increase – but refused to continue in the plenary meeting, where the State, employers and unions must agree on the increase or define it by vote. The underlying claim, as it transpired, was both for the amount offered and for the virtual modality of the meeting: the unions had been demanding that the Council return to meet in person.
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"We demand a true dialogue, with proposals that allow workers to live with dignity" — CGT communiqué after the withdrawal of the plenary |
With the meeting broken and without agreement between the parties, the definition of the new salary floor remains, once again, in the hands of the national Executive Branch, which must set by decree the update of the Minimum, Vital and Mobile Wage (SMVM), as happened in the previous calls of the body.
💰 The numbers on the table: the gap between unions and businessmen
The distance between the parties largely explains the breakdown of the negotiations. While the business sector offered a scheme of gradual increases, the labor federations demanded a much faster recomposition of purchasing power.
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📊 The positions in conflict • Value effective from August 2026: $376,600 per month for monthly workers and $1,883 per hour for daily workers. • Business proposal: +1.8% in September and +1.7% monthly between October and April, reaching $468,000 in April 2027. • Union demand: not to fall below $911,202 in July and to reach $993,300 in December 2026. • Result: without an agreement, the Executive Branch will set the amount by decree, as in the five previous calls of this administration. |
|
Concept |
Proposed amount |
Validity |
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Current SMVM floor |
$376,600 |
August 2026 |
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Business offer (floor) |
$468,000 |
April 2027 |
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Union claim (floor) |
MX$911,202 |
July 2026 |
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Union claim (floor) |
$993,300 |
December 2026 |
📉 A salary that fails to recover ground
The Council's new failure comes in a context of sharp deterioration in the purchasing power of the minimum wage. According to a report by the Interdisciplinary Institute of Political Economy (IIEP) of the UBA-CONICET, the real SMVM fell again in July 2026, with a monthly contraction of 0.8%, and accumulates a real loss of 40.5% since November 2023.
To measure the fall, the researchers calculated that the purchasing power of the minimum wage in November 2023 would be equivalent today to $626,106, well above the nearly $372,400 that represents the current value in real terms. The deterioration led the real minimum wage to be below the level it had in 2001, before the collapse of convertibility.
Another study, by the Center for Research and Training of the Argentine Republic (CIFRA-CTA), adds historical perspective: it maintains that the minimum wage was at real levels 45.6% lower than in November 2019 – the end of the Cambiemos government – and 58.4% lower than in November 2015.
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Comparison |
Cumulative Actual Drop |
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Since November 2023 (IIEP-UBA) |
-40,5% |
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Compared to November 2019 (FIGURE) |
-45,6% |
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Compared to November 2015 (FIGURE) |
-58,4% |
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Compared to the all-time high of Sept. 2011 |
-66,7% |
⚖️ A pattern that has been repeated since 2024
This Friday's outcome is no exception: it is the continuity of a mechanism that has been repeated since the beginning of Javier Milei's administration. According to a survey by CIFRA, the five previous meetings of the National Council for Employment, Productivity and the Minimum Wage ended without an agreement between workers and employers, so it was the Ministry of Labor that ended up setting the increases, in general very close to the proposal of the employer sector.
Recent timeline of the SMVM
|
Period |
Fixed amount |
Mechanism |
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December 2023 |
$156,000 |
Starting point of the current management |
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November 2025 |
$328,000 |
Decree (Resolution 9/2025) |
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December 2025 |
$334,800 |
Decree (Resolution 9/2025) |
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August 2026 |
$376,600 |
Last section of the current decree |
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Next leg |
To be defined |
New decree after the failure of 28/08/2026 |
Accumulated inflation between December 2023 and July 2026 reached about 365%, while the nominal SMVM rose in that period by around 135%, according to calculations released by different economic think tanks, which explains much of the real liquefaction of the minimum income.
🗣️ The voices of the conflict
In addition to the official statement of the CGT, the general secretary of ATE, Rodolfo Aguiar, questioned the functioning of the organization and proposed that it should operate as a salary reference for sectors that do not have their own paritarias. According to his reading, the lack of a real agreement leaves a large portion of informal and low-skilled workers unprotected.
On the official side, the government's strategy – according to reports – aims to make collective bargaining by branch of activity, and not the minimum wage, the main tool to improve incomes: it is sought that the parity agreements place the salary floors of registered workers at around $1,000,000, leaving the SMVM as a reference limited to very specific sectors of the labor market.
The unions, for their part, anticipated that they will take the claim for the modality and result of the Council to international bodies, within the framework of the International Labor Organization (ILO), according to reports collected by specialized media.
📌 What's Next
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🔜 Next steps • The Ministry of Labor must prepare and publish a decree or resolution with the new scheme of increases in the SMVM. • The amount that is set will also impact unemployment benefits, which take the minimum wage as a calculation reference. • The unions are evaluating additional claims before the ILO for the lack of face-to-face negotiation instances. • The Council could convene again in the coming months to review new sections, following the pattern of staggered decrees of the last two years. |
🔎 Why it matters
The Minimum, Vital and Mobile Wage not only sets the legal floor that a worker must receive for a full day: it also functions as a benchmark for other income and social benefits, including unemployment insurance. For this reason, each decree that updates it – or that fails to recompose its purchasing power – has repercussions beyond the workers directly reached by that wage floor, reaching a broader universe of the popular and informal economy.
The new chapter of this dispute leaves, once again, two certainties: that the Wage Council continues without achieving tripartite consensus since the beginning of the current administration, and that it will be the Executive Branch, by decree, that determines alone the course of the minimum income of millions of Argentine workers.
📚 Sources consulted
• The negotiation for the minimum wage failed and there will be a decree — https://www.infobrisas.com/noticias/2026/08/28/105962-fracaso-la-negociacion-por-el-salario-minimo-y-habra-decreto (Infobrisas)
• Scandalous end of the Minimum Wage Council — https://www.infobae.com/politica/2026/08/28/escandaloso-final-del-consejo-del-salario-minimo-la-cgt-y-las-cta-abandonaron-el-encuentro-y-el-gobierno-fijara-el-aumento/ (Infobae)
• Salary Council: there was no agreement and the Government will define the new amount — https://www.jujuyalmomento.com/consejo-del-salario/consejo-del-salario-no-hubo-acuerdo-y-el-gobierno-definira-el-nuevo-monto-n206516 (Jujuy al Momento)
• In the midst of internal differences, the CGT and the CTA desisted from mobilizing — https://www.infobae.com/politica/2026/08/28/en-medio-de-diferencias-internas-la-cgt-y-las-cta-desistieron-de-movilizarse-hoy-cuando-delibere-el-consejo-del-salario-minimo/ (Infobae)
• The Wage Council failed and the government will define the new minimum wage by decree — https://www.sanrafaeldigital.com/post/fracas%C3%B3-el-consejo-del-salario-y-el-gobierno-definir%C3%A1-por-decreto-el-nuevo-salario-m%C3%ADnimo (San Rafael Digital)
• The CGT and the CTA rejected the new minimum wage and walked out of the meeting — https://www.gentedesalta.com/politica/la-cgt-cta-rechazaron-nuevo-salario-minimo-abandonaron-reunion-milei-debera-definir-monto-decreto-n11309 (Gente de Salta)
• The Wage Council failed and the Government will define the increase — https://www.redboing.com/consejo-salario-gobierno-paritarias/ (RedBoing)
• The Wage Council was reactivated after half a year of paralysis — https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/se-reactiva-el-consejo-del-salario-tras-medio-ano-de-paralisis-y-los-gremios-exigen-una-suba-de-100-nid26112025/ (La Nación)
• Historical setback: the minimum wage under Milei is worth less than before the 2001 crisis — https://elargentinodiario.com.ar/zona-destacada/30/05/2026/retroceso-historico-el-salario-minimo-bajo-milei-vale-menos-que-antes-de-la-crisis-de-2001/ (El Argentino Diario)
• To recover its pre-Milei value, the Minimum Wage would have to double — https://www.minutouno.com/economia/para-recuperar-su-valor-previo-la-gestion-javier-milei-el-salario-minimo-deberia-duplicarse-n6312724 (Minuto Uno)
• The Government convened a meeting to update the devalued Minimum, Vital and Mobile Wage — https://www.minutouno.com/economia/el-gobierno-convoco-una-reunion-actualizar-el-devaluado-salario-minimo-vital-y-movil-n6312715 (Minuto Uno)
Note: for copyright reasons, this document does not reproduce journalistic photographs of third parties; it is recommended to incorporate in the CMS of the blog an image of your own or with a free license, citing the corresponding source if using agency material.
POLITICS · JUSTICE · ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE
La Rioja sues the National Government for the alleged diversion of more than $1 billion of road funds
The administration of Ricardo Quintela asked to intervene as a plaintiff in a federal case that investigates the destination of resources from the Integrated Road System (SisVial). The filing argues that more than $1 trillion would have been placed in financial instruments while a substantial part of the funds were not applied to road works.
Updated August 25, 2026
Reading Time: 8 minutes
Suggested section: Politics/Economy/Justice
Editorial authorship: Redacción MiDire
SEO Listing for Publication
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SEO Title |
La Rioja sues the Nation for more than $1 billion in road funds |
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Meta Description |
La Rioja asked to be a plaintiff in a case that investigates the destination of more than $1 billion of the SisVial placed in financial instruments. |
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Recommended Slug |
la-rioja-demand-national-government-road-funds-sisvial |
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Primary Keyword |
La Rioja demands road funds from the National Government |
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Keywords secundarias |
SisVial, Ricardo Quintela, road funds, National Roads, fixed terms, Treasury Bills, Federal Justice, national routes |
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Search intent |
Informational / political news / judicial investigation |
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Open Graph title |
La Rioja takes the controversy over the SisVial funds to court |
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Open Graph description |
The Province seeks to intervene in the case that investigates the destination of more than $1 billion of road resources. |
Recommended images for the blog
1. Photo by Ricardo Quintela — image available under CC BY-SA 4.0 license on Wikimedia Commons: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RQ_WIkipedia.jpg · Alt: "Ricardo Quintela, governor of La Rioja".
2. Pircas Negras International Pass — free-use photography under CC BY-SA 4.0: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vista_del_Paso_Pircas_Negras_desde_la_Ruta_76.jpg · Alt: "Route to the Pircas Negras Pass, La Rioja".
3. Reference journalistic image of Pircas Negras: https://cdn.eldestapeweb.com/eldestape/112025/1762527454666.webp?ch=506&cw=900&extw=jpg · Verify reproduction rights before publishing.
La Rioja takes the dispute over road funds to court
The Government of La Rioja, headed by Ricardo Quintela, appeared before the Federal Court to request that the Province be recognized as a plaintiff in the investigation that analyzes the destination of resources from the Integrated Road System (SisVial). The presentation targets President Javier Milei, Economy Minister Luis Caputo and other officials, and seeks to determine if there were irregularities in the management of funds that had a specific impact on road infrastructure.
The data that placed the file at the center of the political agenda is of enormous magnitude: according to the presentation of La Rioja and the journalistic reports that reconstructed the case, as of May 31 there was more than $1 trillion of SisVial placed in financial instruments, including fixed terms and Treasury Bills. At the same time, the information released on the execution of the resources indicates that only 26.2% of the funds allocated during the current administration would have been effectively allocated to road works.
The complaint does not amount to a conviction nor does it prove by itself the existence of a crime. The central point that the Justice must establish is whether the administration and placement of these resources were in accordance with the legal framework of the trust, its specific purpose and the powers of the intervening officials. This distinction is fundamental to understanding the institutional scope of the case.
🔎 The data that explains the controversy
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Fact |
What it means |
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More than $1 billion |
An amount that, according to the complaint and the journalistic coverage, remained placed in financial instruments as of May 31. |
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26,2% |
Percentage of the resources allocated during the current administration that, according to the Rioja presentation, was applied to road works. |
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SisVial |
Integrated Road System, component of the national trust scheme for transport infrastructure. |
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Causa federal |
The Province asked to intervene as a plaintiff in a criminal investigation into the destination of the resources. |
What is SisVial and why does it matter?
The Integrated Road System is part of the architecture of trust funds linked to transport infrastructure. Its financing is related to tax resources that have a specific allocation. Decree 301/2018, in its updated text, establishes that the resources integrated into the trust must be distributed among the systems that make up the scheme; after Decree 526/2024, 50% corresponds to SisVial, 32.5% to the integrated automotive transport system and 17.5% to the railway system. [1][2]
The legal importance of this allocation is that it is not, in principle, an undifferentiated box of freely available resources. The legal regime establishes a specific purpose and contains rules on the administration and destination of the funds. Law 27,431, in addition, provides that certain assets assigned to the SisVial and the railway system intended for the payment or financing of works may not be reassigned to different obligations, except in the case of surplus funds once these obligations have been fulfilled. [3]
For this reason, the judicial debate is not reduced to asking whether the State can temporarily place money in a financial instrument. The relevant question is more precise: what funds were placed, under what authorization, for how long, for what purpose, what was their availability to execute works and whether these operations were compatible with the legal allocation of resources.
The presentation of La Rioja: what the Province is demanding
The Quintela administration maintains that the retention or financial placement of road resources had concrete consequences on the territory of La Rioja. The judicial presentation especially mentions the paralysis of works considered strategic, including those linked to the bioceanic corridor and the Pircas Negras International Pass, a connection of logistical interest for integration with Chile. [4][5]
The Province intervened with the sponsorship of lawyer Jorge Yoma and asked that the possible responsibility of national officials be investigated. The coverage of the presentation identifies, among the legal figures that are intended to be investigated, possible crimes such as embezzlement of public funds, fraudulent administration to the detriment of the Public Administration, abuse of authority and breach of the duties of a public official. The final classification, however, corresponds to the Justice and may be modified during the investigation. [4][6]
The Riojan proposal adds a federal dimension to the conflict: if the resources allocated to the road system remained immobilized or were used in financial operations while national works remained paralyzed, the eventual damage would not only be accounting. It could involve infrastructure, regional connectivity, road safety, economic activity and logistical capacity.
The origin of the controversy: $1.5 billion raised and a much lower execution
The discussion gained strength after a journalistic investigation that reconstructed the flow of resources from SisVial. According to data cited by EL PAÍS from that investigation, from the beginning of Milei's administration until mid-2026, approximately $1.5 billion had been collected through the tax route linked to the system, but only about a quarter had been allocated to road works. The rest — equivalent to almost US$668 million according to that publication — appeared to be placed in financial investments such as fixed terms and public securities. [7]
The presentation of La Rioja uses a time cut and a different methodology and places the amount placed in financial instruments at more than $1 trillion as of May 31, while calculating at 26.2% the proportion of resources allocated during the management that came to works. The figures may seem different because they respond to periods and calculation bases that are not necessarily identical. In a responsible journalistic investigation, this difference must be made explicit and not presented as an automatic contradiction.
The most sensitive political fact is that the discussion about the destination of the money occurs in parallel with the deterioration of the national road network. EL PAÍS cited estimates by the National Highway Union according to which about 70% of the roads would be in fair or poor condition. That figure corresponds to a union source and should therefore be distinguished from an independent official audit. [7]
Does money placed in fixed terms necessarily imply a crime?
Not necessarily. The mere existence of a financial placement does not allow us to conclude, by itself, that there was embezzlement or fraudulent administration. In public trusts, there may be liquidity management and fund preservation mechanisms. The decisive thing is to determine the origin and allocation of each peso, the rules applicable at the time of the operation, the instructions given, the deadlines, the yields obtained, the level of availability and, above all, whether the placements were compatible with the legal purpose of SisVial.
The central judicial question is not simply "where was the money?", but "could it legally be there, for how long and under what conditions?"
The official defense and the argument of fiscal balance
The controversy also incorporates a discussion of economic policy. According to the reconstruction published by EL PAÍS, presidential spokesman Adrián Ravier acknowledged that part of the SisVial resources had been allocated to contribute to the objective of fiscal balance. The Government, in turn, questioned the administration of National Roads of previous periods and maintained that the new approach prioritizes private participation in the construction of roads. [7]
This argument raises a fundamental institutional question: even when a government considers it convenient to preserve liquidity or contribute to a fiscal strategy, the administration of resources with specific allocation must respect the legal regime that determines their destination. The fiscal surplus is an economic policy objective; it does not in itself replace the rules for allocating a public fund.
In other words, the debate should not be framed as a simple opposition between "deficit" and "public works." The legal point is whether the State used the resources in accordance with the rules that link them to a specific purpose.
The cause and what the Justice must determine
1. Specify the total amount of resources collected and assigned to SisVial during the period under investigation.
2. Identify the balance that remained in accounts, fixed terms, Treasury Bills or other financial instruments.
3. Determine who ordered, authorized and executed each operation and with what regulatory support.
4. To establish the terms of the placements, their yields and the conditions of availability of the funds.
5. Compare the available resources with the level of execution of the road works committed.
6. Determine if there was financial damage, delay of works or affectation of legal obligations.
7. To define, on the basis of documentary and expert evidence, whether there are sufficient elements to attribute criminal responsibility to specific officials.
The judicial precedent that widened the conflict
The investigation into SisVial did not begin with the presentation in La Rioja. There was already a criminal complaint filed by national deputy Victoria Tolosa Paz. At the same time, a federal judge agreed to process a collective amparo aimed at obtaining information and demanding that the resources collected for the road system be reflected in works. According to EL PAÍS's coverage, Judge Ernesto Kreplak requested reports from the Ministry of Economy, the National Highway Directorate and the National Bank on the use of the funds. [7]
The coexistence of a criminal investigation and actions of a collective nature shows that the problem has two dimensions: one aims to determine whether there were crimes and individual responsibilities; the other seeks to control the destination of resources and the fulfillment of public obligations. They are different ways, although they can share documentary and financial information.
Why La Rioja considers the Pircas Negras Pass strategic
The dispute over funds takes on a territorial dimension when observed from La Rioja. The Pircas Negras Pass connects the province with the Atacama Region in Chile and is part of a vision of a bioceanic corridor that seeks to reduce logistical distances between productive areas in central and northern Argentina and the ports of the Pacific.
The road infrastructure in that area is not only a provincial issue. International connectivity, freight transport, tourism and trade integration depend on routes capable of operating with continuity and safety. Hence, the Government of La Rioja has presented the paralysis of works related to that corridor as a damage that exceeds the local budget discussion. [4][5]
What's at stake: money, roads, and federalism
The case brings to the fore a recurring discussion in Argentina: how national resources are managed for specific purposes and what control mechanisms exist when the execution deviates from the purpose for which they were collected.
It also reactivates the tension between the Nation and the provinces. For the governors, national infrastructure is a condition for territorial development and economic federalism. For the national government, fiscal discipline and the change in the financing model of the routes are part of a strategy that seeks to reduce direct State spending. Judicial dispute should separate those political differences from specific legal obligations.
If the courts conclude that there was a legitimate use of surpluses or liquidity in accordance with the applicable rules, the investigation could be closed without criminal liability. If, on the other hand, it were proven that the resources concerned were used in a manner incompatible with their purpose, the file could acquire a much greater institutional and criminal dimension. In both scenarios, money traceability will be the centerpiece.
📌 Keys to understanding the news in a minute
• La Rioja, governed by Ricardo Quintela, asked to intervene as a plaintiff in a federal case over SisVial funds.
• The investigation analyzes the destination of more than $1 billion that, according to the provincial presentation, remained placed in financial instruments.
• The complaint maintains that only 26.2% of the funds allocated during the current administration were allocated to road works.
• The regulatory framework establishes a specific allocation of resources for transport infrastructure systems.
• The existence of financial placements does not in itself prove a crime: the justice system must establish its legality, purpose, authorization and possible damage.
• The dispute has national and territorial impact, especially over road works and integration projects such as the corridor to Pircas Negras.
❓ Frequently Asked Questions
What is SisVial?
It is the Integrated Road System, a component of the national trust scheme aimed at financing obligations related to road infrastructure.
How much money is under investigation?
The Rioja presentation speaks of more than $1 trillion placed in financial instruments as of May 31. The figure should be read together with the period and the methodology used to calculate it.
Is La Rioja already a plaintiff?
The Province appeared before the Federal Court to be recognized and intervene as a plaintiff in the case. The coverage of the presentation is described as a constitution of the Province in the file.
What crimes are being investigated?
The presentation seeks to investigate possible figures such as embezzlement of public funds, fraudulent administration, abuse of authority and breach of the duties of a public official. The existence of these crimes must be determined by the Justice.
What role does Ricardo Quintela play?
As governor, he led the provincial presentation and stated that La Rioja suffered damages due to the lack of execution of road works of national scope.
Is placing public money in financial instruments illegal?
Not necessarily. The legality depends on the applicable regulations, the nature of the funds, the authorization, the term, the purpose and the conditions of the placement.
What will the investigation have to prove?
Mainly, the route of the funds, the administrative decisions that determined their destination, the regulations applied and the existence or not of damage or criminally relevant conduct.
Conclusion
La Rioja's filing transforms a budget controversy into a federal court dispute. The axis is in more than $1 billion of resources linked to SisVial that, according to the provincial complaint and the journalistic investigation that gave rise to the debate, remained placed in financial instruments while the execution of road works was much lower than the resources collected.
Now the Justice will have to reconstruct the route of the money and establish if each operation had legal and administrative support. The underlying issue exceeds a fight between Quintela and Milei: it compromises the discussion on funds of specific allocation, control of public spending, federalism, infrastructure and transparency in the administration of the resources that Argentines contribute to the State.
In a democracy, the discussion about the destination of public money does not end when it is collected: it begins there.
Journalistic note
This article distinguishes between reported facts, arguments of the parties, and issues still under investigation. The expressions "alleged", "according to the complaint" and "the investigation analyzes" are used deliberately: at the close of this edition there is no conviction that determines the commission of the crimes denounced. The figures may vary depending on the cut-off date, the universe of funds and the accounting methodology used by each source.
Sources consulted and absolute links
1. Argentina.gob.ar — Decree 301/2018, updated text: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/decreto-301-2018-308868/actualizacion
2. Official Gazette — Decree 526/2024: https://www.boletinoficial.gob.ar/detalleAviso/primera/309193/20240613
3. Official Gazette — Law 27.431: https://www.boletinoficial.gob.ar/detalleAviso/primera/176942/20180102?anexos=1
4. LA NACION — La Rioja asked to be a plaintiff against Milei for the diversion of road funds (08/23/2026): https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/la-rioja-pidio-ser-querellante-contra-milei-por-el-desvio-de-fondos-viales-nid23082026/
5. Agencia Noticias La Rioja — presentation of the Province in case CFP 3960/2026: https://agencianoticiaslarioja.com.ar/el-gobierno-de-la-rioja-denuncio-a-milei-y-caputo-por-el-desvio-de-fondos-viales/
6. El Cronista — La Rioja asked to be a plaintiff for the diversion of funds for road repair (24/08/2026): https://elcronista-el-cronista-prod.web.arc-cdn.net/economia-politica/la-rioja-pidio-ser-querellante-por-el-millonario-desvio-de-fondos-para-arreglo-de-rutas/
7. EL PAÍS — Milei faces a scandal for covering deficit with funds allocated by law to public works (20/08/2026): https://elpais.com/argentina/2026-08-20/milei-enfrenta-un-escandalo-por-cubrir-deficit-con-fondos-asignados-por-ley-a-obras-publicas.html
8. Wikimedia Commons — Ricardo Quintela.jpg / license and image source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RQ_WIkipedia.jpg
9. Wikimedia Commons — View of Pircas Negras Pass from Route 76 / CC BY-SA 4.0: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vista_del_Paso_Pircas_Negras_desde_la_Ruta_76.jpg
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👶 ARGENTINE DEMOGRAPHY The Buenos Aires birth rate plummets: 30% fewer births in the Province of Buenos Aires since 2019 An analysis of the official data on the decrease in births in the Province and throughout Argentina, its causes and its social, educational and social security consequences. 📊 📉 🏥 👨👩👧 midire.ar Analysis and current affairs in Argentina |
⏱️ Reading time: 9 minutes 📅 Updated: Aug 2026 🏷️ Demographics · Province of Buenos Aires · Birth rate
The Province of Buenos Aires is going through the most profound demographic transformation in its recent history: births fell by about 30% between 2019 and 2023, and the trend not only did not reverse, but deepened during 2024 and 2025. The phenomenon, far from being an isolated data, reflects a generalized decline in the birth rate throughout Argentina, with a direct impact on education, the health system and the pension system.
According to information collected by the Strategic Data Observatory from official records, the Province went from 227,596 live births in 2019 to 162,380 in 2023, a reduction of 28.7% in just four years. The decline reached 126 of the 135 municipalities of Buenos Aires, in a context in which the provincial population had grown 12.2% between the 2010 and 2022 censuses. That is to say: there are more and more Buenos Aires residents, but fewer and fewer children are born.
🖼️ Government House of the Province of Buenos Aires, La Plata (Wikimedia Commons) (CC BY-SA 3.0)
📉 The numbers of the fall in the Province
Data after 2023 confirm that the decline did not stop. According to the Provincial Registry of Persons, 130,900 births were recorded in its delegations during 2024 and 123,971 in 2025, an additional decrease of 5.3% in just one year. Another source, the Buenos Aires Registry of Persons with series since 2020, shows an even steeper drop if the peak recorded during the pandemic is taken as a starting point: from 186,588 births in 2020 to 120,138 in 2025, a drop of 55% in five years.
The difference between the two series responds to different survey methodologies, but the direction of the phenomenon is identical in all available sources: the Province of Buenos Aires, the most populous district in the country, has far fewer births today than five years ago.
|
Year |
Births in the Province |
Year-on-year change |
|
2019 |
227.596 |
— |
|
2020 |
186.588 |
↓ |
|
2021 |
166.102 |
-11,0% |
|
2022 |
154.046 |
-7,3% |
|
2023 |
141.785 / 162.380* |
-8,0% |
|
2024 |
130.900 / 131.186* |
-7,7% |
|
2025 |
120.138 / 123.971* |
-9,0% / -5,3%* |
*The values marked with an asterisk correspond to the series of the Strategic Data Observatory / Provincial Registry of Persons; the figures without an asterisk correspond to the series of the Buenos Aires Registry of Persons based on 2020. Both series show a sustained downward trend.
The correlation of this drop is equally eloquent at the other end of the demographic pyramid: during 2025, around 133,900 deaths were registered in the Province, a figure that has remained relatively stable in recent years. As a result, the natural balance of Buenos Aires – the difference between births and deaths – became negative, with a net loss of close to 13,800 people in 2025, something that was not recorded with this magnitude in recent decades.
🗺️ An unequal phenomenon in the Buenos Aires territory
The decline in the birth rate does not affect all municipalities equally. Between 2019 and 2023, only nine of the 135 Buenos Aires districts – Pila, San Cayetano, Las Flores, Alberti, Tapalqué, Adolfo Gonzales Chaves, Carmen de Areco, Cañuelas and Lezama – registered more births than four years earlier, in general districts of low population density where few absolute variations generate large percentage oscillations.
In the most populated municipalities, the drop is sharp. La Matanza, the district with the most inhabitants in the Province, went from 22,513 births in 2019 to 15,905 in 2023 (-29.4%). In La Plata, the provincial capital, live births fell from 11,339 to 7,627, a reduction of 32.7%, equivalent to 3,712 fewer births per year.
|
Municipality |
Fall 2019–2023 |
|
Colonel Rosales |
-53,3% |
|
General Viamonte |
-54,4% |
|
Morón |
-41,3% |
|
Tres de Febrero |
-36,1% |
|
Quilmes |
-35,0% |
|
Lanús |
-34,0% |
|
Tiger |
-33,8% |
|
Lomas de Zamora |
-33,7% |
|
La Plata |
-32,7% |
|
The Slaughter |
-29,4% |
In Coronel Rosales, the most extreme case among the large parties, the crude birth rate fell to just 5 births per thousand inhabitants, well below the provincial average.
🖼️ Hospital Rivadavia, Buenos Aires (Wikimedia Commons) (CC BY 2.5 AR)
🇦🇷 The national mirror: a 47% drop in ten years
The Buenos Aires collapse is the most visible expression of a phenomenon that crosses the entire country. According to the Vital Statistics report of the Directorate of Health Statistics and Information (DEIS), under the Ministry of Health of the Nation, in 2024 413,135 live births were registered in Argentina, compared to the 777,012 counted in 2014: a drop of 46.8% in a decade, the steepest of the entire available historical series.
Translated into everyday life, the change is drastic. Ten years ago, some 2,128 babies were born in the country per day – one every 45 seconds; in 2024 that figure dropped to 1,131 per day, one every 80 seconds. The reduction also narrowed the gap between births and deaths in an unprecedented way: in 2014 births almost doubled deaths (777,012 against 325,539); In 2024, with 376,405 deaths, the difference was reduced to just 36,730 people, about 10% of the total number of births.
The City of Buenos Aires and the Province of Buenos Aires are, according to the same report, the only two districts in the country where deaths already exceed births, a threshold that anticipates an eventual decline in the total population if the trend continues and is not compensated by immigration.
|
Jurisdiction |
Birth rate 2024 (‰) |
|
|
Quests |
12,3 |
|
|
Chaco |
11,9 |
|
|
Santiago del Estero |
10,8 |
|
|
Formosa |
10,7 |
|
|
Santa Fe |
9,2 |
|
|
Province of Buenos Aires |
8,4 |
|
|
La Pampa / Río Negro |
8,1 |
|
|
Jujuy |
8,0 |
|
|
CABA / Tierra del Fuego |
6,9 |
|
|
|
"The country is facing a demographic revolution: the historical variable of 2.4 children per woman that differentiated Argentina from the rest of Latin America was broken." — Rafael Rofman and Carola della Paolera, CIPPEC researchers |
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🔍 Why births are falling: the causes pointed out by specialists
The DEIS itself clarifies that it does not have studies that conclusively explain the reasons for the fall, but different specialists in obstetrics, demography and reproductive health consulted by national media agree on a combination of structural factors:
• Postponement of motherhood: the average age of seeking the first child is now close to 34 years, compared to the 20-24 years that prevailed a decade ago.
• Greater female autonomy: the growing participation of women in higher education and in the labor market is directly associated with the decision to have fewer children or to postpone it.
• Cost of living and access to housing: Parenting involves growing economic challenges—housing, health, education—that lead to a preference for smaller families.
• Access to reproductive health: the greater availability of contraceptive methods and comprehensive sex education has steadily reduced adolescent pregnancy.
• Cultural changes: the social mandate that associated adulthood with motherhood or paternity has been weakened, and childless households and individual life projects are on the rise.
The phenomenon, moreover, is not exclusively Argentine: the fall in the birth rate is observed in most of the developed world and in a large part of Latin America, although the speed of the process in Argentina – and in particular in the Province of Buenos Aires – is especially pronounced in the regional comparison.
🏫 The consequences: education, health and the pension system
The most immediate impact is already being observed in the education system. While births fell 28.7% between 2019 and 2023 in the Province, total educational enrollment went from 5,138,086 students in 2020 to 5,052,747 in 2024, a still moderate reduction of 1.7% that anticipates a greater impact in the coming years, as the youngest litters reach school age.
Projections based on data from the National Population Directorate anticipate that, by 2030, the primary level could suffer a 27% drop in enrollment at the national level, with the Province of Buenos Aires losing more than 510,000 students in absolute terms, the largest contraction in the country due to its population weight.
In the medium and long term, specialists agree that the phenomenon will also reconfigure the labor market and the pension system: fewer births today imply, in the coming decades, fewer active workers compared to a population of older adults that, at the same time, grows due to the increase in life expectancy.
🖼️ Clinica y Maternidad Suizo Argentina, Buenos Aires (Wikimedia Commons) (public domain/CC)
❓ Frequently Asked Questions
❓ How much did births fall in the Province of Buenos Aires between 2019 and 2025?
According to the Strategic Data Observatory and the Provincial Registry of Persons, births fell by about 30% between 2019 and 2023 (from 227,596 to 162,380), and the trend continued in 2024 and 2025, with 130,900 and 123,971 births respectively in the latter series.
❓ Which municipalities in Buenos Aires had the largest drop in births?
Coronel Rosales (-53.3%) and General Viamonte (-54.4%) lead the decline between 2019 and 2023, followed by Morón (-41.3%), Tres de Febrero (-36.1%) and Quilmes (-35%).
❓ How many births were there in all of Argentina in 2024?
413,135 live births, according to the DEIS of the Ministry of Health of the Nation, 46.8% less than the 777,012 registered in 2014.
❓ Why is the birth rate falling in Argentina?
Specialists point to a combination of postponing motherhood, greater female autonomy, economic and housing difficulties, better access to reproductive health and cultural changes around the life project.
🧭 A trend that redefines the demographic map
The Province of Buenos Aires, which concentrates about 40% of the country's population, functions as an advanced mirror of what is already happening at the national level. With two districts – CABA and the Province itself – where deaths exceed births, and with an overall fertility rate that is well below the population replacement level (2.1 children per woman), Argentina is facing a demographic transformation that, according to the specialists consulted, is just beginning to manifest its full effects on education. health and social welfare.
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📊 🏛️ 📉 MANAGEMENT 📉 🏛️ 📊 ANALYSIS Milei between two fronts: advances in Congress and attrition in the polls Perfil and La Nación agree on the same diagnosis: the ruling party gains legislative margin while the social mood deteriorates due to economic pessimism |
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📅 PUBLICATION August 15, 2026 |
⏱️ READING ≈ 6 minutes |
🏷️ SECTION Politics / Public opinion |
📰 SOURCES Profile · La Nación · Others |
Halfway through his third year in office, President Javier Milei faces a scenario crossed by contradictory signals. While the ruling party manages to unblock key votes in Congress and consolidates its capacity for parliamentary negotiation, polls describe a sustained deterioration of the presidential image and a social mood increasingly hit by economic pessimism. The analyses published by Perfil and La Nación coincide in the same diagnosis: the attrition is advancing, although it has not yet found an electoral alternative to capitalize on it.
📌 X-RAY IN NUMBERS
|
📉 34-46% Approval rank according to consultant |
😟 58-59% He believes that the economy is getting worse |
🏛️ 42-28-2 Labor reform vote in the Senate |
🔁 61,9% I would prefer a change of government |
❓ s/d Opposition alternative that capitalizes on it |
Sources: Giacobbe & Asociados, Monitor UBA, Pulso Research, Opinaia, CB Global Data and BAE Negocios. The ranges reflect methodological differences between consulting firms.
📊 SOCIAL MOOD, THE MOST DELICATE VARIABLE
Public opinion data released in recent weeks show an economic picture that is perceived harshly. According to Giacobbe & Associates, 58% of the population maintains that the general economic situation worsens, a diagnosis that the UBA Monitor raises to 59%. Along the same lines, the Confidence in Government Index prepared by the Torcuato Di Tella University registered a monthly drop of 6.5% in July, with a cumulative decline of 21.5% since the end of 2025, according to the analysis published by La Nación.
The presidential image reflects the same downward movement, although with nuances according to the consultancy. Pulso Research placed the negative evaluation of the administration at 54.8% compared to a 37.2% positive image – the lowest record in its historical series – according to the review of five public opinion studies published by Perfil between March and July. Other surveys, such as that of Opinaia, show a somewhat less adverse picture: 46% approval, with a slight recovery compared to the floor recorded in June.
Beyond the management numbers, the social mood continues to be the most eloquent indicator. A study by consultant Hugo Haime, cited by La Nación, found that 42% of Argentines declare themselves sad and discouraged, 34% express anger and only 20% are happy and hopeful with the direction of the country.
The podium of concerns was also rearranged. According to the Synopsis survey taken up by La Nación, corruption leads the ranking with 33.4% of the mentions, followed by unemployment (28%), education (10.5%) and insecurity (9.2%); inflation, on the other hand, fell to fifth place with just 8.4%, despite being one of the few fronts where the government exhibits concrete results. Other measurements, such as that of Opinaia, place unemployment in first place with 63% of mentions and poverty in second place with 59%.
🏛️ CONGRESS, THE TERRAIN WHERE MILEI ADDS
While the social mood deteriorates, Congress became the stage where the ruling party manages to show concrete results. The approval of the labor reform in the Senate – with 42 votes in favor, 28 against and two abstentions – was described as the greatest legislative victory of the administration, the product of the negotiation led by Senator Patricia Bullrich. To this milestone was added the sanction of the lowering of the age of imputability, another of the historical flags of the libertarian space.
With only 95 of the 257 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 21 of the 72 in the Senate, La Libertad Avanza does not have its own majority and depends on agreements with dialogue blocs to unblock each vote. For the second half of the year, the political table defined as priorities the reform of the Central Bank's Organic Charter – which would prohibit the financing of the Treasury via monetary issuance – the expansion of the Fiscal Innocence Law and, as an objective of greater strategic weight, the elimination of the PASO for the presidential elections of 2027.
Not all initiatives have the same fate. The "Inviolability of Private Property" bill, linked to the foreignization of land, reached the Chamber of Deputies with half the approval of the Senate but cut from its most controversial chapters, after a CB Global Data survey revealed that 77% of those consulted support limiting the purchase of land by foreigners. The discussion even led to a mobilization in front of Congress, a precedent that the ruling party evaluates as a sensitive social limit.
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💬 "Today the government is hit, society is tired." — Juan Mayol, director of Opinaia, in statements reproduced by Perfil |
💬 WHAT THE PROFILE ANALYSES AND LA NACIÓN SAY
The Perfil report, which compares five consulting firms between March and July, identifies March as the turning point: it was then that, for the first time since the beginning of the administration, a survey by Pulso Research showed that more respondents blamed the current government (46.9%) than the previous administration (41.6%) for the economic situation. The media also highlights that the labor reform, despite its parliamentary success, failed to establish itself as a political triumph and was read by a large part of society as a measure favorable to employers.
From La Nación, two opinion columns describe similar nuances with different readings. In "Milei, in the face of the danger of 'toxic rigidity'", the analysis connects Manuel Adorni's departure from the government with the persistence of attrition, despite the drop in inflation. On the other hand, the column "Milei and the polls: not good, but not so bad either" qualifies the diagnosis by recalling that, according to a comparative study, the government's current approval is higher than that shown by his two immediate predecessors at the same height of his administration.
🔮 THE PARADOX: UNREST GROWS, BUT NO CLEAR ALTERNATIVE APPEARS
The data most cited by analysts is, however, a paradox. According to Giacobbe & Associates, for every percentage point that social tolerance for the adjustment recedes, the intention to vote for La Libertad Avanza falls by around 0.9 points, an almost mathematical correlation between economics and politics. Other measurements deepen this discomfort: a study by CB Global Data found that 54.5% of those consulted prefer a change of government compared to 33.4% who support continuity, while a survey by BAE Negocios raised that figure to 61.9%.
Despite this deterioration, no opposition space has so far managed to capitalize on the discontent. Mayol himself warned that the electorate that moves away from the ruling party does not migrate to the Kirchnerist options, which leaves open one of the central questions for 2027. In this context, the ruling party retains some of the best-valued figures on the political chessboard: Patricia Bullrich leads the ranking of positive image in the Opinaia measurement, followed by Milei himself and Vice President Victoria Villarruel.
📅 THE AGENDA TOWARDS 2027
With an eye on reelection, the Casa Rosada defined three axes for the rest of the year: sanctioning as many projects as possible pending in Congress, deepening the electoral operation towards 2027 and strengthening agreements with allied provinces. The underlying challenge, according to the analyses of Perfil and La Nación, will be to sustain this double chessboard – legislative victories inside Congress and a social mood that has not yet been reversed – during the decisive months that remain until the next presidential election.
Methodological note: the figures cited come from different consulting firms (Giacobbe & Asociados, Pulso Research, Opinaia, UBA, Di Tella, Synopsis, CB Global Data, BAE Negocios, Hugo Haime), each with its own methodology and margins of error, so the percentages should be read as trends rather than as exact figures comparable to each other.
🖼️ REFERENCE IMAGE GALLERY
Absolute and verified links to real images hosted in open sources (Wikimedia Commons). Click on each link to view them in your browser.
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📷 Official portrait of President Javier Milei Official photograph of the Presidency of the Argentine Nation, used as an institutional reference of the president. |
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📷 Palace of the Congress of the Argentine Nation Façade of the Palace of Congress, seat of the Legislative Branch and scene of the key votes analyzed in this note. |
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📷 Javier Milei — file image File photo of President Javier Milei, available in the free Wikimedia Commons repository. |
📚 SOURCES CONSULTED
La Nación — Milei, facing the danger of "toxic rigidity"
La Nación — Milei and the polls: not good, but not so bad either
La Nación — Milei vs. Cristina: the international fight
Polls show Milei's wear and tear, but the ruling party resists as the first minority
Infobae — The legislative victories that Milei achieved in the first half of the year
BAE Business — More than 61.9% would vote for a change in government
💳 📉 ⚠️
MIDIRE.AR · ECONOMICS AND PERSONAL FINANCE
Debt Concerns
Claims grow over credit card overdraft and financial harassment by fintechs
One in four Argentine debtors can no longer pay what they asked for. While the arrears multiplied almost five times in 18 months, complaints of harassment by collectors tripled. X-ray of a silent crisis and the rights that protect users against financial harassment.
🕒 Approximate reading time: 9 minutes
📅 Updated as of August 11, 2026
A snowball that doesn't stop growing
In the Argentina of 2026, a new social profile has been consolidated in the Central Bank's statistics: the indebted citizen. It is not a marginal or transitory phenomenon. According to the Monthly Monitor of Credit to Families, prepared by the Faculty of Business Sciences of the Universidad Austral together with the consulting firm ECO GO, one in four debtors in the country today has some degree of default, and that percentage rises to 31% when the credit comes from a fintech or a non-financial provider.
The overdraft of the credit card – that habit of paying the minimum month by month to sustain expenses that inflation no longer liquefies as it used to – has become a trap for millions of middle- and lower-middle-class families. Prepaid health insurance, private schools, vacations and daily consumption that were previously financed with fixed installments today have become balances that grow on their own, month after month, pushed by rates that far exceed inflation.
But the delinquency crisis has, in addition to its visible face in the numbers, a hidden face: the systematic harassment suffered by thousands of debtors by collection agencies, law firms and fintech applications that bought or manage their unpaid debts. Calls at all hours, messages to relatives and bosses, and even mock judicial notifications that never existed.
📊 The map of defaults: the numbers that worry the Central Bank
The deterioration in the payment capacity of Argentine households is not a perception: it is documented month by month in the BCRA's Debtors Center. The report by Universidad Austral and ECO GO, which accesses this database, shows a sustained collapse for 20 consecutive months.
In December 2024, the total default on credit to individuals represented only 3.6% of the amount granted. A year later, in December 2025, it had already climbed to 12.6%. And in June 2026, the latest data available, it reached 17.5%: almost one out of every six pesos lent in the country is now in an irregular situation. In just 18 months, the indicator multiplied by 4.9.
|
Indicator |
Dec. 2024 |
Dec. 2025 |
Jun 2026 |
|
Total credit default (% of the amount) |
3,6% |
12,6% |
17,5% |
|
Debtors with some degree of arrears |
— |
— |
26,1% |
|
Non-bank / fintech credit default |
— |
— |
31,0% |
|
Default in the traditional financial system |
— |
— |
15,2% |
Source: Monthly Monitor of Credit to Families, Universidad Austral and ECO GO, based on data from the BCRA's Central Debtors Center (June 2026).
The gap between banks and fintech is one of the most eloquent pieces of data in the report: non-financial credit providers – including virtual wallets, non-bank cards and consumer finance – account for only 14.1% of the total credit granted to individuals, but they account for a delinquency rate of 31%, more than double that of the traditional financial system.
The phenomenon is not even throughout the country. La Rioja leads the ranking of non-performing loans by amount with 24.5%, followed by San Luis (22.6%) and Santa Cruz (22.2%). At the other extreme, La Pampa (9.1%) and CABA (11.9%) show the lowest levels. A fact that caught the attention of the authors of the report: three out of four new defaulters identified between 2024 and 2026 already had loans two years ago and had been paying normally. They are not people who got into too much debt: they are people who stopped being able to pay what they already owed.
📞 When the collector crosses the line: the other drama of debt
Behind each number of arrears there is a person who, in addition to not being able to pay, in many cases begins to receive calls at any time, WhatsApp messages with a threatening tone and, most seriously, communications to relatives, co-workers or neighbors informing them about the debt of others.
Official data from the Directorate for the Defense of Consumer Rights of the province of Buenos Aires reflect the magnitude of the phenomenon. Claims for 'abusive practices', under the sub-ground 'harassment', went from 393 cases in 2024 to 1,064 in 2025. And between January 1 and May 31, 2026, 1,237 complaints had already accumulated: more than in the whole of the previous year, in just five months.
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❝ Repeated calls during non-working hours, intimidating messages and threats of seizures that never arrive: the pattern is repeated in thousands of complaints. — Directorate for the Defense of Consumer Rights, Province of Buenos Aires |
Ariel Aguilar, Buenos Aires' Undersecretary of Commercial Development and Investment Promotion and head of that agency, described the pattern that is repeated in most of the files: repeated calls during business and non-business hours – including weekends – WhatsApp and email messages, and harassment directed not only at the debtor but also at family members. co-workers and neighbors, to whom personal and sensitive data are disclosed.
The cases surveyed correspond mostly to collection agencies and law firms that bought portfolios of unpaid loans from banks and financial institutions, both traditional and non-traditional. According to data from the Center for City Studies (CEC), the peak in debt sales to the secondary market coincided with the strong volatility of interest rates and the fall in real income recorded between the end of 2025 and the beginning of 2026.
In the case of informal or unbanked workers, the battlefront is transferred to fintech applications such as Mercado Pago, Naranja X or Ualá. Many users discover, when it is too late, that the collection system can contact their personal contacts: the authorization to do so is usually in the Terms and Conditions that are accepted when installing the application, without the user noticing that clause.
🚫 The tactics that the law prohibits (although they are used anyway)
Not all collection management is illegal: claiming a debt is a creditor's right. The problem arises when this management crosses limits that the Consumer Protection Law and the Civil and Commercial Code clearly establish. These are the most denounced practices and their legal status:
|
Practice denounced |
Is it legal? |
|
Call at night or on weekends |
Not allowed |
|
Contact family members, bosses, or neighbors to report the debt |
Prohibited (violates dignified treatment) |
|
Simulate a non-existent service or judicial process |
Expressly prohibited |
|
Disclose personal or sensitive data of the debtor |
Forbidden |
|
Capitalize interest before 6 months of arrears (anatocism) |
Void by law |
|
Report the delay to the BCRA / Veraz after due process |
Allowed |
|
Starting a lawsuit over the debt |
Allowed |
⚖️ The legal framework: what protects the Argentine debtor
Argentine law does not exempt anyone from paying what they owe, but it does strictly regulate how that debt can be claimed. These are the central rules that protect financial users against harassment:
• Law 24.240 on Consumer Protection, Article 8 bis — Guarantees dignified treatment and expressly prohibits extrajudicial collection from pretending to be judicial.
• Law 24.240, Article 52 bis — Enables punitive damages: if a non-existent judicial process was simulated, the employer was contacted or a documentable moral damage was generated, a judge may impose a civil fine in favor of the consumer.
• Civil and Commercial Code, Article 770 — Declares null and void the capitalization of interest (anatocism) before six months of arrears, a frequent practice in fintechs.
• Communication 'A' 7146 of the BCRA — Subject to the supervision of the Central Bank and the Financial Services User Protection Regime (PUSF), with a period of 20 business days to respond to claims.
At the rate level, the Central Bank itself sets periodic ceilings for financing with cards issued by non-banking entities: through Communication 'B' 13096/2025, it established at 72.56% the reference rate for personal loans without real collateral, applicable from the January 2026 billing cycle and used as a ceiling for the cost of card revolving. Added to this are the Total Financial Cost (TFC), debt balance insurance and VAT, which in practice raise the real cost of financing the minimum payment well above that nominal figure.
🛡️ What to do if you are harassed about a debt
Claiming against an abusive collection does not erase the debt: they are two different issues. What is required is that the collection process be carried out within the law, without intimidation or simulation of non-existent judicial instances. Consumer protection specialists recommend the following steps:
• Document everything: screenshots of messages, record of times and number of calls, and names of people contacted without authorization.
• File the complaint at the Consumer Protection Platform (argentina.gob.ar) or at the provincial address corresponding to the complainant's domicile.
• If the creditor is a bank or a regulated fintech, add the claim on the Central Bank's Financial Users platform, which generates direct regulatory pressure on the entity.
• Evaluate, with legal advice, the possibility of claiming the punitive damages provided for in article 52 bis if there was simulation of judicial proceedings, contact with the employer or documentable moral damage.
• Check if there was capitalization of interest before the six months of arrears: this practice is null and void according to Article 770 of the Civil and Commercial Code and can be challenged.
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❝ The complaint enables a conciliation hearing. If the creditor is a bank or a fintech, adding the claim to the BCRA generates direct regulatory pressure on the entity. |
🏛️ A social phenomenon without political translation
While the arrears multiply, no political force has yet managed to clearly interpret this new social subject that is the indebted Argentine. It is, to a large extent, the same electorate that supported the austerity of Javier Milei's government and that today lives with the deterioration of its own standard of living, without any leader offering a diagnosis or a concrete answer to the problem of over-indebtedness.
In Córdoba, the claim even reached the unions: the Union of Educators of the Province of Córdoba (UEPC) and public employee unions requested refinancing lines from the provincial bank Bancor to stop the automatic debits that liquefied the salary accounts of its members. It is a sign that the phenomenon no longer only affects the informal sectors, but also registered workers with fixed incomes.
The national government, for its part, maintains that the over-indebtedness of families is 'a problem between private companies'. Meanwhile, a bill to reform the Central Bank's Organic Charter is advancing that would cut some of its powers of intervention on the allocation of credit, at a time when delinquencies accumulate 20 consecutive months of growth.
🔚 A crisis that is just beginning to be named
The combination of high financing rates, revenues that do not keep pace with accumulated inflation, and a collection industry that in many cases operates outside the law creates a picture that the researchers themselves describe as a 'social drama' rather than a simple financial fact. The challenge, for the political system and for the control bodies, is twofold: to contain the growth of delinquencies without leaving credit unprotected, and at the same time to ensure that claiming a debt does not become a form of daily violence against those who can no longer pay it.
🖼️ Visual references
Verified images available on Wikimedia Commons to accompany the publication (use under Creative Commons license, with attribution):
💬 Frequently Asked Questions
❓ Is it legal for a fintech to call my boss or a family member to claim a debt from me?
No. Contacting the employer, relatives or neighbors to inform them about a personal debt violates Article 8 bis of Law 24,240 on Consumer Defense, which guarantees dignified treatment. It is an abusive practice that can be reported to the Consumer Defense and, if the creditor is a regulated entity, also to the BCRA.
❓ Can I claim compensation if I was harassed for a debt?
Yes. Article 52 bis of Law 24,240 enables punitive damages: if a non-existent judicial process was simulated, the employer was contacted or a documentable moral damage was generated, a judge can impose a civil fine in favor of the consumer.
❓ Does reporting a collector's harassment erase or cancel the debt?
No. They are two independent issues: the complaint for harassment seeks that the collection process respects the law, while the debt itself remains in force and must be negotiated or refinanced separately with the creditor.
❓ Where is harassment from a collection agency reported in Argentina?
It can be started online at argentina.gob.ar or at the Consumer Protection Directorate of each province. If the creditor is a bank or a regulated fintech, it is advisable to add the claim on the Financial Users platform of the Central Bank (BCRA), which has a period of 20 business days to respond.
❓ Why is delinquency higher in fintechs than in banks?
According to the report by Universidad Austral and ECO GO, the irregularity of non-bank credit reached 31% in June 2026, more than double the 15.2% of the traditional financial system. Specialists associate it with a profile of users with less access to bank credit, higher rates and less repayment capacity in the face of the fall in real income.
🔍
✈️ ECONOMY & INFRASTRUCTURE
🗓️ August 10, 2026 ⏱️ 3 min 🏷️ read Transportation · Airports · Concessions
🏛️ BIDDING FOR AIR INFRASTRUCTURE
The Government analyzes the extension of the concession of air terminals in the midst of crossings for investments and profitability with the business sector
The Executive is negotiating with Aeropuertos Argentina, of the Eurnekian group, the future of the country's 35 terminals. While the company demands to extend the contract until 2056, the State demands verifiable investments and warns that it will not raise airport taxes.
✍️ Economy Editorial Team | 📍 Buenos Aires, Argentina
📊 NEGOTIATION IN NUMBERS
|
35 terminals under concession |
USD 600 M in slowed works |
2038 → 2056 Current vs. Intended Term |
+72% H1 2026 earnings rise |
🏛️ An open-ended negotiation
The national government and Aeropuertos Argentina, the company of the Corporación América group linked to Eduardo Eurnekian, are holding open a key negotiation for the future of the country's air infrastructure. The file involves the concession of 35 air terminals and, as confirmed by official sources, the declared objective of the Executive is to close a new agreement before the end of 2026.
The discussion came to light after it transpired that a work plan of more than 600 million dollars – planned for Ezeiza, Aeroparque and other terminals in the interior – remains held up by the lack of a defined contractual horizon. Without certainty about the term of the concession, the company cannot go out to seek international financing or announce new investments.
⚖️ Three friction points
The differences between the parties are concentrated in three central axes that so far prevent the agreement from being closed:
⏳ Term of the contract: the concessionaire intends to extend the link until 2056, with an additional option of ten years, while the Government seeks to tie it to periodic reviews.
💰 Profitability: the State requires that any extension be conditional on the effective, enforceable and verifiable compliance with the investment commitments assumed by the company.
🏗️ Financing of works: the company maintains that it needs a longer contractual horizon to access international credit and execute the modernization of the terminals.
📜 A history of extensions
The concession of Aeropuertos Argentina dates back to 1998 and originally expired in 2028. The extension that governs the contract today was signed in December 2020, in the midst of the pandemic, when the Executive Branch approved through Decree 1009/2020 a ten-year extension that took the term until February 2038.
That decision sought to compensate for the collapse of air traffic during the health emergency. However, according to official sources, the income from the contract fell by about 50% compared to what was projected as soon as the extension was activated, an imbalance that no tariff adjustment managed to compensate for and that today puts the link back on the table. Last year, the company and the regulator had signed a preliminary agreement that contemplated the extension until 2056, but that understanding was without effect.
"Any possible extension must be linked to concrete, enforceable and verifiable investment commitments."
— Official sources of the national government
🚧 What works are at stake
The investment plan under discussion is around 600 million dollars and includes the expansion and modernization of the main terminals of the system. Among the priorities are Ezeiza and the international sector of Aeroparque Jorge Newbery – which in 2025 was close to 18 million passengers – in addition to the Mendoza airport, indicated as one of the terminals with the greatest urgency for expansion in the entire country.
While the new contractual scheme is being defined, Aeropuertos Argentina is also close to completing the investment plan of 606 million dollars that had been associated with the 2020 extension.
💹 A company with better numbers
The contractual discussion takes place simultaneously with a significant improvement in the financial results of the concessionaire. During the first half of 2026, Aeropuertos Argentina recorded a net profit of 168,859 million pesos, 72% higher than in the same period of the previous year, and reduced its financial debt from 908,107 million to 736,984 million pesos.
This recovery in the company's profitability feeds the official demand for greater investment guarantees in exchange for any extension of the contract, in a context in which the Government seeks to prevent an extension from translating into extraordinary benefits for the company without concrete counterparts for the airport system.
🚫 What the Government rules out
As it was known, the possibility of increasing the airport taxes paid by airlines, particularly foreign airlines, was left off the negotiating table. The official argument is that an increase in these charges would reduce the country's competitiveness and could affect the number of air connections available. Nor is it considered viable, from the Executive, a reduction in costs that ends up deteriorating the quality of the service received by passengers.
🔮 What can happen from now on
Both the Government and the company agree, as it transpired, on the convenience of unlocking the contractual uncertainty as soon as possible. An extension of the uncertainty could affect the pace of investments and compromise the resources of the Fund for the Strengthening of the National Airport System (FFSNA), to which the company makes regular contributions.
At the moment, there is no closed agreement. Negotiations continue between the Ministry of Transportation, through the Regulatory Body of the National Airport System (ORSNA), and Aeropuertos Argentina, with a view to a definition before the end of the year.
|
🔑 KEYS TO UNDERSTANDING THE NOTE 1️⃣ The concession for 35 airports expires in 2038; the company is asking to extend it until 2056. 2️⃣ The Government conditions the extension on verifiable compliance with investments. 3️⃣ There are USD 600 million in works slowed down by the lack of contractual definition. 4️⃣ An increase in airport taxes on airlines is not foreseen. 5️⃣ The official goal is to close the deal before the end of 2026. |
🖼️ Reference Images
Photographs and graphic material on the terminals mentioned in this note can be consulted in the following sources, available on the Internet:
✈️ Ezeiza International Airport Terminal — Aeropuertos Argentina 2000 ↗ See source
🛬 Aeroparque Jorge Newbery — Aeropuertos Argentina 2000 ↗ See source
🏢 Regulatory Body of the National Airport System (ORSNA) ↗ See source
🔗 Sources consulted
📰 La Nación — The government seeks to renegotiate the concession of Aeropuertos Argentina, but rejects the company ↗'s conditions See source
📰 Infobae — The Government assures that it will renegotiate the concession of the country's main airports before the end of the year ↗ See source
📰 Infobae — More than USD 600 million in airport works slowed down by the lack of definition of the contract with the State ↗ See source
📰 REPORTUR — Airports Argentina: Government to renegotiate concession ↗ See source
📰 Profile ↗ View source
MIDIRE.AR
LEGISLATIVE POLICY · ARGENTINA 2026
⚖️
Backtracking on the Land Law
The national government backed down with the modifications proposed by the Rural Land Law, a hard legislative setback within the official reforms on private property
🕒 Estimated reading time: 8 minutes
📅 August 8, 2026
✍️ Editorial midire.ar
The ruling party had to give in to allied governors and social rejection in order to move forward with the rest of its package of reforms on private property.
📌 What happened
The national government backtracked on one of the most resisted points of its reform agenda: the modification of the Rural Land Law. After weeks of negotiation and given the lack of votes of its own in the Senate, La Libertad Avanza decided to remove from the bill of Inviolability of Private Property the chapter that relaxed the current restrictions on the purchase of rural land by foreigners. The decision, confirmed on Wednesday, August 5, represented a new concession by the ruling party and the second chapter that it had to resign since the entry of the initiative into Congress, after having also withdrawn, during the debate in commissions, the elimination of the National Registry of Popular Neighborhoods (Renabap).
Hours later, at the end of a marathon session of almost twelve hours, the ruling bloc also had to sacrifice the chapter that modified the Fire Management Law, due to the lack of sufficient support. Only then, after 1:40 a.m. on Friday, did the Senate give half sanction to the rest of the bill by 37 votes in favor and 33 against, with no abstentions.
🌾 The context: what the government sought to change
The reform promoted by the Minister of Deregulation and Transformation of the State, Federico Sturzenegger, proposed to modify Law 26,737, the Regime for the Protection of the National Domain over the Ownership, Possession or Tenure of Rural Lands, sanctioned in 2011. The official project sought to raise from 15% to 25% the limit of foreign ownership over productive rural lands per district, making more flexible a scheme that until now limited the foreignization of Argentine agricultural land.
The initiative generated a cross-cutting rejection: environmental, social, political and agricultural sector organizations warned about the finite and irrecoverable nature of the land once sold, and questioned that the reform did not contemplate concrete advantages for local producers. That resistance was joined by that of allied governors and pro-dialogue sectors, who on other occasions had accompanied projects of the Executive but this time conditioned their support.
Official defense, before the retreat
Before the chapter fell definitively, the head of the bloc of senators of La Libertad Avanza, Patricia Bullrich, had tried to unblock the resistance by presenting a modified ruling that incorporated explicit limits for foreign states, in an attempt to differentiate the purchase of land by foreign private parties from that of foreign governments.
"Foreign states cannot buy a meter of rural land in Argentina, period"
— Patricia Bullrich, head of the LLA bloc in the Senate (La Nación)
⚠️ Why the ruling party had to give in
The seat count ended up being the deciding factor. Several senators from allied blocs, including legislators linked to provincial governors, spoke out against increasing the percentage of foreignization, making it clear that La Libertad Avanza did not have the necessary support to sustain the reform in the chamber.
To this legislative pressure was added social mobilization. Environmental, trade union and popular economy organizations called for a march in front of the Congress, in the Plaza de los Dos Congresos, to which artists and public leaders adhered. The proximity of that protest ended up inclining several senators to reject the chapter, according to different coverage of the parliamentary debate.
● Rejection of allied governors who conditioned their support on the withdrawal of the chapter.
● Social mobilization called in front of Congress for the key session.
● Absence of arguments that would convince the dialoguist blocs about the need for reform.
● Recent precedent: the government backtracked on a decree that had generated another political conflict days earlier.
"This is basically a very hard setback for the government"
— Javier Preciado Patiño, agribusiness consultant (Canal E / Perfil)
📋 What fell and what is still standing
Although it lost two of its most resisted chapters, the project retained the core of the reform that the Executive considered a priority: changes in evictions, expropriations and property regularization. The following table summarizes the final state of each chapter after the session of August 6 and 7.
|
Project chapter |
Original content |
Final state |
|
Chapter III — Rural Land Law (26.737) |
It raised the limit of foreign ownership of rural land from 15% to 25% |
Withdrawn before the session |
|
Chapter IV — Fire Management Law |
It eased restrictions on fire-affected surfaces |
Withdrawn on the closing of the debate |
|
Express evictions |
Summary procedure and electronic notification to return real estate |
Approved with half sanction |
|
Expropriation regime |
Toughens conditions and deadlines for expropriating real estate |
Approved with half sanction |
|
Real Estate Registry |
Modernization and new requirements for property regularization |
Approved with half sanction |
🗓️ Timeline of the setback
The process that led to the cut half sanction lasted for almost five months, with successive postponements and a three-week intermission before the final vote.
|
Date |
Fact |
|
26 Mar. 2026 |
The Executive Branch sends to the Senate the bill on the Inviolability of Private Property, with the chapter on Rural Lands included. |
|
16 Jul. 2026 |
The Senate opens the session and goes to the intermission room due to the lack of agreements. |
|
Aug 5. 2026 |
La Libertad Avanza formally withdraws the chapter on Rural Lands due to the lack of votes and pressure from allied governors. |
|
Aug. 6-7. 2026 |
After almost twelve hours of debate and with mobilizations in front of Congress, the ruling party also withdraws the chapter on Fire Management. The Senate gives half sanction to the rest of the bill by 37 votes to 33. |
|
Next step |
The cut bill goes to the Chamber of Deputies to continue its legislative process. |
🏛️ The session: incidents and voting
The day of August 6 was marked by strong disturbances in the vicinity of Congress, where federal security forces used hydrant trucks during the march called in rejection of the project. Inside the chamber, an opposition motion to return the initiative to committee was rejected by 38 votes to 31, which anticipated that the ruling party would achieve the half sanction in general.
After almost twelve hours of debate, the Senate approved the bill by 37 affirmative votes against 33 negative, with no abstentions. The vote in particular, chapter by chapter, incorporated additional modifications in several articles before the initiative was in a position to be sent to the Chamber of Deputies.
➡️ What's next: the stage in the Chamber of Deputies
With half the approval of the Senate, the bill for the Inviolability of Private Property – now without the chapters on Rural Lands and Fire Management – now goes to the Chamber of Deputies, where it will have to go through a new debate in commissions and in the chamber to become law. The current chapters that reach the Lower House include the tightening of the conditions for expropriations, the acceleration of eviction processes and the modernization of the Real Property Registry.
The result left, according to different political analyses, a relevant precedent for future legislative negotiations: the capacity for social mobilization and the resistance of the provincial blocs managed to twist one of the most ambitious reforms of the deregulation package promoted by the economic team.
💬 Frequently Asked Questions
❓ What is the Rural Land Law that the Government sought to modify?
It is Law 26,737, passed in 2011, which establishes a regime of protection over the ownership, possession and tenure of rural lands, setting limits on the ownership of foreigners over Argentine productive land.
❓ Why did the Government withdraw the reform of the Land Law?
Due to lack of their own votes in the Senate: allied governors and dialogue blocs rejected extending the limit of land in foreign hands, in a context of strong social mobilization against the initiative.
❓ What other chapters fell out of the Inviolability of Private Property project?
In addition to the Land Law, the ruling party had to withdraw at the end of the debate the chapter that modified the Fire Management Law, due to the lack of sufficient support in the chamber.
❓ Which parts of the bill did get half a sanction?
The Senate approved by 37 votes to 33 the chapters on express evictions, toughening the expropriation regime and modernization of the Real Property Registry.
❓ What happens now with the project?
It goes to the Chamber of Deputies, where it must be approved in committees and in the chamber to become a final law.
— END OF ARTICLE —
The Exact Impact of the Crisis with Brazil on Industrial Exports
The drastic decision of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to downgrade the relationship with Buenos Aires to the rank of chargé d'affaires sets off alarms in the manufacturing plants. Beyond the political uproar, the real economy operates under a precise gear: Brazil is the absolute buyer of 61.7% of the Manufactures of Industrial Origin (MOI) that Argentina ships to the world. [1, 2]
While corporations and terminals operate through private channels that diplomacy does not destroy overnight, the freezing of the political channel introduces a dangerous "bureaucratic tax." The absence of a top-level interlocutor slows down the resolution of non-tariff barriers and slows down key flows just in a year when bilateral trade had been showing its greatest dynamism in more than a decade. [1]
📈 1. The X-ray of Bilateral Industrial Trade
To measure the exact impact, it is necessary to review the official figures consolidated by INDEC. Of the US$49,454 million that Argentina exported globally in the first half of the year, US$6,255 million (12.6%) were destined for the Brazilian market. [1]
The enormous difference with other partners lies in the quality of this trade: while raw materials are sold to China, industrial added value is exported to Brazil. Manufactures of Industrial Origin (MOI) comfortably lead shipments to the Mercosur partner: [1, 2]
📊 Composition of Argentine Exports to Brazil (First Semester)
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ [██████████████████████████████████░░░░░░░] 61.7% MOI │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
(Manufactures of Industrial Origin: Autos, auto parts, chemicals)
🚗 The Hard Core: The Automotive and Transportation Complex
Heavy and integrated industries absorb most of the foreign exchange flow. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), the items with the highest monthly turnover to Brazil are:
- Delivery and cargo trucks: They represent the main engine of industrial exports with peaks of more than US$316 million per month.
- Utility and passenger vehicles: Shipments stabilized at around US$45.9 million per month.
- Auto parts and chassis: Essential components for the São Paulo and Minas Gerais terminals. [1]
🛑 2. The Risks of the "Bureaucratic Brake" without an Ambassador
The exact trade impact will not be reflected in a direct tariff (prohibited by Mercosur rules), but in the tightening of non-tariff barriers. A chargé d'affaires lacks the direct access to the Head of State or the ministers of the Planalto that a career ambassador has. [1]
In the practice of foreign trade, the lack of fine political harmony translates into three critical fronts:
- 🛃 Border Delays: The tightening of non-automatic import licenses by Brazil's Receita Federal. A delay of 10 days at Uruguayana customs can paralyze the production chain of an automaker in Córdoba or Buenos Aires.
- 📋 Phytosanitary and Technical Hurdles: Brazilian regulatory agencies (such as ANVISA or the Ministry of Agriculture) can apply ultra-strict labeling regulations or safety inspections, leaving trucks loaded with chemicals, plastics, or processed foods stranded at the binational border. [1]
- 📉 Loss of Cross-Financing: Financial engineering for joint projects is weakened. Brazil's National Development Bank (BNDES) is unlikely to prioritize lines of credit for commercial connectivity infrastructure works with a country whose government maintains open hostility.
⚖️ 3. The Private Sector Counterweight
Despite the institutional degradation, international trade analysts point out that the interdependence of private companies acts as a containment cushion.
- 🔄 Integrated Supply Chains: An automotive plant in São Paulo needs gearboxes made in Argentina as much as the Argentine plant requires Brazilian engines. Disrupting the flow for ideological reasons would damage employment and corporate balance sheets on both sides of the border.
- 📦 Complex Market Substitution: For Argentine industrial SMEs (footwear, metalworking, packaging), Brazil is the only viable export market due to logistics costs and zero-tariff benefits. Losing ground there would force immediate domestic production cuts.
SOCIETY · WEATHER IN ARGENTINA
Strong storms hit the country: yellow and orange alert in more than ten provinces
The National Meteorological Service extended warnings for severe storms, hail, gusts and snowfall to much of the territory, while the storm is already causing flooded streets and delays in the AMBA.
🖊️ Editorial team · 📅 August 1, 2026 · 🕒 4 min read
|
⛈️ 🌧️ 🧊 💨 ❄️ Storms, hail and gusts affect the center and north of the country, with snow in Patagonia |
A bad weather front is keeping much of Argentina on tenterhooks this Saturday. The National Meteorological Service (SMN) maintains orange and yellow level warnings that reach more than a dozen provinces, with locally severe storms, hail, intense gusts and snowfall in the south of the country.
🌩️ A Saturday under alert in much of the country
The most critical conditions are concentrated in the northeast of the province of Buenos Aires, the south and southeast of Santa Fe, Entre Ríos and Corrientes. There, the SMN predicts locally severe storms, with abundant falling water in short periods, intense electrical activity and gusts capable of causing material damage and complicating circulation.
In the areas under orange warning, accumulated temperatures of between 60 and 90 millimeters are expected throughout the alert period, a volume that in some points could be exceeded. In the sectors with yellow alert, on the other hand, the forecast is around 30 to 50 millimeters, also with the possibility of hail and frequent electrical discharges.
In the AMBA, the rains have already generated flooded streets and delays in transportation during the early hours of Saturday. The agency estimates that the instability will last for a good part of the weekend, so new episodes of intense rain are not ruled out.
📍 Which provinces are under alert
|
LEVEL |
PROVINCES / ZONES |
PHENOMENA |
|
🟧 ORANGE |
CABA and AMBA, central-east of Buenos Aires, south of Entre Ríos, southeast of Santa Fe, Corrientes and northeast/west of Córdoba |
Locally severe storms, hail, gusts +100 km/h, 60–90 mm |
|
🟨 YELLOW (storms) |
Rest of Buenos Aires, Chaco, Santiago del Estero, La Pampa and north of Corrientes |
Storms of varying intensity, 30–50 mm, occasional hail |
|
🟨 YELLOW (wind) |
Jujuy, Salta, Tucumán, Catamarca, La Rioja, San Juan, Mendoza, north of San Luis, Neuquén and Río Negro |
West wind 40–80 km/h, gusts +100 km/h, Zonda in Jujuy |
|
❄️ SNOW / COLD |
Chubut and Santa Cruz (snowfall); west of Santa Cruz on red alert for extreme cold; Tierra del Fuego in yellow |
Accumulated from 10 to 40 cm, white wind, very low thermal sensation |
❄️ Snow and extreme cold in Patagonia
While the center and northeast of the country face storms, Chubut and Santa Cruz register alerts for persistent snowfall, with expected accumulations of between 20 and 40 centimeters in mountain areas and 10 to 30 centimeters in lower sectors, in addition to the risk of white wind. The west of Santa Cruz, for its part, was under red alert for extreme cold, the highest level on the scale, while Tierra del Fuego remains on yellow alert.
|
⚠️ According to the SMN scale, the orange level warns of phenomena with the capacity to harm the population, property and the environment; yellow signals events that can disrupt daily activities. |
⚠️ Official recommendations in the face of the storm
🏠 Stay in closed buildings and avoid displacements that are not essential.
🚗 Do not drive on flooded streets or try to cross flood zones, on foot or by vehicle.
🔌 Cut off the electricity supply if water enters the house and avoid contact with connected appliances.
🪟 Stay away from doors, windows, canopies, trees, and structures that may be blown off by the wind.
🎒 Have an emergency kit on hand: drinking water, non-perishable food, flashlight, battery-powered radio, first aid kit, and a charged cell phone.
🔮 How the storm continues
The SMN anticipates a progressive improvement as the cold front finishes crossing the region: the rains will lose intensity during Saturday morning and the rest of the day will have a low probability of new rainfall, although with mostly cloudy skies. For Sunday, a more stable day is expected, without rain, but with a marked thermal drop: minimums close to 10 degrees and maximums of around 15 degrees in the AMBA.
🔗 Sources consulted
🔗 MDZ Online — Orange alert for storms in the AMBA and 18 provinces
🔗 Cadena 3 — Orange and yellow alert for storms in six provinces
🔗 La Nación — Red, orange and yellow alert for cold, storms and Zonda
🔗 Financial Sphere — Orange alert for severe storms, hail and gusts
🔗 Profile — The SMN keeps the AMBA and several provinces on orange alert
📷 Reference image (credit: MDZ Online — external link, not incorporated by copyright)
Last import : 02/09/2026 &Wed, 02 Sep 2026 05:06:33 -0300amq0000002026; 05:06